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1 The regional? Mediation, scale and 
power
We see Earth from space in a projection that highlights the northern polar region 
and where water rather than sea ice dominates. At times, potential or real ship-
ping lanes are superimposed onto the image. At other times, the image depicts 
the latest claims to mineral rights under the continental shelf that might become 
accessible once the ice recedes even further and new offshore technologies have 
been developed. Other images focus on military capacity, in a region with a three-
decade record of peaceful international cooperation but an even longer history as 
a heavily militarized meeting point between east and west.
At first shocking in their stark new reality, such images have quickly become 
the new ‘normal’. These images appear in the major news media outlets, as part 
of expert reports, and in scientific presentations. The future of the Arctic region 
(see Figure 1.1) is also discussed in a plethora of forums where interested par-
ties from around the world gather to claim their right to co-shape this vast space. 
Meanwhile, the approximately four million people living in the region are start-
ing to make their own voices heard. Such interventions come from indigenous 
peoples who assert their rights to land, resources and knowledge, as well as their 
cultural identities in all their complexities. This is visible in explicit messaging 
through the media, particularly regional outlets, and at political forums, such 
as the Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change, and through popular communication channels, such as 
film and music. The award-winning movie Sami Blood is one such example. 
The many expressions of Saami joik and joik-inspired music also reach a broad 
range of listeners in the mainstream media. Meanwhile, local elected politicians 
are creating new links across national borders, asserting their special role in the 
delivery of essential public services and ensuring that their communities are 
resilient and sustainable in the long term (Declaration of Arctic Mayors, 2017; 
Kristoffersen, 2017).
Over the past decade, the images and narratives that circulate through tra-
ditional news outlets have been accompanied by web-based specialist news 
services providing daily updates about the circumpolar north that reach read-
ers both within and far beyond the Arctic. As fibre optic connections improve, 
social media are becoming more prominent in spreading individual local stories 
across the region and to an audience that might have had no previous connection 
Figure 1.1  Map of the Arctic. There is no single definition of the Arctic region. 
Scientific definitions tend to emphasize climatic conditions or vegetation 
zones, whereas politically guided processes, such as the Arctic Council 
working groups, have used varying delimitation for deciding the southern 
boundary for information to be included in the assessments. Descriptive 
synonyms for the Arctic include the northern polar region, the circumpolar 
north or simply the north. In this book we use these terms interchangeably 
but treat only the Arctic as a proper noun for naming the region. In addition 
to these circumpolar references, some countries have their own names 
for designating their northernmost regions. These include the Norwegian 
designation of the ‘High North’, the Russian ‘Far North’ and the ‘Arctic 
Zone’ as well as the ‘Far North’ as a designation for Canada north of the 
Arctic Circle. Map prepared by Hugo Ahlenius, Nordpil.
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with the Arctic. The reach of such messaging—once aimed at highly specialized 
audiences or meant only for local communication—is not unique to the Arctic 
but rather an illustration of a global development in which the local can instantly 
become global and where no part of the world can escape the influence of global 
environmental and social change. Environmental scientists have in recent decades 
emphasized that we live in a new geological era in which human activities have a 
major influence on planet Earth as a system. Thus, in only a few decades, Earth sys-
tem science has moved from an emphasis on the Earth as a self-regulating system 
with only a limited role played by human agency, captured in the Gaia metaphor 
(Lovelock and Margulis, 1974), to one denoted by the term Anthropocene (Crutzen, 
2002; Crutzen and Stoermer, 2000). This shift in the biophysical dynamics of planet 
Earth is accompanied by equally fundamental social and technological changes, 
commonly known by the paradigmatic rubric of globalization.
Starting in the 1980s, social theory accounts of globalization have emphasized 
the compression of time and space through digital mediation and the dialectics of 
space, where the local can no longer be conceived without bringing in the global, 
and vice versa. Moreover, the discursive scopes of the national and the local had 
become too narrow to accommodate the political, economic and cultural trans-
formations that were becoming visible. Beneath globalization were multilayered 
material and symbolic denationalization processes, from financial markets to eco-
nomic and cultural exchanges of goods to political decision making, as well as an 
expansion in the technological environment through digital networks changing 
the media ecology. The earliest accounts of globalization in particular highlighted 
dynamics associated with deterritorialization as both drivers of change and the 
consequences of intense mediation and connectivity. Such intense spatialization 
through a hyper-connected media and politico-cultural environment and its soci-
etal implications are addressed in both celebratory accounts of globalization and 
critical research (Balibar and Wallerstein, 1991; Garnham, 1990; Mattelart, 1994; 
Mcchesney, 2000; Mosco, 1996; Murdock, 1993; Schiller, 1991). Hafez (2007), 
for one, notes the mythic role of the globalization paradigm and the way it ‘dis-
cursively obfuscates . . . the local, national, and regional’ (Christensen, 2013b: 
2401). As David Morley (2014: 42) puts it: ‘In some versions of the story of glo-
balization, we are offered what I would characterize as an abstracted sociology of 
the postmodern, inhabited by an un-interrogated “we”, who “nowadays” live in an 
undifferentiated global world’.
Spatial imaginations based on abstracted notions of globalization thus sub-
sumed the particularities of locales and regions. They also failed to account for 
the dialectics of ‘global spatiality’, which oscillate between phases of deterrito-
rialization and reterritorialization—the challenging of existing borders and how 
they limit economic, socio-cultural and political activities followed by the estab-
lishment of new borders as a result of such activities. Such dynamics bring about 
consolidated structures of spatiality as well as regulatory regimes that use these 
structures for the purposes of dominance and integration.
Specifically in the Arctic context, because relatively few people live in the 
region, economic globalization is often framed as a strong driver of change 
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(Andrew, 2014). A prominent example is the growing influence of large transna-
tional companies in resource industries, such as the forestry, mining and oil and 
gas sectors (Keskitalo and Southscott, 2014). Globalization has thus become a 
key issue in analyses of the vulnerability of Arctic communities (e.g. Keskitalo, 
2008) and in relation to adaptation (e.g. AMAP, 2017). However, globalization 
has also been discussed as an opportunity to break with old trajectories of national 
colonization, where local actors can jump scales directly to global economic and 
political contexts (Keskitalo and Southscott, 2014).
This book seeks to highlight how the region’s growing connections to global 
economic and political systems combine with the shifts in the global communica-
tion landscape in ways that have engendered a new discursive and material terrain 
for debating the future of the region. The shift goes beyond new Arctic actors and 
the oscillating power relations within the region and among the global players 
that have been highlighted in the recent literature (e.g. Keil and Knecht, 2017; 
Paglia, 2016; Raspotnik, 2018; Dodds and Nuttall, 2016). While Arctic change is 
often narrated as a consequence of the physical impacts of climate change, such 
a narrative is too simplistic. Climate change, as such, is more than just a physical 
force affecting the region. It also comprises complex social and technological 
dimensions that affect both its causes, such as emissions of greenhouse gases, 
and its effects, where impacts and adaptation are nested within local contexts 
with economic, political and cultural dimensions (Nilsson et al., 2017). As is the 
case elsewhere in the world, climate change in the Arctic is closely intertwined 
with globalization in all its aspects. These include both international news and 
digitalized connectivity, as well as their implications for the discursive shaping of 
space. At the heart of the Arctic are intertwining narratives about its future(s) and 
relations between the global, the national, the regional and the local, not least in 
relation to responsibility for climate change (e.g. Dale and Kristoffersen, 2018).
Amid this complexity, simple images are attractive. They get our atten-
tion, especially when they allude to something we recognize. Media images of 
the Arctic are no different, and part of their power comes from how easily we 
can relate them to old colonial narratives about the region (Bravo and Sörlin, 
2002). Examples include headlines about ‘a race for resources’, images related 
to national sovereignty and identity, and the renewed emphasis on the risk of 
military conflict. These and other images are also power tools, as they make it 
more difficult to see other perspectives. They create a frame within which we 
understand the region and act as an effective filter of new information, which 
is absorbed or ignored depending on how well it fits our preconceived notions. 
Media frames become especially important in discussing the future of a region 
that few people have first-hand experience of or deep knowledge about. At the 
same time, the dynamics of change themselves make it timely for many actors to 
position themselves in relation to what the future might bring and how they would 
like to either be a part of it or absolve themselves of responsibility.
Why does all this matter? A short answer would be that images and narra-
tives have generative power in influencing the positionalities of various actors 
and their claims to a legitimate right to make decisions about the region’s future. 
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The longer answer is elaborated throughout the chapters of this book and based 
on the notion that the Arctic of today illustrates dynamic shifts that are global in 
scale. We need to understand the scope of such shifts—beyond the effects of a 
warmer climate and beyond Internet connectivity or economic globalization—if 
we wish to develop political solutions that enhance human well-being rather than 
adding to social tensions and human insecurity. Understanding the context in 
which visions of the future are shaped becomes even more urgent given the call 
in the 2018 report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change for imme-
diate and drastic measures to cut emissions of greenhouse gases (IPCC, 2018). 
Transitioning to a post-petroleum world will add yet another dimension to both 
global and Arctic change.
Changes in the physical geography of the Arctic play into geopolitics, in both 
the classical and the constructivist sense. For some Arctic states and especially 
those with coasts facing the Arctic Ocean—Russia, Canada, the United States, 
Greenland (and by extension Denmark), Norway and Iceland—the extent to 
which the ice recedes has consequences for industrial activities, commercial ship-
ping and tourism, with further implications for governance. Longer periods of an 
ice-free Arctic also make the Arctic attractive to global players, such as China and 
the European Union (EU), and big corporations. The EU’s interests exemplify the 
complex connections between changes in geography, policy choices, and its role 
of representing its members’ and affiliated countries’ interests as well as those of 
the corporate players with which the EU is linked in economic terms.
While recognizing the importance of how states fashion their international 
relations and foreign policy based on their geographic positioning (i.e. classical 
geopolitics), this book adopts a critical understanding—or critical geopolitics—that 
challenges the assumption that ‘the state’ and other geographical constructions are 
fixed entities (Dodds et al., 2013; Burkart and Christensen, 2013). We thus also turn 
our attention to how media and mediation influence the rapidly changing, and at 
times fluid, role of other actors such as NGOs, commercial interests and local com-
munities. Moreover, we suggest that a ‘geoeconomic’ emphasis in geopolitics is 
essential in an era where economic activity can be both the reason for, and a means 
of, contestation and conflict in the Arctic. Increased maritime traffic can be framed 
in relation to potential risk for accidents or oil spills, and the need for cooperation 
and governance that follows, but Arctic voyages can also be understood as manifes-
tations of capacity and power to operate in challenging polar environments.
Frames and narratives
The generative power of images and narratives lies in how they place specific 
information within overarching discourses and frames that can serve different 
interests. A focus on the context in which an event or a piece of information is 
placed rather than the details of the text reveals the frames that situate a specific 
story within a societal discourse (Nisbet, 2009; Nisbet et al., 2003). As the litera-
ture on frame theory elaborates (for reviews, see Christensen and Wormbs, 2017; 
Pincus and Ali, 2016), frames can be described as a cognitive mechanism that 
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people use to grasp the most relevant information in the vast amounts of sensory 
input they are exposed to. They help us make sense of new information because 
they link it to our earlier understandings but also exclude or reinterpret informa-
tion that does not comfortably fit our priorities, and thereby also set the boundaries 
for what becomes visible and audible. In political discourse, frames make certain 
debates legitimate and natural, while other ways of describing something can 
appear odd or out of place. The process of framing and reframing is a key aspect 
of policy-shaping processes as the reframing of an issue can make it more urgent 
or relevant for a larger group of people. For the Arctic, media and connectivity 
that facilitates mediation play central roles in public understanding of the region 
and thus in shaping narratives that can have geopolitical implications.
Mediation takes place in a range of contexts, such as the articulation of national 
Arctic policies, texts and images in popular culture, museum exhibits and new 
media, and the role of such expressions in public life and politics has come into 
increasing focus in studies of the critical geopolitics of the Arctic (e.g. Dittmer 
et al., 2011; Dittmer and Dodds, 2013; Steinberg et al., 2015; Wegge and Keil, 
2018). Secondary information about the region is likely to play a prominent role 
in how the Arctic is framed, as relatively few people have any first-hand knowl-
edge of the region. News media play a particular role as they have the potential 
to reach large audiences, either directly or indirectly, through narrowcasting and 
spillover to social media.
Before the late 1990s, the Arctic did not figure prominently in the mainstream 
media. Over the past two decades, however, various media have been paying 
more attention to the region, not least due to the impacts of climate change. 
While most studies of media discourses focus on recent years and specific issues, 
a study on how the Canadian press has covered the Arctic in the past 30 years 
shows an exceptional growth in media attention from 252 stories over the whole 
of the 1970s to over 1,000 stories in 2013 alone (Nicol, 2013). Other studies 
indicate that a substantial spike in media interest arose with the publication of 
the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment in 2004 (Chater and Landriault, 2016; 
Steinberg et al., 2014; Tjernshaugen and Bang, 2005), but even more promi-
nent was the attention that accompanied the unexpected record Arctic Ocean 
sea-ice loss in 2007 (Christensen et al., 2013). Arctic climate change became 
a meta-event in the various media’s coverage of global climate change and a 
context in which journalists began to tap into a range of issues, such as access 
to resources, new shipping opportunities, the risk of geopolitical conflict and the 
plight of polar bears (Christensen, 2013a). These stories were not exclusively 
about the Arctic as such but featured a topical multiplicity (ibid.) whereby the 
Arctic became a Christmas tree on which to hang media savvy ‘hot’ topics such 
as military conflict and resource geopolitics, at least in the western media. Many 
stories involved both local and global concerns, creating a sense of scalar tran-
scendence (ibid.) of the local-regional Arctic being, in fact, global. Nonetheless, 
these changes in the coverage do not appear to have created new media space for 
the concerns of people living in the region, such as regional economic develop-
ment, social welfare and food security, unless they fit into another overarching 
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frame, such as global environmental change. Chapter 2 discusses coverage of the 
Arctic in the news media in more detail.
Narratives are particularly powerful when they can tap into earlier stories, 
and Arctic history is ripe with stories that project external ambitions onto the 
region (Bravo and Sörlin, 2002). As actor-network theory shows (Callon, 1986; 
Latour, 1987), a convincing storyline does not just enlarge the network of actors 
that share the same vision and conception of reality. If powerful enough, it can 
also translate into technologies and socio-technical systems with their own path 
dependencies. Furthermore, if the narratives and their associated networks of 
actors become enshrined in the norms and procedures of governance mecha-
nisms, their power is further cemented (Avango et al., 2013). Narratives are 
thus part of social-ecological-technological systems that can feature system 
dynamics that go far beyond the narrative as such. It is therefore important to 
scrutinize the interplay between the discursive shaping and reshaping of the 
region and the impacts of the material constructions that are made possible by 
certain narratives. Critically important for our interest, these include commu-
nications infrastructure, such as satellites and fibre optic technologies, as well 
as the range of software algorithms and services that create platforms for shar-
ing information, values and interests. Such materialities have profound impacts 
on the mobility of narratives, how they interact with other storylines and their 
potential influence on decisions that shape the future.
Narratives do not appear out of nowhere, however. At one level they have their 
basis in specific interests, but interests start to become narratives more concretely 
when they are expressed, and as speech or other actions they can travel further. 
Putting ideas into words or images is an action that is often aimed at creating 
change. When words and images feed into narratives that are further mediated, 
they can have the power to shape overarching narratives and change them in ways 
that can ultimately have geopolitical consequences, as is illustrated for the Arctic 
in Chapters 3 and 4.
Shifting media ecosystems
The media, in all its discursive shades and materialities, is a big player in the 
Anthropocene. At the same time, the news media is facing many challenges in a cul-
tural and financial landscape of economic downturns and consolidations, leading to 
the downsizing of the environmental desks of ‘media giants’ such as globally prom-
inent newspapers. Furthermore, these media outlets are affected by social media 
filter bubbles, which influence news reporting and editorial choices. Questions 
therefore arise regarding ‘metacommunication’, or the ‘communication of commu-
nication’, and how the current landscape might influence the dominant discourses 
that circulate and, in the longer run, broader political decision making on the Arctic.
A combination of theoretical perspectives is needed to address the issue of 
the interconnected factors that shape news and media reporting on anthropogenic 
environmental change in general, and Arctic change in particular. Two areas 
provide a starting point for a more complex understanding of the relationship 
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between the so-called legacy media (traditional outlets), online platforms such as 
social media and offline forms of communication such as art, music and orality: 
disintermediation and media ecology.
First, disintermediation is related to the extent to which mainstream, ‘tradi-
tional’ or ‘legacy’ media maintain or lose power and relevance in an era of citizen, 
activist and social media. As Aday et al. (2013) note, a core of researchers insists 
that the power of these elite gatekeepers has diminished, and that the increase 
in horizontal creation and sharing of information will disintermediate legacy 
media by eroding their near-monopoly position as a bridge between citizens, and 
between citizens and the state. An alternate view is that this disintermediation is 
not taking place, and that major media corporations have maintained their ability 
to frame events and set the public agenda. It is clear that the rise of social media 
platforms over the past 15 years has given environmental activists and indigenous 
peoples and others new avenues for reaching out to large numbers of individu-
als without the need to rely upon mainstream media coverage for exposure. Yet, 
the fundamental question is whether or not this by-passing of traditional outlets 
is an exception rather than the norm. To put it another way: to what extent does 
self-produced activist or on-site content, released via social media platforms, still 
rely upon pick-up by mainstream news outlets for the level of major exposure 
needed to make a real impact? And, in addition, to what extent does mainstream 
media exposure impart a degree of (editorial) gravitas and credibility to material 
produced by, for example, activists?
In order to avoid the ‘zero-sum-game’ of seeing media influence as an all-or-
nothing contest between a limited number of media actors—primarily mainstream 
media news outlets and social media platforms—media ecology can be a useful 
theoretical framework (see Cottle, 2011; Robertson, 2013; Tufekci and Wilson, 
2012). The conception of media ecology is rooted in the work of Scolari (2012, 
2013), and his notion of an ‘intermedia’ variant of ecology (as opposed to an 
‘environmental’ conception), within which different media forms co-exist, as 
plants and animals co-exist within a classical ecosystem. For Scolari, the key 
is not to examine each media form in isolation, but to consider the relation-
ships between media (2013: 1419) and how various media forms (electronic and 
non-electronic) influence each other. In relation to the coverage of the Arctic, a 
media ecology perspective would take into account the domination of storytelling 
power. Lessons from other parts of the world, for example, show that mainstream 
media rarely make use of indigenous perspectives, and that, ‘indigenous actors 
have limited access to the types of communication required to reach a larger audi-
ence’ (Graf, 2016: 10). Roosvall and Tegelberg (2016) found that when asked 
about their understanding of the media ecosystem (national, mainstream, local, 
alternative and non-indigenous) within which they operate, indigenous activ-
ists found mainstream outlets to be exclusive, but so powerful that they could 
not be ignored. The authors note that the ‘media logic in the mainstream realm 
of the news ecology is strongly connected to power’ and that, for activists, ‘it 
is necessary to connect to this power if a message is to be widely heard and 
respected’ (Roosvall and Tegelberg, 2016: 98). Crucially, respondents also noted 
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the underlying political economy of media systems, highlighting ‘the need for a 
re-balancing of current media ecologies—which unlike natural ecologies are con-
structed ecologies closely connected to distribution of means’ (p. 98). The more 
pessimistic view of political economy is that attempts by indigenous populations 
to get their issues raised in mainstream outlets are ultimately futile because the 
demands of private capital will always side with ‘industry and governments rather 
than the people’ (Roosvall and Tegelberg, 2016: 95).
Scale, politics and power
For a region that has not traditionally had a strong ‘own voice’ in the media and 
where political priorities have most often been determined by actors outside the 
region, the questions of narrative power, framing and mediated discourse are 
particularly significant. As is discussed in Chapter 2, media discourses about 
the region vary between different countries and also over time. For example, a 
study of Canadian press coverage (Nicol, 2013) showed that discourses related 
to the economy and development once dominated coverage of the Arctic region, 
but that in recent decades these have been supplemented by increasing attention 
to science and the environment. Of specific interest to the overarching ques-
tion addressed in this book—the potential for and limitations of international 
regional governance—is how discourses relate to scalar preferences and how 
such preferences might play out in the politics of Arctic change. Issues related 
to scalar preferences and politics have been treated extensively in the literature, 
from political science and geography to media studies (Brenner, 2001; Brown 
and Purcell, 2005; Couldry and McCarthy, 2004; Dittmer and Dodds, 2008, 
2013; McCarthy, 2005; Smith, 1992; Swyngedouw, 2000, to list just a few). A 
key aspect is that they can affect preferred levels of governance (Lebel et al., 
2005; e.g. Swyngedouw, 1997), in that a specific scalar framing can make it 
very difficult to think about an issue as anything other than local, national or 
global, depending on how the discourse has developed. Framing the Arctic as 
a global interest invites different actors into the discussion than a framing that 
emphasizes the local or the national would. Framings, therefore, conserve cer-
tain power relations, in a similar way to how established governance structures 
favour those who already have a seat and disfavour those whose interests do not 
fit nicely into the established frame. The power of framing is thus ultimately 
about power over decision making.
Scalar framings also serve to assign responsibility. For example, in discussing 
climate change, responsibility for reducing emissions of greenhouse gases is most 
often highlighted as a global issue, while adaptation is mainly seen as a local or 
national concern. Any deviation from this ‘natural’ division requires extensive 
political negotiations backed up by arguments that are strong enough to justify a 
deviation from the norm.
The transformation of the Arctic into a recognized international region in the 
1990s is another example of how relevant scale is negotiated and highlights the 
tensions between the national as the most natural framing and the regional as 
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the more relevant (for descriptions of this negotiation process, see Young, 1998; 
Tennberg, 1998; Keskitalo, 2004; for a discussion of the reframing process from 
a national to a regional focus in political logic, see Heininen and Nicol, 2007). 
These negotiations were based on the notion of the national as the highest level 
of political decision making. This is a scalar preference that has been naturalized 
to the extent that it can be difficult to think about international society in any 
other way and is the underlying assumption of realist international relations the-
ories (Dunne and Schmidt, 2001). However, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, 
access to the region’s offshore resources required peaceful cooperation, as did 
any attempt to address the transboundary environmental problems that were 
becoming apparent. This situation, along with the emergence of indigenous peo-
ples as new transnational political actors, opened up space for a renegotiation 
of scalar preferences regarding the Arctic, as is discussed further in Chapter 3. 
Heininen and Nicol (2007) describe the emergence of a circumpolar regional 
perspective as a process of ‘reterritorialization’ within the circumpolar north 
and highlight how ‘new voices and new discourses created a new discourse that 
operated at a circumpolar scale’ (p. 135). It is easy to forget that writing ‘Arctic’ 
with a capital A is a relatively new phenomenon, and that ‘arctic’ for a long 
time referred mainly to northern ecosystems and landscapes without any politi-
cal significance attributed to the term in an international context. Whether it is 
relevant to treat the Arctic as a region is still contested. For example, Keskitalo 
et al. (2013) argue that such a framing has imposed images and understandings 
based on the situation in North America on northern Fennoscandia without tak-
ing into consideration that national policy, populations and economic structures 
are very different, leading to a risk of ‘fictionalizing the region’. According 
to the authors’ line of reasoning (ibid.), the unique history and institutional 
structures of the Fennoscandia north should be understood in their own right 
by de-emphasizing the regional framing. However, such a de-emphasis of the 
regional would also place less focus on circumpolar social and environmental 
processes and commonalities that can have political implications—one example 
being whether it should be considered relevant to highlight similarities related 
to histories of colonization.
Each scalar perspective has its own advantages, depending on the question 
in focus. It is no coincidence that certain scientific disciplines have developed a 
strong preference for the global scale—climate science being a case in point—
while others focus on local processes. The latter include ecological studies, 
where local fieldwork to understand ecosystem dynamics has a strong tradition. 
The problem in relation to power over decision making arises when one scalar 
preference comes to exclude other possible perspectives, or when one specific 
perspective is deemed scientifically correct and others not. The latter lurks in 
the background in the use of the term ‘fit’, which has been used in the study of 
how institutions affect the relationship between societies and the environment. 
Embedded in the notion of fit is the understanding that there is an ideal scope and 
scale of governance (Folke et al., 1998, 2007; Galaz et al., 2008; Young, 2002). 
Most often, a sort of ecosystem process has been considered the relevant starting 
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point for defining fit, but other spatial logics also appear in the literature, such as 
social fit and social-ecological system fit (Epstein et al., 2015).
Following arguments articulated by Clement (2012) and insights from critical 
studies of scale, we see a need to go beyond identifying the ‘right’ institutional 
fit to instead focus on how power and discourses frame what is considered an 
appropriate scalar delimitation. By recognizing and focusing analytical efforts on 
how any framing of fit is negotiated, in policy messages as well as in the media, 
it becomes possible to reveal interests, perspectives and shifts in power relations 
that might not be equally obvious within an established discourse.
Notions of appropriate scale of governance have shifted substantially over 
time. For example, while many local societies have developed systems for man-
aging common pool resources (Ostrom, 1990), states have increasingly taken on 
the role of politically legitimate administrative power, even if some decisions 
are then delegated to subnational governments. During the 20th century, particu-
larly in the aftermath of World War II, this national scale was challenged when 
human security as a collective interest became an issue of global politics. One 
example is when food insecurity became framed as a question on which interna-
tional collaboration was necessary (Mayne, 1947). The global regulation of trade, 
which later developed into the World Trade Organization, also stems from the 
post-World War II era. A few decades later, when pollution and the risk of deple-
tion of resources became hotly debated political topics (Worster, 1994), it also 
became clear that national borders were more porous than political theorists had 
previously imagined. Following publication of the Club of Rome report, Limits 
to Growth, in 1972, a global systems perspective entered the mainstream political 
debate (Meadows et al., 1972). In the same year, the United Nations held its first 
global summit on the human environment in Stockholm, on the theme ‘Only One 
Earth’ (Ward and Dubos, 1972).
The focus in political discussion about the relationship between people and 
the natural environment has thus moved from the local to the global, even if there 
are also examples of a counter-movement back to stronger local influence, espe-
cially in cases where top-down management has failed. The pre-eminence of the 
global framing has its roots in the images of planet Earth from space, along with 
mathematical models of Earth as a single system that were enabled by computer 
technologies (Miller and Edwards, 2001) and concerns over the limits to the 
global resource supply (Meadows et al., 1972). The global scale perspective also 
made inroads into the social sciences in the 1970s, not least with world systems 
theory and its critique of the nation state as the only unit of analysis, and focus on 
core–periphery economic and power relations (Wallerstein, 1974). In the 1990s, 
mainstream political scientists started to highlight the complex interdependence 
of international systems (Keohane and Nye, 1994). In the growing plethora of 
international environmental agreements, political scientists turned their attention 
to the dynamics of global governance as a system that went beyond earlier notions 
of international society as anarchic (Young, 1997).
Despite its relatively recent history and the critique of reductionist under-
standings of globalization, the persistence of the unreflective uses of the global 
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is a good example of the power of framing that has implications for one of the 
major challenges facing the Arctic region—climate change. In the case of cli-
mate change mitigation, a global framing has been used as a rhetorical tool to 
avoid taking responsibility locally, nationally and regionally, as is discussed in 
Chapter 5. The point here is not to question the legitimacy of the global fram-
ing as a useful analytical starting point for understanding biophysical and social 
processes that defy national borders, or to question efforts to create governance 
mechanisms that go beyond the national. However, it becomes problematic when 
one scalar perspective becomes so dominant that it can be used to preclude politi-
cal action in all other scalar contexts. Why, for example, have the Arctic nations, 
which all highlight the challenges related to the severe impacts of climate change 
in their national policies, not made the Arctic region a leader in reducing reliance 
on the use and production of fossil fuels? The answer, of course, lies in what is 
politically palatable, albeit not according to any ‘natural law’, that regions are 
not fit to take a lead in such a transformation. Indeed, as is discussed further 
in Chapter 5, this relates to the strong geopolitical interests connected with the 
production of oil and gas in the Arctic, which it might be convenient to conceal 
beneath another narrative—that climate change is a common global responsibility. 
A highly dominant scalar perspective can also hide important information about 
the world that would be more visible from other scalar perspectives—information 
that might be critical to achieving specific goals, such as securing and enhancing 
human well-being. For example, research on adaptation to climate change inspired 
by an anthropological focus on the local has shown that shifts in climate are not 
the only drivers of change locally, and that local and regional histories and dynam-
ics play an important role in the capacity of societies to deal with global drivers of 
change, including shifts in climate conditions (Nilsson et al., 2017).
On the Arctic, a global framing often dominates the discourse. This is no sur-
prise given that it is the region’s global significance that has made the Arctic 
relevant to media consumers as well as political actors beyond the region. A 
catchphrase used by scientists and politicians alike is that what happens in the 
Arctic does not stay in the Arctic. Efforts have also been devoted to establish-
ing the phrase ‘Global Arctic’ (Heininen and Finger, 2017). While some media 
imagery depicts local events, including polar bears on ice floes and indigenous 
people in the context of their traditional livelihoods, the aim is often to emphasize 
a global issue, especially climate change, and to use the Arctic as a tool for raising 
global political awareness.
Scalar perspectives have political implications. It is no coincidence that the 
European Parliament in 2008 articulated the idea of an Arctic Treaty to govern the 
circumpolar north, modelled on the Antarctic Treaty (European Parliament, 2008). 
This would give the EU, as a supranational actor, a legitimate role that it currently 
lacks in shaping the region’s future by way of putting the emphasis on territorial 
presence and the connected sovereign rights. The view of the southern polar region 
as the common heritage of mankind is another example of global framing, which 
stems from the global research initiatives of the International Geophysical Year 
1957–58, that actors have since attempted to apply to the Arctic. However, the idea 
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of an Arctic Treaty led to immediate pushback, not least from states that already 
have well-established territory in the circumpolar north and indigenous peoples 
who saw a potential Arctic Treaty as threat to their right to self-determination. 
Instead, Arctic states began to emphasize existing mechanisms for international 
cooperation, such as the Arctic Council and the UN Convention on the Law of 
the Sea (UNCLOS). Incidentally, these are governance mechanisms in which 
certain states—and in the case of the Arctic Council also indigenous peoples’ 
organizations—have a privileged position in comparison with other international 
actors. The eight countries that are represented on the Arctic Council also began 
to speak about themselves as the ‘Arctic nations’ in newly issued Arctic policies. 
This stance was countered by various imaginative expressions from other actors 
seeking to challenge any claims to exclusive privileges, including China’s claim 
to be a ‘near-Arctic state’ and language in its Arctic policy that frames the region 
as of common global interest (Xinhua, 2018).
An Arctic regional framing has been in the making since the 1990s and the 
establishment of Arctic regional cooperation (Keskitalo, 2004). However, from 
the perspective of national high-level priorities, this development appears to 
have taken place mostly below the political radar until the actual and poten-
tial future impacts of climate change started to become apparent, particularly 
following the 2007 Arctic Ocean sea-ice minimum. It suddenly became impor-
tant to reassert the national scale, in contrast to framing the Arctic region as a 
global concern. The rationale is obvious: it defines the actors that have a legiti-
mate right to make decisions about the region. The relative roles of the regional 
scale perspective and national framing has been a recurring theme in negotiating 
circumpolar cooperation, where the Arctic Council is still a high-level forum 
and not governed by legally binding obligations. The United States, for one, 
has been adamant that it should not take on any decision-making rights from 
the national level (Bloom, 1999; National Security Presidential Directive 66 on 
Arctic Region Policy, 2009). This lack of a regional perspective in power over 
decision making is also visible in the fact that the legally binding agreements that 
have been signed under the auspices of the Arctic Council have a focus on coor-
dination among the Arctic states rather than creating another level of governance 
that would supersede the power of states. This can be contrasted with the state of 
affairs in the European Union, where the member states have given up some of 
their rights to the supranational level of decision making in the EU’s administrative 
and political machinery.
The regional of today; the regional of tomorrow?
While the Arctic appears in the title of this book, the argument put forward is 
not just about the Arctic but also a more general question about the role of the 
regional international scale and its relevance to governance. This question is espe-
cially pertinent when the recognized challenges are global in scope while global 
governance initiatives struggle to make a difference, the need to reduce emissions 
of greenhouse gases to halt climate change being a prime example. Moreover, 
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the positive expectations of globalization are increasingly being questioned and 
a return to a focus on nation states rather than international and transnational 
responsibilities is gaining political momentum. Can international regions provide 
a middle ground in which international collaboration can still make a difference? 
Is regional cooperation between fewer actors more manageable than trying to 
negotiate among the 193 member states of the United Nations?
At first sight, it would appear so, but a close study of a region such as the 
Arctic could provide an empirical foundation for highlighting the strengths and 
shortcomings in relation to the ambitions and priorities of various actors. From 
a geopolitical point of view, the Arctic is an especially interesting case for two 
reasons. First, cooperation has continued despite the major rifts between Russia 
and the rest following the annexation of Crimea. Second, and linked to climate 
change and energy geopolitics, its vast reserves of oil and gas mean that inter-
national agreements among the Arctic states could play a central role in one of 
today’s major political challenges—the need to transition to a society that does 
not depend of fossil fuels for its energy needs. The challenges are huge, not least 
that of acquiring the political will. Russia is the largest Arctic country by both 
population and geographical extent and much of Russia’s Arctic population is 
dependent on industry and the extractive sector for its employment and liveli-
hood. In addition, industrial activity in the Russian Arctic amounts to over 11 
per cent of the country’s gross domestic product. It is a similar story, albeit not 
to the same extent, for the population of Alaska in the USA, many of whom 
regard climate change and energy-related science with scepticism. This points to 
the delicate equilibrium between high politics and questions of livelihood in the 
region, as well as the role of mediation in communicating alternative perspectives 
and solutions. We return to these questions in Chapter 5.
The theoretical appeal lies in the fact that the study offers a window on how 
international society functions today—a world of nested and interacting social, 
ecological, economic and technological systems, where the pervasiveness of 
the media and mediations play a central role in shaping perceptions of current 
challenges and available opportunities. While there are many issues of common 
concern, one stands out in particular: the need to find a path to a sustainable 
post-petroleum society. Past emissions and the momentum of the climate system 
mean that climate change cannot be eliminated, but there is still time to affect its 
pace and eventual magnitude as well as its impacts on society. Access to energy 
has played a central role in human history, and shifts in energy regimes have had 
profound consequences for all aspects of society (McNeill, 2001). A deliberate 
shift away from the current fossil fuel-based energy regime is not welcomed by 
everyone. As noted above, in the Arctic the stakes are high, with strong economic 
and political interests to the fore. It is thus a useful case in which to highlight the 
potential for a regional international regime to overcome some of the inevitable 
inertia caused by existing power geometries. One way to overcome inertia in an 
existing regime is a major shift in the distribution of power among the actors 
involved. A more likely scenario would be a reframing of interests in ways that 
make change palatable within existing power structures.
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Organization of the book
Following this introductory chapter, Chapter 2 is an in-depth examination of the 
content-related and infrastructural aspects of media and mediation. Chapter 3 dis-
cusses how the Arctic came to be narrated as a region in the 1980s. This is followed 
by a discussion of more contemporary developments in Chapter 4. Chapter 5 has a 
specific focus on media and policy narratives in relation to the potential for a post-
petroleum future. Chapter 6 concludes the book with a discussion on the implications 
of the discursive and material dynamics treated in the earlier chapters and returns to 
the generic question of the role of regional international governance in a world 
where the legitimacy of democratic decision making requires attention to social, 
ecosystem and technological dynamics at all scales, from the local to the global.
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2 Media narratives–media 
cartographies
Throughout the 20th and into the 21st century, the Arctic has been inscribed 
with a diverse range of political and popular imaginings (Steinberg et al., 2015), 
which have added new layers to the colonization narratives of the 18th and 19th 
centuries (Bravo and Sörlin, 2002). Their mediation reflects shifts in the social 
landscape over time. Early depictions of polar explorers, missionaries and treas-
ure hunters in literature and paintings have given way to present-day social media 
messaging and activist performances featuring images of melting ice and starving 
polar bears. Depictions of Arctic geopolitics in artistic and news representations, 
feature films and literature which formerly focused on the potential deployment 
of nuclear weapons and related hostilities have expanded to include imaginings of 
peace and cooperation, such as Gorbachev’s widely mediated Murmansk initia-
tive in 1987 and photographs of Arctic Council events with the flags of the eight 
Arctic countries and the six indigenous peoples’ organizations.
While many Arctic imaginaries persist over time, shifts in geopolitics as well 
as in modes of mediation and media cartography create new contexts. It is notable 
how the availability of satellite measurements combined with other sophisticated 
methods of ice analysis have provided data and insights about a changing Arctic 
Ocean that sets the past three and a half decades apart from any preceding era. 
Submarine measurements between 1987 and the mid-1990s showed that the ice 
cover became unusually thin in the mid-1990s. Further observational records 
that combined remote sensing, submarine data, modelling and field and marine 
expeditions underlined the variability of the Arctic atmosphere, its ocean and ice 
cover (Rothrock et al., 2003). This information has been mediated with powerful 
imagery that provides a gaze on the region from a circumpolar perspective but in a 
global context (Wormbs, 2013). Already in 1995, the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC) was noting that there was evidence of ‘discernible human 
influence on global climate’ (IPCC, 1995). Later IPCC reports, particularly in 
the 2000s, increasingly underlined the scientific consensus on anthropogenic 
climate change. Meanwhile, the role of the Arctic in this change became increas-
ingly apparent (ACIA, 2005; Nilsson and Döscher, 2013; Wormbs et al., 2017). 
Following the record Arctic sea-ice minimum of 2007, and even more notably in 
connection with the 2012 sea-ice minimum, the circumpolar region gained new 
significance and became a physical and discursive space where global and regional 
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imaginaries both merged and collided. The sea ice had thus moved from being the 
backdrop to heroic exploration voyages of the 19th century (e.g. Nansen, 1897) 
to become a heavily mediated resource for actors claiming a stake in the future of 
the northern polar region.
As a region where few people live or visit for extended periods of time, the 
Arctic in a global context assumes form and meaning through popular com-
munication channels and most notably through the news media. The section 
below, ‘Media narratives’, presents elements of those imaginaries based on a 
short summary of earlier research, new analyses of major mainstream news out-
lets and interviews with representatives of news organizations that cover the 
Arctic region. Today’s media landscape is tightly linked to Internet access, and 
the latter part of the chapter, ‘Media cartographies’, focuses on the policies 
and politics relating to the broadband infrastructure that influence the avail-
ability and use of online news and communications platforms. The concluding 
remarks reflect on the potential consequences of the developments observed for 
the future mediations of the Arctic.
Media narratives
The past decade has featured an increasing body of literature on coverage of the 
Arctic in various media, often using discourse analysis and frame analysis in their 
methodological and theoretical approaches (Berzina, 2015; Bushue, 2015; Chater 
and Landriault, 2016; Christensen, 2013; Davies et al., 2017; Gritsenko, 2016; 
Hiebert, 2014; Nefidova, 2014; Pincus and Ali, 2016; Reistad, 2016; Steinberg 
et al., 2014; Stoddart and Smith, 2016; Tjernshaugen and Bang, 2005; Wilson 
Rowe, 2013; Wilson Rowe and Blakkisrud, 2012). While coverage of the Arctic 
dates back many decades, the more widespread media (and academic) attention 
on the Arctic has coincided with the increased attention on climatic change and its 
consequences for the Arctic. For example, an earlier study based on an analysis 
of coverage of the Arctic in the Swedish and international news media revealed 
an increase in the number of articles between the two four-year periods 2003–
2006 and 2007–2010 (Christensen, 2013). A surge in media interest after 2007 
was visible in a study of Canadian media coverage of the Arctic (Nicol, 2013). 
On coverage specifically related to climate change and the Arctic, Christensen 
found that Arctic climate issues were covered in topically diverse ways during 
this period, and in a way that linked global issues to the Arctic and vice versa. 
Furthermore, scientific certainty was highlighted in contrast to an earlier common 
focus of climate reporting on doubt and uncertainty. In hindsight, it is apparent 
that Arctic climate change had become a ‘meta-event’ (Christensen, 2013) and 
the sea-ice minima of 2007 and 2012 served as significant moments with conse-
quences for the media visibility of the Arctic and for linking climate change issues 
to security frames and geopolitical considerations.
While the number of studies of Arctic media content has grown, studies often 
focus on a limited number of issues or a national context in order to provide more 
in-depth analyses. Examples include studies on press coverage of climate issues 
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(Christensen, 2013; Stoddart and Smith, 2016; Tjernshaugen and Bang, 2005), 
the conflict–cooperation dichotomy (Wilson Rowe, 2013), the race for resources 
(Pincus and Ali, 2016), the Arctic Council (Chater and Landriault, 2016; Steinberg 
et al., 2014) and governance mechanisms (Buurman and Christensen, 2017). A 
few studies have tried to cast a broad net looking at Arctic coverage more gener-
ally, including Nicol (2013) on Canadian media (as mentioned in Chapter 1) and 
Devyatkin et al. (2017) who used automated identification of topics in documents 
from the web, mainly in Russian. In adding to these studies, we provide a helicop-
ter view of Arctic coverage in the English-language press in 2007–2015 as well 
as findings from a frame analysis of two Russian newspapers between 2007 and 
2016. This is complemented with insights gathered from in-depth interviews with 
journalists and editors who work at international and regional news outlets.
English-language newspaper content
To get an overview of how elite, ‘quality’ or ‘broadsheet’ newspapers in the United 
States, Canada and the United Kingdom have covered the Arctic region since the 
2007 record sea-ice minimum, a large-scale content analysis of the New York 
Times (USA), The Guardian (UK), the Financial Times (UK) and the Globe and 
Mail (Canada) was conducted for the period 2007–2015. Every article that men-
tioned the word ‘Arctic’ was retrieved from LexisNexis. Using the word cruncher 
tool in the AtlasTi software, tables were generated of how often different words 
appeared, and these were used to find the most common meaning-bearing words 
that might be relevant to how the Arctic region was being discussed. This section 
presents a selection of the data from the study. In addition, the articles that con-
tained some of the most relevant keywords were reviewed in a qualitative analysis 
to find the specific context in which these words were used. The analysis begins 
with an overview of the word count and specific keyword numbers from the New 
York Times, the Globe and Mail, The Guardian and the Financial Times. This is 
followed by an analysis of word clusters related to a number of specific topics.
Figure 2.1 shows the total number of words published by the New York Times, 
the Globe and Mail, The Guardian and the Financial Times between 2007 and 
2015 in articles that mention ‘Arctic’. Immediately striking about the graph is 
that neither the Globe and Mail and nor the Financial Times saw any significant 
increase in the number of words published in articles containing the word ‘Arctic’ 
in that period. In fact, the Globe and Mail, perhaps counterintuitively given the 
fact that Canada has a vast Arctic territory, saw a gradual reduction in its cover-
age. The New York Times, on the other hand, saw a slight increase in the latter 
half of the eight-year period. The stand-out newspaper was The Guardian, which 
saw a significant leap in the volume of words published, which began in 2011 but 
took off in 2014. The total coverage in the Financial Times was less than in the 
other newspapers.
Some interesting patterns emerge when looking at the frequency of use of spe-
cific keywords (see Figures 2.2 and 2.3). The major topics that the newspapers 
have in common are climate and oil. (Oil is discussed in more depth in Chapter 5.) 
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Use of the word ‘climate’ in the articles mentioning the Arctic shows a slight 
decline over time in the Globe and Mail and a slight increase in the New York 
Times. In The Guardian, the pattern over time is more erratic, with major peaks 
and dips. The following are two examples of the use of the word ‘climate’:
According to the IPCC, if no action is taken on greenhouse gases, the earth’s 
temperature could rise by 4.5C or more. The effects of climate change are 
being felt already, the panel says. The Arctic is warming twice as fast as 
the global average and adverse effects on human activities are documented. 
Impacts of warming have also been observed in other regions and sectors, in 
particular on ecosystems. The Guardian
(Aldred, 2007)
In recent years, climate change has raised the stakes and even non-Arctic 
nations have been looking north for new shipping routes, resource develop-
ment and a place to express their national ambitions. In response, Mr Harper 
laid out a more muscular approach for Canada in 2007. Globe and Mail
(Bird, 2015)
Throughout the eight-year period analysed, The Guardian referred to ‘climate’ 
as much as three times more often than the Globe and Mail or the New York 
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Figure 2.1  Change over time in the number of words used in articles that mention 
‘Arctic’ in the New York Times, the Globe and Mail, The Guardian and the 
Financial Times, 2007–2015
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increase in 2014–2015, so too did mentions of ‘climate’, which more than tri-
pled in that one-year period.
In all three newspapers, ‘environment/environmental’ was either relatively sta-
ble or showed an upswing toward the end of the period (The Guardian and the 
New York Times). The frequency of ‘oil’ varied over time in the New York Times 
and the Financial Times and showed an increase in The Guardian, especially 
toward the end of the study period. A closer look at three examples reveals the 
complex interactions between environmental and economic business interests:
Greenpeace, which opposes the opening up of Arctic regions to oil explora-
tion, said last night: ‘Conditions, whether in April or August, mean drilling is 
going to be a huge risk for the environment and for investors’. The environ-
mental group disrupted drilling for two days last August when four activists 
managed to board Cairn’s drilling rig, the Stena Don. The Guardian
(Webb, 2010)
The drilling for oil off the west coast of Greenland and the potential environ-
mental hazards were much discussed last summer, but now large-scale min-
ing projects dotted around the rocky coastline are being considered for iron, 
gold, nickel, platinum and diamonds, to name but a few. With a relatively 
uneducated and tiny workforce, it is inevitable that Greenland will require 
thousands of foreign workers to explore and mine these resources—a pros-
pect that concerns many people here in the north because they think their 
previously ‘closed’ country, with a population of just over 50 000, will be 
rapidly overwhelmed by people from different cultures. The Guardian
(Leonard, 2011)
The US panel also recommended that the government dramatically increase 
the Coast Guard presence in the Alaska offshore, describing federal emer-
gency response capabilities as ‘very limited’. And it warned the industry 
will have to make major investments in spill response equipment that is 
currently lacking in the north. ‘Bringing the potentially large oil resources 
of the Arctic outer continental shelf into production safely will require an 
especially delicate balancing of economic, human, environmental, and tech-
nological factors’, the panel concluded. Globe and Mail
(McCarthy, 2011)
The sharp increases seen in both 2012 and 2015 in the number of times the words 
‘ice’, ‘environment’ and ‘climate’ were used by The Guardian, as well as the 
dramatic increase in the overall level of coverage by The Guardian in 2014–2015, 
are probably linked to two events. The first, in September 2012, was a report 
that Arctic sea ice had receded to a record minimum level of 18 per cent below 
the previous record-breaking minimum set in 2007, and 49 per cent below the 
1979–2000 average. The second event was the 21st Conference of the Parties to 



























Figure 2.2  Number of times specific keywords were mentioned in the Arctic coverage of 
the New York Times and the Globe and Mail, 2007–2015



























Figure 2.3  Number of times specific keywords were mentioned in the Arctic coverage of 
The Guardian and the Financial Times, 2007–2015
was held in Paris in December 2015. This led to the 2016 ‘Paris Accord’ on the 
global reduction of greenhouse gas emissions in order to slow global warming. 
While in The Guardian there was a dramatic increase in the amount of attention 
paid to the Arctic, it is noteworthy that COP21 did not trigger a corresponding 
increase in articles containing the word ‘Arctic’ in the Globe and Mail or the New 
York Times, both of which are newspapers from countries with Arctic territories.
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In addition to the analysis of individual words, an examination of the words 
used was conducted based on a select number of themes: (a) indigenous popula-
tions; (b) protest; (c) technology/media; and (d) profit/business. The results are 
presented in Table 2.1.
Unsurprisingly, the use of terms to indicate indigenous populations was led by 
Canada’s Globe and Mail. The connections between the Arctic and these groups 
often revolved around threats to traditional ways of life, such as when the Globe 
and Mail wrote:
Many indigenous peoples depend on hunting polar bears, walruses, seals and 
caribou as well as herding reindeer and fishing. Access to these species is 
likely to be seriously impeded by climate warming. Health concerns include 
an increased accident rate because of environmental changes, such as sea-ice 
thinning.
(Globe and Mail, 2007)
A limited number of articles discussed collaborations between indigenous peoples 
and scientists:
In Europe, the Institute of Development Studies is establishing an Indigenous 
Knowledge and Climate Change Research Network that aims to ‘look in 
greater depth at the learning, exchange and valuing of indigenous knowledge 
Table 2.1  Word count for selected themes in the New York Times, Globe and Mail, The 
Guardian and the Financial Times, 2007–2015
Total Globe and Mail NYT FT The Guardian
Indigenous populations
Inuit 3,120 2,358 268 108 386
Indigenous 399 204 123 55 128
Native 1,438 560 542 50 286
Protest
Protest 1,540 197 396 173 784
Protester/s 401 49 75 55 272
Activist/s 1,613 233 335 169 876
Profit/Business
Profit 1,660 356 324 477 503
Profitable 244 42 65 70 67
Corporate 952 217 184 201 350
Capitalism 185 35 43 23 84
Corporation 763 179 232 90 262
Technology/Media
Twitter 250 2 16 0 232
Facebook 458 85 107 73 193
Blogs 1,750 0 1744 1 6
Radio 1,008 282 313 49 364
Television 1,316 53 30 1 224
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on climate change’, according to Blane Harvey, one of the project’s three 
directors. North American scientists are collaborating with Inuit leaders to 
gain an understanding of changes in the Arctic and the potential impacts on 
native livelihoods. New York Times
(Walsh, 2011)
In general, however, references to indigenous peoples were few, which is in 
line with other studies of how the Canadian press covers indigenous issues (e.g. 
Stoddart and Smith, 2016). The use of words in relation to the second theme, 
‘Protest’, saw a similar domination by one outlet, this time The Guardian. The 
newspaper was the leading user of all three protest-related words that we searched 
for, with all the others far behind.
The Guardian was also the primary outlet for words in relation to profit/ 
business. A more detailed look at the themes of the coverage, however, showed 
these mentions to be largely rhetorical afterthoughts. Akin to the issue of native or 
indigenous populations and protest, addressing questions of corporations, profits 
and capitalism in relation to the Arctic appears not to have been a priority, despite 
the fact that a significant number of issues that link the Arctic to environmental 
issues and climate change have a direct connection with private sector businesses 
and profit-led industries such as petroleum. While the word ‘oil’ in all newspapers 
combined was mentioned 20,822 times, adding its variants ‘gas’ and ‘petroleum’ 
nearly doubles this rate and reaches around 38,000. Words corporations, capitalism 
and profit, on the other hand, garnered slightly over 3,800 mentions.
Finally, given the discussions in recent years about the role of the Internet and 
social media in influencing the national and international news flows, it was inter-
esting to examine the extent to which various media platforms and systems were 
mentioned in articles where the Arctic was named. What we see in these numbers 
is that other forms of media—but social media in particular—were not factors in 
issues of substance in stories from the Arctic. (The high number of mentions in 
blogs by the New York Times is probably linked to its practice of using a blog for-
mat in its reporting, leading to the word being used in many articles, but not in the 
body of the text.) Twitter and Facebook, which are often discussed as important 
sources of news and information, were largely ignored, as was television.
Russian newspaper content
To map the Russian media discourse, 822 articles in Rossiyskaya Gazeta and 127 
articles in Novaya Gazeta were analysed, focusing on the major frame in each 
article. The articles were retrieved from the database Medialogia using the search 
term ‘Arctic’ (in various variations in the Russian language including noun and 
adjectival forms) for the years 2007–2016. Each article was coded using a set of 
overall frames from Buurman and Christensen (2017) adapted from studies on 
how media frame scientific issues (Nisbet and Scheufele, 2009). Details of the 
study are presented in Klimenko et al. (2019). An overview of the results is pro-
vided in Figure 2.4. Examples of the topics from the media coverage relating to 
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Figure 2.4  Frequency of different framings in Rossiyskaya Gazeta and Novaya Gazeta, 
2007–2016
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Rossiyskaya Gazeta is the daily government newspaper of record, which 
mirrors the official Russian voice, while Novaya Gazeta is an independent 
journalist-owned newspaper published three times a week and famous for its 
investigative journalism. The amount of attention paid to the Arctic differed 
substantially between the newspapers, in terms of both volume and how the 
region was framed. Recurring frames in Rossiyskaya Gazeta were conflict and 
strategy, science and technology, and economic development. While science 
and technology received rather neutral and consistent coverage throughout the 
ten-year period, focused on various polar expeditions, scientific achievements 
and developments, as well as the state of the Russian icebreaker fleet, the other 
two frames changed in focus and tone over time. The conflict and strategy frame 
was visible in 2007 and significantly increased in response to western reac-
tion to the planting of a Russian titanium flag on the seabed at the North Pole 
in 2007. In 2007 and 2008, a number of articles focused on the potential for 
conflict over territory and resources in the Arctic and underlined growing com-
petition between the Arctic states. For instance, Nadezhda Sorokina wrote that 
the ‘division of the Arctic will be the beginning of a new re-division of the 
world’ (Sorokina, 2007), while Darya Yurieva wrote about US and Canadian 
‘harsh statements about Russian claims in the Arctic’ and the participation of 
the ‘mighty among the nations’ in the ‘battle for the Arctic’ (Yurieva, 2007).
The dominance of the conflict and strategy frame subsided in later years, as the 
focus instead shifted to cooperation between the Arctic states, diplomatic rather 
than military resolution of competing territorial claims and governance, includ-
ing UNCLOS and the Arctic Council. The language also changed to a greater 
emphasis on ‘absence of disputes in the Arctic’ (Feschenko, 2011), ‘international 
dialogue’ in the Arctic and opportunities for bilateral cooperation between Russia 
and various states (Smolyakova, 2011). In 2014–2015, however, following the 
annexation of Crimea and subsequent western sanctions, the conflict and strategy 
frame was resurgent. Although the theme of potential conflict in the Arctic did 
not return to the discussion, coverage started to focus on military developments in 
the region, such as various military exercises, the construction of military assets 
in the Arctic and the views of military personnel on developments in the Arctic 
region. By 2016, however, the extreme level of attention on military issues had 
subsided once again.
Attention on economic development mirrored both market changes and geo-
politics. For example, in years of high hope for the development of Russian 
offshore resources, Rossiyskaya Gazeta regularly reported on the potential for 
the development of oil and gas resources on the Arctic shelf, the strategies of the 
state companies, Rosneft and Gazprom, for Arctic resource development and 
cooperation between state companies and international players in the Russian 
Arctic. The discussion post-2014 focused primarily on the impacts of western 
sanctions on Russia.
Compared to the western English-language media, Rossiyskaya Gazeta paid 
only limited attention to issues related to climate change and the environment, 
and the notion that climate change is human-induced was still being questioned 
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by some experts in Russia. Increased economic opportunities linked to offshore 
resource extraction and shipping were emphasized in discussions on observed 
changes in the environment, such as receding sea ice, as illustrated in the fol-
lowing passage from Rossiyskaya Gazeta: ‘This [melting of the ice] is good for 
the Russian economy because it ensures the full return of Russia to the Arctic’ 
(Krivoshapko, 2016). Another focus of the discussion within the frame of the 
environment/environmental change was ‘cleaning up’ the Arctic islands after sig-
nificant levels of pollution during the Soviet era.
The reporting in Novaya Gazeta focused less on conflict and strategy than 
Rossiyskaya Gazeta. In relative terms, it also had more articles with the frame 
social progress and human well-being, especially toward the end of the study 
period. In this frame Novaya Gazeta often raised questions about difficult living 
conditions in the northern communities, which were omitted from Rossiyskaya 
Gazeta’s coverage. Novaya Gazeta also paid more attention to the environment 
and environmental change, with a focus on potential ecological damage linked 
to the development of oil and gas, and mining industries, rather than on the eco-
nomic opportunities presented by climate change. Also notable is the number of 
articles with a governance and politics frame in 2013 when Novaya Gazeta ran 
significant coverage of the Arctic Sunrise case, in contrast to Rossiyskaya Gazeta 
which published only four articles about it.
More in-depth and longitudinal studies would be needed in order to pinpoint 
what factors have been driving the Russian media’s coverage of the Arctic and 
how it compares to the western international media reportage. A large-scale study 
by Devyatkin et al. (2017) provides some additional context. Using automated 
identification of topics from the web they identified the most prevalent topic as 
hydrocarbon production in autonomous areas and offshore in the Arctic Ocean, 
followed by: transport issues (including Northern Sea Route); public steps to sup-
port northern regions and indigenous peoples; scientific expeditions to assess 
climate change; government support programs and infrastructure development; 
tourism in the European north; marine scientific expeditions; protection of species; 
deployment of the Arctic forces group; and politics of offshore area ownership. 
Furthermore, Devyatkin et al. note that ‘international media pay more attention 
to conflict issues rather than the development of infrastructure, tourism or envi-
ronment protection’ (p. 335). This is in line with an observation by Sergunin and 
Konyshev (2016) that the drivers of the current discourse in Russia are competi-
tion for resources and the control of the Northern Sea Route. Yet, contrasting Cold 
War geopolitics with today’s economic and strategic interests could be falsely 
dichotomous considering the complexities inherent in today’s geopolitical dynam-
ics. Within Russia, rifts remain between those who champion internationalist and 
cooperative discourses and those who favour expansionist and imperialist ones 
(ibid.). At international forums, Russian representatives emphasize cooperation 
and the supremacy of international law. Tensions between cooperative-pragmatist 
views and more ‘imperialist’ assertions are also observable in the positionalities of 
other international actors with a stake in the Arctic, all depending on the political 
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are affected by shifting geographic factors and their mediation. We return to these 
questions in Chapters 4 and 6.
Perspectives from the field
To put the analysis of western media content in context, open-ended interviews 
were conducted with journalists at two major international newspapers: The 
Guardian and the Financial Times. Our empirical material also includes perspec-
tives presented at the Arctic Circle Assembly panels organized by ourselves and 
others in 2016 and 2018. The insights that journalists in the field shared illustrate 
some of the material and political/professional dynamics that affect decision 
making and the media logic that is in play behind the stories that reach readers.
The circumpolar region has made the headlines in the international news media 
primarily due to its melting sea ice, decorated with dramatic pictures of age-old 
glaciers perishing chunk by chunk and starving polar bears. Fiona Harvey, who 
has been the environment correspondent at The Guardian since 2011, noted that 
climate change has made the Arctic an international news story:
Arctic science is absolutely fundamental to climate change in every way and 
from a journalist’s perspective, the Arctic is something people really connect 
to even if they have never been there, partly because the ice caps became 
beacons, and also because of the images of polar bears and all that.
(Harvey, 2018)
From a readership and audience perspective, it is significant that the Antarctic was 
linked with another widely mediated environmental issue, the hole in the ozone 
layer. Harvey noted that this phenomenon had already conditioned readers glob-
ally to perceive polar science as having planetary significance:
The Arctic became an imaginative vehicle. . . . The Arctic and the poles 
speak to the imagination in unique ways. It was not that long ago when we 
had the first expeditions to the poles. These are still very alive in people’s 
imagination. It’s exotic and almost unimaginable; and its unimaginability is 
its great strength. A vast white desert. That blankness provides a canvas onto 
which people’s own imaginings get inscribed. . . . Talking about the Arctic 
became a shorthand for talking about climate change.
(Harvey, 2018)
The record sea-ice minima of 2007 and 2012 and the changes in the Arctic sea ice 
provided ‘set pieces’ and new news hooks for journalists to write about the Arctic 
in the mainstream media.
Our analysis of the news content as well as the interviews indicate that 
journalists and editors judge that international readers and audiences are less 
interested in social or regional and local issues, unless these are weather events 
or environmental disasters, and more interested in the scientific dimension or 
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in the global implications for finance and trade, such as shipping routes and oil 
drilling. Fiona Harvey remarked that ‘people are bored with seeing pictures of 
politicians, mostly men in suits, so when picking pictures for the Arctic or other 
environmental issues, we keep that in mind. People love looking at pictures of 
wildlife’. She added:
Arctic has a mysticism; something greater than people’s imagination com-
pared to other environmental realms; it has an enormous emotional pull. 
It’s remote, very few people visit it. It brings together the emotional and 
the imaginative. . . . and we should use that as journalists. . . . Some ani-
mals like polar bears are charismatic megaphones for environmental issues. 
Journalists are often shy about using that emotional connection, but we 
shouldn’t be because what is at stake is not just a dry scientific subject or a 
political subject. What we are talking about is the future of the planet and 
it is an emotional subject.
(Harvey, 2018)
Pilita Clark, Associate Editor and columnist at the Financial Times, who 
worked as its environment correspondent between 2011 and mid-2017, offered 
similar observations, noting that climate change is the main issue that has put 
the Arctic on the news agenda: ‘The Arctic is the canary in the coalmine, it 
is where we see the effects of global change most potently and obviously’ 
(Clark, 2018). While the Arctic has become of more interest to non-specialist 
journalists, because of the multitude of trade and geopolitical implications, 
Clark said that the fact that it is difficult and expensive to get there explained 
why it remains under covered in the international news media. As Google and 
Facebook increasingly swallow up advertising and the newspaper business 
becomes more fragile, the environmental desks at many newspapers shrink or dis-
appear altogether. However, Clark noted that climate change is becoming a subject 
of increasing interest, especially to younger readers and audiences—and younger 
audiences are the ones that media organizations are trying to hang on to. In that 
regard, using climate change as a news hook to cover Arctic issues, including the 
social, political and economic dimensions as well as questions other than climate 
change itself, remains a strategic choice. She mentioned new scientific informa-
tion or a new record low in sea-ice measurements as important drivers of the news 
coverage. One aspect that can draw people’s attention is the relationship between 
the melting ice and weather patterns.
While generally similar to other international newspapers, Clark mentioned 
that the Financial Times is more focused on business than other papers, such as 
issues related to shipping and who is likely to benefit from new routes: ‘More 
granular stories in terms of what is happening on the ground, if people are getting 
excited or worried as the case may be from a business and financial perspective’ 
(Clark, 2018). She also highlighted that the perspective was mainly global, noting 
that the Arctic ‘has been covered from a global perspective, in terms of the con-
sequences of its change on trade and on people elsewhere’ and added that ‘local 
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aspects have not been covered that much partly because it is difficult to get there’. 
Regarding the changes in the news coverage in recent years, Clark mentioned 
changing attitudes to climate change sceptics since 2011:
Climate [change] sceptics and deniers have been downgraded. I was never 
asked to include this and that for balance in my stories or deniers for balance. 
But if say there was a report issued by a conservative think tank, then the edi-
tor would perhaps say ok let’s have a look at it, see what it is all about. I think 
also the Paris Accord made a difference.
(Clark, 2018)
Clark also mentioned that the BBC has recently issued new guidelines to the effect 
that a climate change denier or sceptic is no longer required to appear on screen 
for balance in any report on climate change. This followed complaints to the BBC 
after radio journalists failed to counter comments that the Earth was not warming. 
The pressure accumulated, according to Clark, adding that all the extreme weather 
in the past summer also played a part.
Clark also commented on the scalar dimension of media coverage:
It has been covered from a global perspective, in terms of the consequences 
of its change on trade and on people elsewhere. People are interested in the 
scientific elements and science stories, in the ways in which the Arctic is 
linked to climate change, to trade. But local aspects have not been covered 
that much partly because it is difficult to get there.
(Clark, 2018)
She mentioned that the lack of in-depth focus on the Arctic or on climate change 
in the mainstream newspapers is compensated for by online specialist news 
organizations such as Climate Home, Carbon Brief and Artic Today. However, 
they are only able to do this if some sort of philanthropic or charitable funding or 
some other form of funding is available: ‘So it’s not like they have a very stable 
business model in place’ (Clark, 2018).
For Arctic news sites, business models are evolving to include institutional 
subscriptions from educational and research institutions as well as building alli-
ances among small online news outlets, as is discussed further below based on 
interviews. While the future of news production, following declining revenues 
for some big media and the increasing prominence of smaller and regional media, 
remains an open-ended question, current developments on the regional news 
scene in particular seem promising. Nonetheless, bringing the Arctic into the 
international news media limelight beyond polar bears and melting ice remains 
a challenge. As Leanne Clare, senior manager of communications at WWF’s 
(World Wide Fund for Nature) Arctic Programme suggests, ‘When the symbol 
gets bigger than the region itself and people don’t realize that the polar bear is just 
one piece of a whole diverse web of life in the Arctic, then it can become almost 
a barrier’ (cited in Breum, 2018).
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Regional close-ups
The appearance in the past decade of media that specialize in news about the 
Arctic has been a major shift in the media landscape. One prominent example is 
Arctic Today, which describes itself as ‘an independent news source in partner-
ship with media organizations from around the circumpolar North’ (Arctic Today, 
n.d.). Another news outlet is the Barents Observer, which publishes in English and 
Russian. It was initially a project run by the Norwegian Barents Secretariat and 
sponsored by the Norwegian government, but is now an independent journalist-
owned platform (see below). Another news platform with ambitions of circumpolar 
reach is Eye on the Arctic, which is run by the Canadian National Broadcasting 
Corporation, and publishes its website in English and French. A fourth outlet, High 
North News, describes itself as ‘an independent newspaper published by the High 
North Center at the Nord university’.
The emergence of these news outlets is linked to increasing interest in the 
Arctic region but also to the technical capacity to publish online, which has 
improved in the past decade. Moreover, their reporting builds on networks of 
collaboration among journalists covering the Arctic from various local and 
national perspectives, through which stories can be shared. These outlets can 
therefore also serve as platforms for gathering similar experiences from differ-
ent local contexts. The regional news outlets have some overarching challenges 
in common linked to economics and politics. A close-up examination of two 
prominent examples, Arctic Today and the Barents Observer, illustrates some 
of these dynamics.
Arctic Now/Arctic Today
Arctic Today was launched at the end of January 2018 as a follow-on to another 
online outlet, Arctic Now, which began publishing in October 2016 as a spe-
cialized online news site affiliated with the Anchorage-based Alaska Dispatch 
News. Alaska Dispatch News, in turn, was the product of a merger between the 
Anchorage Daily News, a traditional newspaper published in Anchorage, and 
the online news blog Alaska Dispatch, which the Colombia Journalism Review 
described as a ‘regional reporting powerhouse . . . that fights aggressively for 
online ad dollars’ (Canyon Meyer, 2010). In 2014, the Anchorage Daily News 
was bought by Alaska Dispatch and the merger of the two sites led to the launch 
of the consolidated outlet Alaska Dispatch News (Alexander and Puh, 2014; 
Medred, 2014). While the merger raised questions about the role of traditional 
print publishing in an era of online news, as well as questions about economic 
viability (Devonne, 2014), Alaska Dispatch News quickly gained in popularity 
and gave Alaskan news a presence through its website, adn.com.
Our interviews with Alice Rogoff, the owner of Arctic Today, Kristia 
DeGeorges, the editor-in-chief of Arctic Today, and Kevin McGwin, a Denmark-
based correspondent of Arctic Today, yielded further insights. Arctic Now was 
launched as an online circumpolar news source with ambitious outreach goals at 
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the Arctic Circle Conference in October 2016. It gathered its news from Alaska 
Dispatch News, along with material from wire services and international news-
papers such as Reuters, Tribune Content Agency, the New York Times and the 
Washington Post, as well as from five partners around the Arctic—the Independent 
Barents Observer and High North News, both from Norway; The Arctic Journal, 
based in Greenland; and the Iceland Monitor and Nunatsiaq News, based in 
Iqaluit, Canada. According to Alice Rogoff, the model was meant to gather Arctic 
news from all these sources and run a subscription-based, comprehensive website, 
which was online until January 2018. Arctic Now also occasionally published 
material written exclusively for the site and solicited opinion pieces (DeGeorges, 
2017, 2018).
The business venture witnessed a major disruption in August 2017 when 
Alaska Dispatch News filed for bankruptcy. Alice Rogoff told Anchorage Daily 
News in 2014:
We had worked hard to help illuminate the issues of the day and provide a 
platform for views from across Alaska . . . yet like newspapers everywhere, 
the struggle to make ends meet financially eventually caught up with us. I 
simply ran out of my ability to subsidize this great news product. Financial 
realities can’t be wished away.
(Zak, 2017)
Reverting to its old name, Anchorage Daily News continued publishing under 
new ownership, but Rogoff took the core staff from Arctic Now with her when 
she launched Arctic Today in January 2018. In terms of content, the focus was 
similar—news of potential interest to a circumpolar audience with a stake in the 
Arctic. Also like Arctic Now, the content is provided behind a paywall. In her 
inaugural email following the launch of the site, on 29 January 2018, Rogoff 
asked readers to become paying subscribers: ‘As with so many news sites, the 
only way we can continue as a business is to ask you, the reader, to pay us for 
what we do!’ Arctic Today works with the same constellation of circumpolar part-
ners as its predecessor, apart from The Arctic Journal which ceased publication 
in June 2017. As of December 2018, Arctic Today publishes email newsletters 
five days a week and maintains a website with news, feature articles and com-
mentary aimed at an audience with circumpolar interests. Rogoff noted that all 
the user data and statistics indicate that its readers are serious news consumers, 
mostly from outside the region, with an interest in the Arctic, and that their base 
is growing. The aim is not only to expand their viewership but also create it by 
catering to a diverse variety of sectors such as academia, business and finance, 
politicians and the general public (DeGeorges, 2017, 2018). One type of jour-
nalism that is lagging behind is cultural journalism and community news, while 
scientific news and geopolitical accounts such as opening airports in Greenland 
or Chinese investment in the Arctic dominate the agenda. Arctic Today recently 
added a travel section to appeal to those outside the region ‘who are interested in 
the ice, polar bears and similar features’. Rogoff mentioned that Arctic Today has 
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more journalists on site covering the region and producing original stories and is 
engaged in a new initiative to form a cooperative alliance with small news outlets, 
blogs and publications to eventually include NGOs and their newsletters: ‘We are 
trying in every way possible to organize amongst ourselves to form a one-stop-
shop for readers because otherwise it is like a needle in a haystack to find readers’ 
(Rogoff, 2018).
Rogoff indicated that while difficulties persist, the growing number of institu-
tional subscribers and of alliances between similar-sized news outlets with similar 
scope helps the business model to sustain itself. However, she emphasized the 
need for more public and institutional support, and for grants to support the net-
working of such outlets to form more robust constellations as one particularly 
desirable mechanism. At the Arctic Circle 2018 panel, she commented: ‘The line 
between for profit and non-profit journalism has frankly disappeared because for 
profit journalism doesn’t make a profit anymore and non-profit journalism means 
dependence on someone else’s journalism’, adding, during our interview that ‘the 
world is less dependent on the journalism of international legacy media. It is our 
job now to provide Arctic news’ (Rogoff, 2018).
Commenting on the potential for political pressure to be put on journalists 
covering the Arctic, Rogoff highlighted how contentions around climate change 
in the United States have had an effect on their way of reporting:
In the media market in Alaska, there are a large number of people who will 
turn off when they see a story about climate change because they don’t 
believe in climate change. So you have to remember who you are writing for. 
That’s a depressing fact.
She also lamented how a lack of resources meant that reporting mainly focused 
on news, making it difficult to make up for a collective absence of voice for 
people living in the north: ‘We struggle with so few resources that we cover just 
the bare bones. What you don’t get is enough resources for features that capture the 
imagination of people’.
The Barents Observer
The Barents Observer describes itself as a ‘journalist-owned online newspaper 
covering the Barents Region and the Arctic’. According to its website, it has ‘a 
devotion for cross-border journalism, dialogue and mutual understanding’. The 
story behind the current website, which was launched in the autumn of 2015, 
illustrates the political challenges involved in Arctic reporting. Our first inter-
view with its editor-in-chief, Thomas Nilsen, took place in October 2015 in a 
small office into which he and his colleague, Atle Staalesen, had just moved to 
set up a new online news outlet: the Independent Barents Observer. One of the 
walls of the office was decorated with a poster of the Norwegian declaration on 
the rights and duties of the editor and Act relating to editorial freedom in media, 
proclaiming that ‘the editor shall lead the editorial operation and take decisions 
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on editorial questions’, and that ‘[t]he owner of the media enterprise or the person 
who leads the enterprise on the owner’s behalf may not instruct or overrule the 
editor in editorial questions’ (ACT-2008-06-13-41, see Norsk Redaktørforening, 
n.d.). In early 2015, Thomas Nilsen had been dismissed from his position as 
editor of the Barents Observer, which was then part of the Norwegian Barents 
Secretariat and owned by the three northernmost counties of Norway: Finnmark, 
Troms and Nordland. The reason given was that Nilsen had published a letter of 
protest signed by all four staff members at the Barents Observer about its owners 
meddling in the outlet’s content.
As Nilsen detailed during our interviews, this was the end result of escalat-
ing tensions that began in March 2014, when the Russian Consulate General in 
Kirkenes launched a major public outburst against the Barents Observer, calling it 
anti-Russian and criticizing it for writing about the annexation of Crimea. Russian-
Norwegian relations became tense in a situation where friendly High North 
cross-border relations were important to maintain, and the Consulate General saw 
the Barents Observer as a megaphone for regional politicians. According to Nilsen 
(2018a): ‘Things reached boiling point when the local politicians told us to be 
careful not to tarnish Barents values’. Nilsen and his colleagues responded to this 
challenge by publishing a letter of protest on 21 May 2015, following which Nilsen 
was dismissed on the spot for alleged disloyalty.
The situation made waves in Norwegian media circles and within the 
Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Norwegian Barents Secretariat 
was forced to rehire Nilsen. After reaching a settlement, Nilsen and the entire 
editorial staff left and the Secretariat eventually decided to end publication of 
the Barents Observer. It is now only available in the Norwegian national archive 
(Barents Observer, 2018). News about the closure of the paper and Nilsen’s 
dismissal reached the international media when the Norwegian Broadcasting 
Corporation, based on an anonymous high-level source, claimed that the Russian 
security services had demanded Nilsen’s removal (Strand, 2015).
However, Nilsen and Staalesen continued their reporting, initially under the 
banner of the Independent Barents Observer, which then became the Barents 
Observer once more, still with the aim of facilitating the exchange of infor-
mation across the border by making news about Russia available in northern 
Norway and vice versa. Thomas Nilsen stated that 20 per cent of the outlet’s 
readers are from Norway, 20 per cent are from among indigenous populations, 
20 per cent are from Russia and the rest are from Scandinavia and Asia, with 
a growing number of readers from East Asia (Nilsen, 2018b). Nilsen remarked 
that the future of journalism is more local, with more contextualized coverage 
involving cooperation across small and medium-sized outlets. Getting reliable 
information from the Russian Arctic is still a problem and the entry of foreign 
journalists into the country is restricted through the visa process. In addition, 
some, like Nilsen himself, are banned from entering the country altogether.
In contrast to growing political challenges, new technologies have made 
reporting easier. In the Arctic Circle panel discussion, Nilsen reflected on how 
new technologies have changed the conditions for Arctic journalism:
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When I started in Murmansk in the late days of the Soviet Union, there was 
one way to communicate with my editorial desk at home in Norway and that 
was to order a telephone. That had to be done 24 hours in advance. Sometimes 
the phone line lasted for five minutes, other times for 30 seconds, and then it 
was to order another phone line and wait for 24 hours. Nowadays, I have the 
ability to contact people on the tundra in the Nenets region far north of the 
Arctic Circle by simple, easy [mobile phone technology]. That is key to Arctic 
journalism. You don’t need a lot of money to run a newspaper today. We have 
close to zero, but we have an international audience and that is due to the fact 
that I can travel around with my nearly four-year old half-broken Samsung but 
with a good camera. I do interviews with this and take photos. So, we are able 
to be in the Arctic and spread the message to the rest of the world, with very 
little funding. The only thing we need is a good contact network.
(Nilsen, 2018a)
Political challenges remain, however. For example, Nilsen cannot pay Russian 
journalists for stories because they would risk being branded ‘foreign agents’ by 
the Russian authorities. For him the politics of journalism is geopolitics, steered 
by Washington, Moscow, Oslo and so on. Being on the stop list of people who 
cannot enter Russia, and naturally wanting that status changed, he relayed an 
exchange that illustrates the situation:
The Russian Consulate tells me that if you write several articles that tell 
what Russia is all about—good journalism is telling the story of 1000 years 
of peaceful relations between Russia and Norway—if I do that, then they 




Today’s media landscape is tightly connected to the growth of the Internet and 
mobile communications. While much of the Arctic has remained off-grid for 
longer than more populated regions, Internet access is now growing. This also 
affects the kinds of stories that can reach either across or beyond the region. 
Eilis Quin, editor of the website Eye on the Arctic at the Canadian Broadcasting 
Corporation, illustrated the point at a panel discussion on Arctic journalism at the 
2018 Arctic Circle Assembly:
In North America, there has always been extremely strong regional coverage, 
in Alaska with the Alaska Public Radio Network and in Canada the CBC 
North, and strong local news organizations covering the villages and what is 
going on at the local level. What technology has let us do within the last 10 
years is really focus on pan-Arctic coverage.
(Quinn, 2018)
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Eye on the Arctic went online in 2010. It is based on partnerships with northern-
based media across the Arctic and the sharing of stories on a non-profit basis. 
According to Quinn: ‘The interest from all these organizations has been to share 
what is going on in our different Arctic regions and that is one of the things that 
technology has enabled’. She also highlighted how social media has made it pos-
sible for people living in the Arctic to respond to comments and views from the 
outside, providing media access to previously marginalized voices: ‘If we go back 
to the EU seal ban and the impact that had on Inuit communities in Canada, it 
was catastrophic, and the legacy of that continues today. . . . There wasn’t Arctic 
media that could amplify those voices’. She contrasted this with how the reaction 
to a video clip of a starving polar bear that had been linked to climate change went 
viral and really did make a difference:
Twitter erupted with Inuit voices across the Arctic saying “what they are 
saying is not true. This bear is sick and old, not [dying] because of climate 
change”. That then got into the mainstream media because there was this 
complete flood on Twitter.
She said it was really interesting to see how agendas from non-Arctic regions that 
often get into the mainstream media no longer go unchallenged:
Social media is turning all that around and nobody can say that they don’t 
know. These are some of the voices that are amplified. It is still not enough 
but it’s really important to see this going on more and more.
Future visions and imaginaries of the Arctic may thus depend as much on the 
development of communications infrastructure in the north as on news and cultural 
industry production elsewhere. The current state of Arctic Internet infrastructure is 
summarized below.
‘Internyet’: from disconnection to connection in the Arctic region
According to local legend, when residents in the northern regions of Russia 
are asked about their access to the Internet, their response is an ironic, resigned 
‘Internyet’. For these Russian citizens, poor access, low speeds and high cost are 
a fact of life. That residents of the Arctic region—in Russia, Iceland, the United 
States, Canada, Greenland, Sweden, Norway and Finland—have experienced 
more sporadic, lower-quality access to the Internet than more southerly residents 
in those countries is no secret. In addition, that residents can technically have 
‘access’ to the Internet—through fixed broadband or mobile broadband—masks 
the fact that there can be significant differences in the quality and cost of such 
access, with huge variations in download and upload speeds as a prime example.
Based on reports from the Arctic Economic Council (AEC) (2016) and the 
Arctic Council (2017), the state of play for the Arctic region regarding the chal-
lenges and implications of providing high-quality, high-speed, low-cost broadband 
42 Media narratives–media cartographies
access to the region are set out below, including a brief, country-by-country sum-
mary of current or planned policies to increase access to broadband.
Arctic broadband as a policy goal
At the 2015 Ministerial Meeting of the Arctic Council in Iqaluit, Canada, the min-
isters of the Arctic states agreed to form a Task Force on Telecommunications 
Infrastructure in the Arctic (TFTIA). The rationale for the decision was out-
lined in the Iqaluit Declaration (Arctic Council, 2015), which noted ‘the 
importance of telecommunications to Arctic communities, [as well as] science, 
navigation and emergency response’, and set a goal to ‘develop a circumpolar 
infrastructure assessment as a first step in exploring ways to improve telecom-
munications in the Arctic’. In short, telecommunications, including broadband 
access, was defined as a key factor ‘for sustainable development in the Arctic’ 
(Arctic Council, 2017). Over a two-year period, the TFTIA, ‘worked to assem-
ble and assess information about the available telecommunications infrastructure 
in the Arctic and the present-day needs of users living, working, or traveling in 
the Arctic’, to review the technologies available to meet the needs of these users 
and to identify the ‘gaps in the infrastructure . . . essential in providing acceptable 
connectivity’ (ibid.).
As a result of the formation of the TFTIA, Telecommunications Infrastructure 
in The Arctic: A Circumpolar Assessment was published by the Arctic Council in 
2017. In the introduction, the TFTIA notes the ‘enormous variations in the popula-
tion densities and associated telecommunications infrastructure and services present 
across the Arctic’. While certain Arctic countries and regions, such as Finland, 
Iceland, Norway, north-western Russia and Sweden, are more densely populated, 
and thus have greater access to a variety of telecommunications services, ‘the vast 
expanses of the Canadian, Greenlandic, Russian, and US Arctic have extremely 
low population densities often with lesser availability’. Specifically, the report 
identified the ‘needs of indigenous peoples and local communities’ and the fact 
that ‘improved connectivity in the Arctic supports better access to education, 
healthcare, and commerce, as well as enhancing citizens’ participation in civic 
life and improving delivery of services’. In particular, telecommunications was 
regarded as of particular importance to indigenous peoples, ‘in maintaining and 
preserving their cultures and livelihoods’ (Arctic Council, 2017).
The TFTIA called high-speed Internet/broadband a ‘transformative technology’ 
that ‘enables a range of life-enhancing technologies and facilitates convenient and 
cost-effective communication among family and friends’. Of specific relevance to 
a discussion of how broadband access can affect the ways in which environmental 
questions are addressed, and how technology can help to connect, for example, 
activists in disparate locations across the Arctic region, the study noted how high-
quality broadband ‘also helps to break down the barriers of distance and time, 
potentially allowing Arctic residents to more actively participate in economic and 
civic life far beyond their geographic locations’.
Similar conclusions on the transformative potential of broadband were 
reached in Arctic Broadband: Recommendations for an Interconnected Arctic 
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(Arctic Economic Council, 2016). In its second report on the topic, the AEC 
drew attention to the fact that, despite the obvious social, economic and cultural 
benefits of broadband access, ‘broadband deployment and adoption across the 
globe have not been uniform’, and that ‘one region in danger of being left behind 
is the Arctic’. Interestingly, and perhaps somewhat ironically, the AEC—which 
is primarily a business-oriented organization—was more overt in outlining the 
relationship between broadband access and political participation than the inter-
governmental Arctic Council. In its report, the AEC wrote that:
Broadband helps to prevent political isolation and to enable political engage-
ment and participation. Broadband improves access to information and 
allows individuals to take part in the political process regardless of one’s 
physical location. Broadband also improves community involvement by 
allowing stakeholders to exchange ideas, meet, and collaborate in order to 
work through issues confronting the community.
(Arctic Economic Council, 2016)
While largely advocating private sector governance of the provision of broadband 
services, the AEC argued that, ‘if public-private partnerships are not practica-
ble, governments should use public resources to finance and operate broadband 
facilities to offer services on a carrier-neutral and cost-based wholesale basis to 
help spur adoption’. In order to spur adoption in communities that were getting 
broadband for the first time, the AEC recommended that, ‘private sector players, 
NGOs and governments at all levels should be encouraged to work together to 
promote digital literacy programs’. In addition, these actors should, according 
to the proposal, ‘coordinate with schools, libraries, community centers and other 
anchor institutions to leverage their presence to spur digital literacy and broad-
band adoption’. While the AEC position was clearly one intended to promote 
broadband adoption in order to benefit the private telecommunications sector, 
recommendations on media literacy are a valuable reminder that simple access is 
not sufficient to guarantee rapid adoption and use in communities previously cut 
off from high-speed services. This, in turn, is a reminder to contextualize techno-
determinist discourses in which information and communications precariousness 
are immediately overcome with the introduction of new services—a perspective 
that ignores the social, economic, political and cultural factors that can influence 
such use. Even with this in mind, however, there can be no uptake without access, 
and the following section assesses the current ‘state of play’ regarding broadband 
access in the Arctic regions on a country-by-country basis.
The state of play: broadband in the Arctic region
There is no up-to-date consolidated summary of Arctic Internet access. The 
following brief summary is compiled based on a number of sources (Arctic 
Economic Council, 2016; Government Offices of Sweden, 2017; TeleGeography, 
2017; Broadband Now, 2018; Nilsen, 2018c; Northwestel, 2018; Staalesen, 2018; 
Tusagassiuutit, 2018).
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Canada
In December 2016, the Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications 
Commission (CRTC) announced a new regulatory framework in which fixed and 
mobile broadband Internet access were classified as a basic telecommunications 
service. The original targets were to provide access to 50 Mbps download and 10 
Mbps upload to households and businesses and along major roads. A proportion 
of the costs would be covered by a tax on telecommunications revenues, leading 
to the creation of a fund that would provide up to CAD 750 million. In addition, 
starting in 2017–2018, Investing in Canada earmarked CAD 2 billion in fund-
ing for rural areas for investment in infrastructure, including improved Internet 
connectivity. One concrete example of these developments was that in October 
2018, residents of Iqaluit in Nunavut had their Internet access speeds tripled when 
Northwestel announced that the city would get access to its high-speed satellite 
network. Known as ‘Tamarmik Nunaliit’ (Inuktitut for ‘every community’), the 
new network has a capacity 20 times greater than the previous satellite. It is worth 
noting, however, that the cost of access is unaffordable: a 15 Mbps package costs 
CAD 129 per month. The Canadian government invested CAD 50 million in the 
Northwestel project to improve coverage in Nunavut. It is anticipated that the 
faster service will be available to all 25 Nunavut communities by the end of 2019.
Finland
In July 2010, Finland became the first country in the world to declare broadband 
access to be a legal right for every citizen. At the time, the Finnish government 
said that every citizen had the right to access a 1Mbps broadband connection, with 
the goal of universal access to 100 Mbps by 2015. By 2016–2017, in an updated 
and more modest target, the Finnish government had a stated goal to increase the 
minimum speed broadband connection to every business and permanent residence 
in the country to 10 Mbps by 2021. By the end of 2015, 76 per cent of Finns had 
access to a 100 Mbps mobile broadband connection and the mobile broadband 
network had expanded to such a degree that it was estimated that 99 per cent of 
the Finnish population would be covered by the end of 2017. In relation to rural 
and sparsely populated areas, since 2010 the Finnish state has implemented an aid 
project worth €130 million to improve access to high-speed broadband. Roughly 
5 per cent of the Finnish population lives in a geographical area that makes up 75 
per cent of the country. By the end of 2015, high-speed broadband had been made 
available to 70,000 residents in these areas, and the project is planned to run until 
the end of 2019.
Greenland
In 2014, the government of Greenland adopted its ‘Digitization as a driver of 
growth strategy, 2014–2017’, the goal of which was to increase broadband speeds 
in all populated areas of Greenland by 2018. According to the Arctic Council, 
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Greenland’s strategy on telecommunications infrastructure, ‘is technology neu-
tral and sets targets for the availability of broadband services in all towns and 
settlements’. By 2018 all populated areas should have access to 10 Mbps and 80 
per cent of the population should have access to at least 30 Mbps. At the time 
of the Arctic Council report, broadband services in Greenland had a household 
penetration of 45 per cent, but most of the connections provided were between 
2 and 10 Mbps. In early 2018, Greenland realized its goal of increased access to 
high-speed broadband when the national provider, TELE Greenland, expanded 
its broadband network of 30 Mbps for downloads and 2 Mbps for uploads to 14 
of Greenland’s 18 towns and settlements, or 80 per cent of Greenland’s popula-
tion. Unlimited access to this maximum 30 Mbps speed, however, costs over US$ 
150 per month. TELE Greenland aims to offer high-speed broadband to over 90 
per cent of the population by 2020. According to a 2018 report the use of mobile 
data has exploded in recent years, and eight in ten people now have access to the 
Internet through their mobile devices (Tusagassiuutit, 2018).
Iceland
Iceland has a well-developed and efficient system in place for high-speed broad-
band access. One area where residents of more sparsely populated parts of the 
country are at a disadvantage is in access to high-speed fixed-line broadband, but 
the Icelandic government has put in place a plan to ensure that there will be (near) 
100 per cent coverage of fixed-line broadband by 2020, and that almost 100 per 
cent of the country will have access to high-speed mobile broadband by 2022. At 
the moment, there is 99 per cent coverage of the country via 3G and 98 per cent 
coverage via 4G.
Norway
Norway’s National Communications Authority (NCOM) defines broadband as 
a minimum service capacity greater than 4 Mbps. In 2013, NCOM set a target 
of 100 Mbps throughout the country. Three years later, the Norwegian govern-
ment repeated that 100 Mbps broadband should be available to at least 90 per 
cent of households by 2020, with a long-term goal of universal 100 Mbps access. 
Norway increased its rural broadband coverage by 6 per cent in 2013, and by 
2014 a network capable of 30 Mbps was available to just under 80 per cent of 
homes in the country and just over 30 per cent of rural households. In the Arctic 
region, broadband is available as either wireless or fibre optic networks in both 
Troms and Finnmark. Full 4G coverage was near completion at the end of 2017. 
To highlight Norway’s commitment to full broadband coverage across the whole 
of its Arctic territory, in order to assist fisheries, the military and research, in 2018 
it was announced that the government would contribute €105 million to a project 
run by Space Norway whereby two satellites providing high-speed broadband 
access will provide 24-hour coverage to latitudes above 65 degrees north. It is 
anticipated that the satellites will be launched in 2022 and have a 15-year lifespan.
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Russia
The Ministry of Communications and Mass Media of the Russian Federation 
announced national broadband targets in 2012. The ministry plans to make 100 
Mbps ultra-fast broadband (UFB) available to 80 per cent of Russian residents 
by 2018, with the ultimate goal of providing affordable and accessible broadband 
to 95 per cent of households by 2020. In addition, the Russian government has a 
goal of 100 per cent availability of mobile broadband Internet in all communities 
with a population above 10,000. A 2015 study by the World Bank showed that 
a fixed broadband service was available to 56 per cent of Russian households. 
Despite these claims—and as indicated by the sardonic phrase ‘internyet’ used 
by Russians living in the north to describe the quality of their access—service 
in the Arctic regions has been problematic. In response, in March 2018 Russian 
President Vladimir Putin announced a new programme to provide ‘almost 
universal fast Internet access’ in the northern region by 2024. A fibre optic 
communication line will be laid to all settlements with a population over 250, 
including in the Arctic region.
A recent news report (Kolomychenko, 2018) notes that Russia’s state security 
agency is opposing a high-level deal for the US OneWeb satellite startup to pro-
vide Internet access to remote parts of Russia on the grounds that the project could 
be used to gather intelligence, thereby damaging national security. A Federal 
Security Service official, Vladimir Sadovnikov, stated: ‘The only way to address 
the threats of foreign satellite networks like OneWeb, especially in the Arctic 
region and Far North, is to restrict their usage in Russia’. He added that Russia 
would prefer a partnership with non-aggressive countries such as India and China.
Sweden
Sweden has long maintained a goal of universal access to high-speed broadband. 
In late 2016, the Swedish government published its broadband strategy document, 
A Completely Connected Sweden by 2025. In it, the government laid out clear 
and precise goals for the spread of high-speed broadband access. By 2020, for 
example, the goal was to provide 95 per cent of all Swedish households and busi-
nesses with access to broadband at a minimum speed of 100 Mbps. By 2025, 100 
per cent of Swedish households and businesses should have access to high-speed 
broadband. Of this 100 per cent, 98 per cent should have access to an impressive 
1 Gbps, 1.9 per cent to 100 Mbps and 0.1 per cent to 30 Mbps. As with many 
other countries, however, there is still a rural–urban divide with regard to access 
to broadband. In 2016–2017, 67 per cent of households had access to broadband 
at a speed of 100 Mbps, while the proportion in rural and less-populated areas was 
21 per cent. Interestingly, this divide is no greater in the Arctic region, where the 
corresponding numbers are 65 per cent and 18 per cent, respectively. Efforts have 
also been made to increase the spread of mobile broadband, and 77 per cent of the 
country now has access to mobile broadband of up to 10 Mbps, although surface 
coverage declines to 56 per cent when narrowed to the Swedish Arctic.
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United States/Alaska
In January 2014, the US government published an Implementation Plan for The 
National Strategy for the Arctic Region, in which federal agencies were asked 
to assess ‘the telecommunication infrastructure in the Arctic and use new tech-
nology to support improved communications in the region, including in areas of 
sparse population to facilitate emergency response’. In 2014, the State of Alaska 
set a goal of 100 Mbps connectivity for every Alaskan household by 2020. As of 
2016–2017, 126 Alaskan communities had a broadband service via fibre optic 
cables or a fixed wireless service. In 2016, the State of Alaska Department of 
Commerce reported that 70 per cent of rural Alaskans and 87 per cent of non-rural 
Alaskans subscribed to an Internet service. Since 2011, access to a wired con-
nection of at least 10 Mbps has increased from 74.8 per cent to 83.9 per cent of 
Alaskans, but large numbers remain isolated. In 2018, 161,000 people in Alaska 
had no access to a wired connection capable of 25 Mbps download, 237,000 had 
access to only one wired service provider, leaving them no options to switch, and 
57,000 had no wired Internet providers available where they live.
Media, communication materialities and geopolitics
The infrastructural dimensions of communication, as exemplified by Internet 
access, have implications for conceptualizing geopolitics in a world where change 
is entangled with both ideas and materialities, including technologies and access 
to them. Specifically, the dialectical relationship between media and nature, 
which was scrutinized in early 20th-century German philosophy in respect of 
the media being environments themselves and the environments being the media 
(see Christensen and Nilsson, 2018) provides a fertile basis for a co-constructivist 
understanding of space and the Arctic. Taking the two simple examples of satel-
lites and photography, including digital imagery, as technological mediums, it 
is possible to say that we would not have known what we know today about the 
Arctic (not to mention the planet as a whole) without data reception and inter-
pretation techniques, which ultimately find their way into the everyday media as 
catchy illustrations of the region (Peters, 2015; Wormbs, 2013). A similar argu-
ment can be made about the availability of and access to communication networks 
as structuring forces. Framing does not only apply to textual meaning but to repre-
sentations through imagery, and still photography and moving images of wildlife 
and Arctic environmental change have been defining features of journalistic 
coverage and media messaging, as our research results reveal. At an age where 
‘alternative truth-claims’ that use both visual and textual representations travel 
far, credible journalism and the capacity of local Arctic residents to connect to 
communication networks that potentially speak to large audiences matter greatly.
The factors that play into journalistic and media representations of the Arctic 
are many. These include the political economy of institutions, journalistic norms, 
ideological polarization, and a market place of agendas and discourses where 
competing news stories are short-lived and episodic. The insights gathered 
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from our quantitative and qualitative content analyses and interviews reveal a 
portrait of an Arctic that has gained global prominence and visibility due to its 
destabilized environment. Yet, its stereotypical representations, with their lack 
of adequate depth and local context, persist in international media. Another cru-
cial dimension of media materiality is the connectivity of the Arctic region itself. 
Decades after digital networks became a global feature and a definer of develop-
ment, digital communications are becoming a must in the Arctic primarily due 
to state and private interests in the region, which necessitate connectivity. This 
has complex reverberations for the four million residents of the Arctic in terms 
of becoming part of the global digital highway, including access to shaping the 
media discourses and the business implications of such connectivity for the big 
players. As Pinkerton (2013) contends, journalists are geopolitical agents who 
occupy a critical position between practical and geopolitical discourses, elites and 
the everyday, frontline events such as wars and disasters, and local and interna-
tional audiences. Journalism has expanded over the past decade to include citizen 
accounts and digital witnessing, placing citizens as well as geopolitical agents.
An approach that highlights the complex nature of geopolitics that includes the 
role of the media makes visible the hierarchically ordering roles of mediation, state 
politics and corporate interests. On a broader level, geopolitical considerations 
help to pinpoint historical and contemporary geographic interplays and shifting 
planetary scales by way of placing centre-stage human impacts and non-human 
systems in the context of colonial legacies and current dynamics of subordination 
(Burkart and Christensen, 2013; Dalby, 2013; Elden, 2013; Moisio, 2015). What 
ultimately defines the geopolitics of the Arctic today is the subject of a diverse 
variety of publications that set out both complementary and contested visions. 
Classical conceptualizations of geopolitics that underscore the supremacy of hard 
power have sustained relevance in the face of climate change, international politics 
and the deeper penetration of the market economy in the region. These dynamics 
bring with them open future scenarios of both peace and cooperation and conflict 
and contestation. Nonetheless, the big state and corporate players in the Arctic 
have more common and pragmatic interests rather than contested interests.
Critical geopolitics epistemologically underscores political economic and 
geographic relations as historically and socially constructed through hard power 
as well as rooted social imaginaries and representations. Embedding the ‘media 
materialities’ perspective—beyond media representations—opens up ways of 
rethinking geopolitics in general and Arctic geopolitics in particular. Such a 
renewed scope accommodates both content/discourse and infrastructural dimen-
sions through a fresh lens, and in that way complements the perspectives on 
dichotomous constructions of hard power versus soft power and culture versus 
nature. We return to these questions in Chapter 6.
Concluding remarks
Our understanding of the Arctic region is fluid, and geopolitical, economic and 
technological changes all have an impact on discourses. The various media play 
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a major role in shaping these discourses and are part of making the region a new 
frontier for exhibitions of geopolitical power. Media content reflects the vast 
quantities of research and data demonstrating the impact of human activity on 
the global climate and the region. Other stories are neglected, however, such as 
those related to the rights and concerns of local and indigenous people who are 
disproportionately affected not only by climate change, but also by the concrete 
relationship between capitalism, profit, oil and climate. As the informants from 
two major newspapers discussed, environmental coverage writ large is interlinked 
with the political economy of the media, as well as global realpolitik. Moreover, 
while the legacy media might be doing as good a job as they can under the cir-
cumstances that define their production logic, their focus remains on news about 
natural disasters, tragedies and scientific breakthroughs. One way potentially to 
bypass the discursive power of the mainstream media is by providing access to 
alternative outlets and forums via local and hyper-local news outlets, social media, 
chat groups and video sharing. Such forums are online for the most part, but 
access to high-quality broadband—and thus high-speed Internet—is often sparse 
in the Arctic locales. The most isolated areas have been relegated to high-cost, 
low-quality communications. An understanding of how national governments are 
attempting to remedy this situation is a first step toward understanding how the 
future might look in the battle to tell the story of the Arctic.
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3 A circumpolar narrative takes shape
The surge in the past decade in images and stories about the Arctic in the main-
stream media may be unprecedented but narratives about the north have a much 
longer history. They were often developed as part of colonial ventures in the form 
of scientific exploration, missionary work and resource exploitation (e.g. Bravo 
and Sörlin, 2002; Steinberg et al., 2015). The tools for their creation were a mix-
ture of exploration heroism, scientific classifications and maps, presence in the 
field and business proposals (as amply exemplified in Sörlin, 2016). Some of these 
narratives have been pervasive, even if the details and their prominence change 
over time. Many still play a role in shaping the public image of the region, and 
their expression in museums and exhibitions serves as a rich source of empirical 
material for studies of critical geopolitics. Often they provide conflicting mes-
sages that influence discussions about the goals of Arctic governance (Young and 
Einarsson, 2004; Cornell et al., 2016).
One of the most pervasive images of the Arctic is as a space for scientific 
discovery. This was initially supported by the diaries of, and news stories on, the 
early explorers (e.g. Nansen, 1897). Today it is further fuelled by universities 
and scientific organizations distributing press releases and media-savvy images 
to highlight scientific fieldwork and new scientific insights, often geared to a 
web-based media landscape. Historically, such stories often served as a source 
of inspiration for building a national identity. Today they still play a role when 
countries assert an Arctic identity. The mediation of the voyages of the research 
icebreaker Oden by the Swedish Polar Research Secretariat is just one example. 
Others include the voyages of the Chinese icebreaker Xue Long (Snow Dragon) 
and the research stations run by countries from across the world at ‘the geopoliti-
cal node’ of Ny Ålesund on Svalbard (Paglia, 2016). What could be perceived as 
a counter-narrative within the same theme of claiming a role in the region’s future 
is the emphasis of indigenous peoples on Arctic spaces as homelands, which pro-
vides a case for special rights, not just a simple stake in a claim to be heard.
Intersecting with the scientific sovereignty narratives is a focus on the Arctic as 
a storehouse of resources. The resources in focus have shifted over time from fur 
and whale oil in the 18th and 19th centuries, to minerals and hydrocarbons in the 
20th century. Less commercially tangible resources include iconic landscapes and 
species to be protected from people in nature reserves, climate cooling capacity 
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and a space for tourists to experience something unique. Regardless of the type of 
resources, however, their values have almost always been defined from outside the 
region and not seldom accompanied by claims to a right to be part of decision mak-
ing on the region’s future. The resource narratives of today also create what might 
be called an Arctic paradox. One the one hand, the impacts of a warming climate are 
an existential threat to the region as they will change its key characteristics—how 
its landscapes and living conditions are shaped by ice and snow. On the other hand, 
the key Arctic resource most in focus in recent years has been hydrocarbon reserves, 
which, if used, will inevitably contribute to further emissions of greenhouse gases 
and thus to further climate change.
An understanding of the Arctic geopolitics of today and how these affect regional 
international governance requires an analysis of how this paradox has emerged and 
if indeed it is a paradox at all. This chapter therefore revisits two speeches made 
in the 1980s that in different ways have shaped today’s Arctic politics, and dis-
cusses the context in which they emerged: the famous speech by the last General 
Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Mikhail Gorbachev, made 
in Murmansk in 1987, in which he proclaimed the Arctic a ‘zone of peace’; and 
a speech in 1986 in which Mary Simon from the Inuit Circumpolar Conference 
and Robert F Keith of the Canadian Arctic Resources Committee set out an indig-
enous view of sustainable development. The 1980s is a conjuncture of political and 
industrial developments that, in addition to being the beginning of the end of the 
Cold War, involved high hopes related to new offshore resources, growing envi-
ronmental awareness and an emerging circumpolar indigenous polity. Building on 
the theoretical foundation presented by Avango, Nilsson and Roberts (2013), the 
analysis focuses on how some actors were successful in convincing others about 
their particular narrative to the extent that their perspective and accompanying inter-
ests became enshrined in international norms, and specifically in shaping the current 
Arctic governance regime based on circumpolar political cooperation.
The Murmansk speech and the Arctic as a zone of peace
From a foreign policy perspective, the Arctic has been narrated both as a theatre 
of war or military conflict and as a zone of peace, according to the time and 
the perspective of the author. Much attention in recent years has been devoted 
to the remilitarization of the Arctic, including monitoring of the military capa-
bilities of different countries (e.g. Wezeman, 2016). However, while military 
expansion and power capture the attention and imaginations of media report-
ing and scholarly commentary, the soft power of political speeches should not 
be overlooked. As Nye (1990) notes, soft power plays a central role in being 
‘able to control the political environment’ and getting other countries to fol-
low a certain agenda (p. 55). A prominent example of how a new narrative 
and its mediation served to shift the political environment in the circumpolar 
Arctic is the so-called Murmansk speech of 1987, in which Mikhail Gorbachev 
proclaimed the Arctic a ‘zone of peace’. It was a speech that set in motion a 
process of the de-securitization of the far north (Åtland, 2008).
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Although the speech was part of a ceremony in which Gorbachev presented 
‘The order of Lenin and the Gold Star’ to the City of Murmansk, it was not 
mainly aimed at a local audience. It was live broadcast on Soviet national televi-
sion and in other Eastern Bloc countries, and the content focused on international 
issues, such as distinct military security proposals, along with proposals related to 
energy, shipping, scientific cooperation, cooperation among indigenous peoples 
and environmental cooperation (Åtland, 2008). Its messages were immediately 
picked up by news media outside the Soviet Union. The New York Times reported 
on Gorbachev’s suggestion that Warsaw Pact and NATO countries consider 
restricting military activities in the Baltic, North, Norwegian and Greenland 
Seas (Taubman, 1987). Its framing was congruent with contemporary US public 
debates on the Arctic, which had a heavy emphasis on military capacities and 
security interests (e.g. Young, 1985). By contrast, the Washington Post and the 
UPI press agency located the speech as part of the détente process that was ongo-
ing at the time and also highlighted domestic themes such as Soviet price reform 
and putting into practice the ideas of perestroika (Bohlen, 1987; Mitchell, 1987).
The focus of the coverage in the Scandinavian press was different. For exam-
ple, the Norwegian media included comments from the director of the Norwegian 
Polar Institute about a breakthrough for Arctic research, including access to Soviet 
knowledge about the Arctic Ocean and new business opportunities for Norwegian 
companies in the exploitation of offshore oil resources and onshore mining oppor-
tunities. Further media comments in the months that followed highlighted the 
remaining unresolved border issues between Norway and the Soviet Union, the 
need for a better picture of the real intentions behind the rhetoric in the speech 
and the need for Norway to step up its engagement on Arctic issues. The Swedish 
press focused on the scope for environmental cooperation and the opportunities 
that peaceful cooperation would open up for developing the potential of Arctic 
resources. There was also a note of caution that it would be crucial to maintain 
freedom of the seas, an area where a Swedish research expedition had run into 
trouble a few years before (Edmar, 2013).
The fact that Gorbachev’s Murmansk speech suggested initiatives on a 
breadth of topics could explain part of its appeal as it allowed different coun-
tries to identify their specific interests. Furthermore, Gorbachev used the Arctic 
region, which at the time was not viewed as a region per se in a political sense, 
as a means for pulling this topical multiplicity together into a new narrative about 
cooperation. With his strategically chosen rhetorical formulation, ‘speaking in 
Murmansk, capital of the Soviet Polar Region’, he extended a Soviet narrative 
about the development of the Arctic, with its roots dating back to Stalin’s ambi-
tions in the 1930s (Emmerson, 2010: Ch. 2), to the entire circumpolar north. To 
achieve this goal of making the Soviet north a motor for economic development, 
security matters had to be addressed head on:
I have had the opportunity to speak about ‘our common European home’ on 
more than one occasion. The potential of contemporary civilization could per-
mit us to make the Arctic habitable for the benefit of the national economies 
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and other human interests of the near-Arctic states, for Europe and the entire 
international community. To achieve this, security problems that have accu-
mulated in the area should be resolved above all.
(Gorbachev, 1987)
The rhetorical power of the speech can be contrasted with Arctic policy devel-
opment in the United States in the 1980s. The Arctic Research and Policy Act 
of 1984 mentions many of the same issues, such as energy resources, military 
security, environmental concerns and the need for Arctic cooperation on research 
(United States, 1984), but does so without creating a new narrative in the way 
that Gorbachev managed to do in Murmansk by reframing the Arctic as a zone of 
peace. At the time, such a narrative ran counter to how the Arctic was perceived 
in the United States, where the focus was on strategic military issues and conflict 
(Nilsson, 2018). It is therefore not surprising that US media reporting placed the 
speech in a global frame related to the duopoly of the great powers rather than a 
regional Arctic context of economic development opportunities.
This global framing can also be contrasted with the more regional focus of 
reactions in the Scandinavian countries, where the speech was soon followed up 
by discussions in parliaments and in diplomatic circles. A contemporary Canadian 
commentary suggests that Gorbachev’s initiative initially caught the foreign 
ministry of Canada by surprise (Purver, 1988), but there is also an account of a 
meeting of the foreign ministers of Canada and Norway in Tromsø on how both 
countries were willing to stretch out the hand of cooperation once Gorbachev’s 
ideas became more concrete. The Norwegian foreign minister commented on 
the need for stable and rational development in a situation of major challenges 
related to security, the environment and science (Fyhn, 1987). In the Canadian 
and Scandinavian context, the geopolitics of the global great powers thus played 
less of a role.
While much of the speech is devoted to the need to reduce military tensions 
in the Arctic, this aim must be placed in the context of what specifically was at 
stake. For the Soviet Union the context was directly related to a narrative that put 
natural resources in focus:
Thirdly, the Soviet Union attaches much importance to peaceful coopera-
tion in developing the resources of the North, the Arctic. Here an exchange 
of experience and knowledge is extremely important. Through joint efforts 
it could be possible to work out an overall concept of rational development 
of northern areas. We propose, for instance, reaching agreement on drafting 
an integral energy programme for the north of Europe. According to existing 
data, the reserves there of such energy sources as oil and gas are truly bound-
less. But their extraction entails immense difficulties and the need to create 
unique technical installations capable of withstanding the Polar elements. It 
would be more reasonable to pool efforts in this endeavour, which would cut 
both material and other outlays.
(Gorbachev, 1987)
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While the policy processes that the Gorbachev speech set in motion focused on 
environmental and scientific cooperation, Swedish and Norwegian media com-
mentaries were quick to pick up on the resources theme. This keen interest is not 
surprising, given the development of offshore hydrocarbon resource exploration 
in Norway at the time, including the discovery of gas in Snøhvit (Snow White) 
field in 1984. In Norway, the ‘High North’ was not yet discussed as a top prior-
ity foreign policy objective, but its importance is well illustrated by the key role 
played by Norway in negotiating the Barents regional cooperation (Young, 1998). 
Perhaps slightly more surprisingly, the resources narrative was also a good fit with 
the interests of Swedish political and industrial actors who saw the potential for 
Swedish technology exports as well as a need to assert their interests in offshore 
resources more generally, given the recent negotiation of the UN Convention 
on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Offshore technology and deep-sea drilling 
were seen as areas with potential for Swedish industry, and political interests had 
already been established in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in the early 1980s 
(Edmar, 2013). Sweden had acceded to the Antarctic Treaty in 1984 to assert its 
polar interests, and several of the articles in the Swedish press around that time 
appeared in the financial newspaper Dagens Industri. One of the headlines is tell-
ing: ‘Sweden has to be in place when Antarctica’s riches are eventually exploited’ 
(Dagens Industri, 1983).
In terms of practical diplomacy, Gorbachev’s proposal on environmental 
cooperation gained the most immediate attention, and eventually developed into 
political negotiations in the so-called Rovaniemi process, which resulted in the 
Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy in 1991 (Young, 1998; Tennberg, 
1998). This focus built on an environmental narrative that was nascent at the time 
but grew into an international political discourse (Haq and Paul, 2012; for some 
Arctic-specific examples, see Petrov et al., 2017). It foreshadowed today’s notion 
of the Arctic as a global environmental linchpin. The environmental focus of the 
Murmansk speech encompassed two quite different themes: concerns about trans-
boundary pollution and climate change. An examination of the nascence of each 
of these discourses provides insights into how an environmental framing was able 
to gain strength from Gorbachev’s initiative.
The climate discourse had its origins in the scientific community and the grow-
ing attention paid in the 1980s to global processes and viewing the Earth as a 
system (Miller and Edwards, 2001). Both the science and the international sci-
entific communities had matured to a point where research into global change 
was being institutionalized at the international level, involving links to interna-
tional political cooperation. Among the examples were international cooperation 
on meteorological research (Bolin, 2007) and developments in polar science fol-
lowing on from the scientific cooperation under the Antarctic Treaty, especially 
in the Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research (SCAR). At the time of the 
Murmansk speech, there was increasing interest in gaining access to the northern 
polar region, as well as tentative discussions about a forum for Arctic research 
cooperation. In Gorbachev’s speech, these ideas materialized as concrete sugges-
tions for an international scientific conference in Murmansk and a joint Arctic 
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Research Council. Through a series of negotiations, this shared interest resulted 
in the creation of the International Arctic Science Committee (IASC) in 1990 
(Rogne et al., 2015). Two of IASC’s early projects focused on the impacts of 
climate change in the north, with specific attention to the Barents Sea region and 
the Bering Sea region, both of which bordered what was then Soviet territory 
(Nilsson, 2007: 98–101, and references therein). The Gorbachev speech even 
alluded to the narrative about the Arctic as an engine for global weather systems 
when he called the Arctic and the North Atlantic a ‘weather kitchen’ of cyclones 
affecting all parts of the world. This attention to the role of the Arctic in the cli-
mate elsewhere was not unique to Gorbachev’s speech. It was also part of Arctic 
policy discussions in the United States (Hickok et al., 1983) and a priority within 
the scientific community.
While the Murmansk speech does not dwell on pollution issues, it does call 
for joint international efforts on environmental protection. Pollution was a grow-
ing concern in several Arctic countries. Neighbouring Finland and Norway were 
worried about the transboundary impacts of emissions from the smelters on the 
Kola Peninsula on areas that had once been considered clear of industrial pollu-
tion (Tikkanen and Nienmelä, 1995). The risk of radioactive contamination from 
Soviet military activities was another major concern among its neighbours. In 
Sweden the impacts of organic pollutants such as PCBs and DDT in the Baltic 
Sea, and in Canada high levels of PCBs and DDT in the breast milk of indigenous 
women living far away from any sources of industrial pollution, were already 
on the political agenda (Downie and Fenge, 2003; Stone, 2015). Both Sweden 
and Canada had a strong interest in getting to grips with the situation. As Young 
(1998) noted, both environmental and scientific cooperation were considered 
areas of low politics and therefore suitable for international efforts despite the 
continuing military security tensions. The Murmansk speech created an opportu-
nity to act and eventually institutionalize the Arctic environmental narrative in the 
Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy in relation to pollution and in IASC in 
relation to climate change research.
The indigenous narrative is not prominent in the Murmansk speech but the 
fact that cooperation among Arctic indigenous peoples is mentioned at all is sig-
nificant as it shows links not just to military security issues and the interests of 
neighbouring countries, but also to an emerging international indigenous move-
ment, including common links to the ever-present resource narrative.
Indigenous rights, sustainable development and the  
Arctic as home
In the environmental political discourse, the term sustainable development started 
to gain traction in the mid-1980s with the publication in 1987 of the report Our 
Common Future (World Commission on Environment and Development, 1987). 
This was conceived as a call for international political action and an attempt to 
bridge the gap between growing concern about the environment and powerful 
calls for economic development from the Global South. The document does not 
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mention the Arctic but contains an extensive discussion about Antarctica. The 
global debate leading up to the launch of the concept of sustainable develop-
ment began with the formulation of a World Conservation Strategy (IUCN, 1980), 
which included a section on the Arctic Ocean and a call for Arctic nations to ‘map 
critical ecological areas (terrestrial as well as marine), draw up guidelines for their 
long-term management, and establish a network of protected areas to safeguard 
representative, unique, and critical ecosystems’.
In the late spring of 1986, a conference on the implementation of this strategy 
was held in Ottawa, Canada. Among the speakers were Robert F. Keith, from the 
Canadian Arctic Resources Committee, and Mary Simon, representing the Inuit 
Circumpolar Conference (ICC). This speech is noteworthy not because it caught 
the attention of the media—it did not—but because it articulated an Inuit notion 
of sustainable development that called attention to the issue of indigenous rights. 
It did so within a polemic directed at national governments seeking to use the 
north for large-scale industrial development without any attention to the need for 
local economic development. It was also a polemic directed at the conservation 
movement wanting to make decisions about Inuit land and traditional harvest-
ing practices. Predating Gorbachev’s Murmansk speech by a year and a half, the 
speech by Keith and Simon discussed how the new cross-cultural alliances in the 
process of forming could ‘give new meaning to basic principles of international 
cooperation’ and highlighted how the World Conservation Strategy could link 
to ongoing work within the United Nations on the right to peace and the right to 
development and ‘might eventually integrate principles of peace with those of 
conservation and development’ and also apply those at the regional level (Keith 
and Simon, 1987: 223).
The Inuit had started to organize politically across national borders in the 
1970s in response to the increasing pressure to develop oil and gas resources in 
the Arctic (Shadian, 2014). The 1986 conference provided a platform to make 
their perspectives heard internationally. Some of the ideas reflected in the speech 
were also shared in other exchanges, such as dialogues with diplomats from the 
Arctic countries. One example is from June 1985, when representatives of the 
ICC met a delegation from the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs during a 
visit to Greenland to discuss Inuit international collaboration and an ‘Arctic 
Environmental Strategy’ (Johnson Theutenberg, 1985). The Swedish diplomat 
Bo Johnson Theutenberg noted in his diary that the ICC wanted to ‘give a kick’ 
to the governments of the Nordic countries, the USA and Canada, and that ‘The 
atmosphere is favourable for this right now. Soviet suspicion is calming down. 
Increased regional cooperation would be confidence-building in the Arctic region, 
to speak in ESK terms’ (translation from Swedish original).1 The paper was given 
to the Danish hosts as ‘food for thought’.
The ideas on circumpolar international cooperation gained momentum after 
the Murmansk speech as the Rovaniemi process unfolded. However, when Leif 
Halonen was invited to outline the perspective of the Saami Council on early indig-
enous involvement in the negotiations on the Arctic Environmental Protection 
Strategy at the 2016 Arctic Frontiers meeting, he told how indigenous peoples 
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were initially shut out of the negotiations. They had heard about the Rovaniemi 
meeting from a Danish friend of the Saami Council during an International Labour 
Organization conference in 1989 but no indigenous organization had been invited. 
The next consultative meeting was held in Yellowknife in April 1990, but indig-
enous organizations were not invited to that meeting either. According to Halonen 
(2016), ‘Mary Simon, the President of the Inuit Circumpolar Conference (ICC) 
tried to take part at the meeting, but was thrown out’. A third consultative meet-
ing was held in Kiruna, Sweden, in January 1991. By then the Saami Council had 
travelled to Alaska to coordinate with the ICC and link up with the newly formed 
Association of the Peoples of the North of the Soviet Union (later renamed the 
Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North, RAIPON). Furthermore, 
the Swedish head of delegation and chair of the Kiruna meeting, Désirée Edmar, 
who had been part of the 1985 meeting with the ICC in Greenland, had become 
personally engaged with the role of indigenous peoples in the north (Edmar, 
2013). A few days before the Kiruna meeting, the three organizations made a 
common statement asking Edmar for the right to participate in the formal con-
sultative meeting, where governmental delegates had been invited to ‘a reception 
with wine and dried reindeer meat, to create an informal arena for small talk’. 
As Halonen reported, ‘Désirée Edmar listened to the indigenous voices . . . and 
even if her delegate advisor wanted [her] to turn us down, she convinced the other 
delegates that inviting us to the table was the right thing to do’ (Halonen, 2016).
Unlike the Murmansk speech, which was conspicuously mediated to gain 
attention internationally, the indigenous voices in Arctic affairs gained momen-
tum through the growing international networking among Arctic indigenous 
peoples, and with the help of international platforms where it was possible to 
insert new perspectives. The latter were especially relevant as they provided 
access to wider audiences than their own networks and the potential to influence 
international norms. Three forums are particularly relevant. One was the pro-
cess that had begun with the World Conservation Strategy, in which the 1986 
meeting where Keith and Simon spoke was part of a formal evaluation of how 
the strategy was being implemented with the aim of revising it. It was a context 
in which the very notion of sustainable development was being moulded and 
from which indigenous perspectives had previously been absent. This can be 
compared with how indigenous knowledge and perspectives are now enshrined 
in the Convention on Biodiversity and its Article 8(j) on Traditional Knowledge, 
Innovations and Practices.
A second process was the reformulation of ILO Convention 169 on Indigenous 
and Tribal Peoples, which was an explicit attempt at ‘removing the assimilation-
ist orientation of the earlier standards, and [r]ecognising the aspirations of these 
peoples to exercise control over their own institutions, ways of life and eco-
nomic development and to maintain and develop their identities, languages and 
religions, within the framework of the States in which they live’ (ILO, 1989). 
The third was the setting provided by the negotiations in the Rovaniemi pro-
cess, including the growing interest of Arctic players, both state and indigenous 
peoples, in building a new circumpolar narrative. In building this narrative, 
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indigenous voices asserted their rights as well as an internal perspective on sus-
tainable development in the northern circumpolar world, as expressed in the 
presentation by Keith and Simon: ‘The circumpolar world is also a homeland’ 
(Keith and Simon, 1987: 210).
The homeland narrative gained further momentum as circumpolar cooperation 
developed. On the creation of the Arctic Council in 1996, the indigenous peoples’ 
organizations gained status as permanent participants, not quite on a par with the 
member states but with much more formal influence than NGOs and other observ-
ers. The scalar political interplay involved in ensuring this status should not be 
underestimated. The global development of a sustainable development discourse 
and the re-evaluation of colonial perspectives in existing normative frameworks, 
such as those of the ILO, provided impetus and inspiration for Arctic indigenous 
peoples to set out their own ideas on sustainability and international coopera-
tion as peoples with rights. From the other end of the scalar spectrum—local 
communities across the Arctic—came an urgent need for strategies to meet the 
increasingly large-scale industrialization of the north, linked to oil and gas as well 
as major hydroelectric dam projects such as those in Alta, Norway, and James 
Bay, Canada. In North America, the legal processes of settling indigenous land 
claims had gained momentum as the major mineral and hydrocarbon resources 
and access routes to them involved indigenous lands. The development of Arctic 
resources came to depend on negotiations and agreements between indigenous 
peoples and national governments.
In Greenland, the home rule referendum of 1979 set in motion the politics of 
independence from Denmark (for a detailed account of recent developments, see 
Breum, 2018). In the Fennoscandian countries, recognition of indigenous land 
rights occurred much later, and the Finnmark Act of 2005 is one of the few legal 
initiatives to create a new setting for making regional development decisions. 
Nonetheless, it is fair to say that the narrative of the Arctic as a homeland, which 
began to be articulated in the 1980s, has been powerfully projected and become 
part of the norms that influence all discussions on the Arctic (Bankes, 2004; 
Bankes and Koivurova, 2014).
How have the developments sketched out above been reflected in media 
reporting? A search of the LexisNexis database on the word ‘Inuit’ reveals that 
the Canadian national newspaper Globe and Mail featured reporting on Inuit 
claims for self-determination as early as the late 1970s, and several articles were 
published in the 1980s about conflicts between industrial development and indig-
enous self-determination and ways of life. It appears to have taken until the early 
1990s (1991) for news about such developments to reach the international press, 
the first being a report in the British press (The Times) on the decision to create the 
Nunavut Territory. In 1992, the Washington Post ran a story about the Canadian 
government apologizing to Inuit for its resettlement policies of the 1950s. As far 
as media coverage goes, the word Inuit is clearly a Canadian discursive choice, 
linked mainly to internal Canadian issues. Searching on the word ‘Eskimo’2 
reveals some stories in the New York Times, including a report from Greenland 
on Eskimo militancy:
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After decades of meek submission to the white man, Eskimos are showing 
new signs of militancy. Increasingly organized to fight back, they are mak-
ing new political and financial demands on the intruders from the south and 
exercising greater influence in the defense of the fragile Arctic environment.
(Border, 1982)
In a more neutral tone, the Washington Post reported in 1977 that:
Eskimos from across the polar northland began meeting today in this remote 
city 347 miles north of the Arctic Circle in the first international attempt at polit-
ically uniting nearly 100,000 Eskimos scattered across the world. The five-day 
gathering includes nearly 200 Eskimo representatives who flew in—Barrow 
has no access by road—from Greenland, Canada, Alaska and Finland for what 
is being called the first Inuit, or Eskimo People’s Circumpolar Conference.
(Richards, 1977)
In general, however, US press coverage of the Arctic or Alaska appears to 
have been meagre in the 1970s and 1980s, apart from the attention on the 
trans-Alaskan pipeline which featured mainly oil interests and some voices 
from environmental NGOs.
In the Scandinavian context, Saami and environmental movement protests 
against the building of a hydroelectric dam in Alta caught the attention of the 
media due to the powerful conflicts between the Norwegian state apparatus and 
the emerging Saami movement. It included hunger strikes in Oslo and an attempt 
to blow up a bridge that was considered sabotage by the authorities and was 
described as ‘one of the most dramatic political conflicts in Norway since World 
War II’ (Andersen and Midttun, 1985). Judging from contemporary accounts, the 
attention of the Norwegian national media mainly focused on this conflict, and 
there was only limited interest in the broader issues of Saami lives and politics 
(Store, 1983). Nonetheless, the media archive database Mediearkivet shows a 
range of Saami issues in the reporting related to schooling, language, health and 
politics. Issues related to the Alta conflict were also reported in Sweden, mainly 
through the work of the TT press agency. Other issues in the Swedish media 
coverage of the 1980s were land-use conflicts in the reindeer herding areas with 
other activities such as forestry, tourism, mining and the building of a new road.
Concluding remarks
The building of an indigenous rights narrative in the late 1970s and the early 1980s 
played out in a range of political arenas in both national and international con-
texts. While the Alta case is an exception, where the strong conflicts appealed 
to the media, most political developments are characterized by a slow but steady 
expansion of and engagement with international institutions. These were open for 
negotiation at the time either because they were in the process of being established, 
as in the case of the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy, or because they 
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were in the process of reforming themselves, as in the case of the world conser-
vation movement and the International Labour Organization through resolution 
ILO-169. It is noteworthy that many accounts of the initiation of circumpolar coop-
eration only highlight the seminal role of Gorbachev’s Murmansk speech, while no 
attention is paid to other international political developments such as the growing 
importance of indigenous voices, which played a critical role in shaping today’s 
circumpolar narrative of the Arctic as a zone of peace and cooperation.
In many accounts of Arctic international governance, the focus is on environ-
mental narratives and how cooperation around shared environmental concerns 
shaped the region (e.g. Stone, 2015). It is a story based on the issues on which 
the regional regime that emerged from the thaw in the Cold War in the late 1980s 
has been quite successful. It is also a story that was shaped in an era when the 
focus of international relations theory was on institutions and regime formation 
(e.g. Young, 1998) more than geopolitical tensions. Nonetheless, regimes do not 
emerge without some shared interests. A look back at the 1980s shows that a key 
theme and goal of international Arctic politics—the Arctic as a zone of peace with 
sustainable development as a goal—took shape at a time when a major driver of 
political change was an increasing interest in the region’s resources, especially oil 
and gas. This interest was linked to increasing the capacity for offshore extraction 
of hydrocarbons, which required greater international collaboration than devel-
oping onshore resources. Given the strong geopolitical interests at play in any 
discussion about access to natural resources, the resource narrative does not lend 
itself as easily to a storyline of peace and cooperation. Nonetheless, it could in fact 
provide at least as much explanatory power for the surge in interest in the region 
in the late 1980s as the environmental narrative.
Notes
1 European Security Conference, since renamed the Organization for Security and 
Co-operation in Europe. Translation by the author.
2 A term that many today consider archaic or offensive because of its colonial history.
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4 Reconstruction and consolidation
In the early 2000s, the emphasis in discussions about the Arctic started to shift 
from a circumpolar regional focus to a global framing. Examples of the latter are 
books about globalization in relation to the Arctic (Heininen and Southcott, 2010), 
research efforts that take their starting point as ‘The Global Arctic’ (Heininen and 
Finger, 2017) and books that analyse the region from an explicitly global per-
spective (Keil and Knecht, 2017). This shift has been accompanied by tensions 
between local or regional and global scalar perspectives, in the scientific sphere as 
well as in relation to the politics of power over decision making, including argu-
ments about the role of ‘non-Arctic’ actors in Arctic governance. Three tropes 
appear as recurring themes in this field of contestation, each with its own dis-
cursive implications: the Arctic as a bellwether of environmental change, rights 
over Arctic resources and the notion of the global Arctic. By delving beyond the 
surface of these three tropes and how they became powerful frames for discussing 
the circumpolar north, this chapter shows how today’s debates about the region’s 
future are rooted in earlier contestations over defining the Arctic.
A bellwether of environmental change
The Arctic has become a symbol of the impacts of environmental change. In 
today’s media landscape, this symbolic role is especially prominent in relation 
to climate change, through images of calving glaciers, melting sea ice and polar 
bears. From a scientific perspective, the region’s special sensitivity is linked to 
some of its physical features, such as the cold temperatures, the snow and ice 
that dominate the landscape and the fact that it is home to unique ecosystems. 
Over time, this environmental materiality has become interwoven with narra-
tives and existential concerns that strike a chord with people who may never 
have visited the region.
Narratives about the Arctic environment have also been interwoven with 
global political discourses, and this has had various impacts on governance. In 
the early 1900s, a wish to preserve wild landscapes and iconic species laid the 
foundations for the creation of national parks in the Arctic and elsewhere. It also 
fuelled early international initiatives on wildlife conservation, in which the musk 
ox of Greenland and reindeer on Spitzbergen, among others, were the focus of a 
68 Reconstruction and consolidation
discussion about protecting species in places that were ‘not owned by any sover-
eign power’ (Conwentz, 1914). More modern efforts at species protection did not 
use such explicit colonial language but contemporary controversies surrounding 
the management of iconic Arctic species such as polar bears, whales and seals 
illustrate how narratives that do not originate in the region play an important role 
in Arctic environmental management and discussions about what knowledge and 
which worldviews should weigh most heavily in decision making. The longstand-
ing controversy between Inuit and the European Union (EU) over the EU’s ban 
on importing seal skin is one of the most illustrative examples (Sellheim, 2015). 
The polar bear narratives warrant a chapter of their own: starving, swimming in an 
Arctic Ocean without ice, displayed as ice sculptures in various shapes and forms 
at political meetings or as an attention-grabbing rhetorical tool, the polar bear has 
become an icon of Arctic environmental change. This icon has sometimes figured 
as an illustration in discussions about international environmental collaboration, 
such as the 1973 Polar Bear Treaty (e.g. Young and Osherenko, 1993), but more 
often as the very symbol of the threats posed by climate change.
An Arctic environmental narrative of more recent origin is pollution, espe-
cially pollution that reaches the pristine Arctic from industrial areas of the globe, 
such as persistent organic pollutants (POPs) and heavy metals. Concern about 
widespread pollution in the Arctic dates back to the 1980s and the discovery 
of high levels of PCBs and DDT in the breast milk and bloodstream of Inuit 
women in Canada who lived far away from industrial areas. The samples were 
initially taken to better understand background levels in order to be able to com-
pare samples from industrial areas. When levels were found to be so high, this set 
in motion a major research programme that later played into Canada’s interest 
in circumpolar Arctic cooperation and the creation of the Arctic Environmental 
Protection Strategy (AEPS) (Downie and Fenge, 2003; Stone, 2015). The narra-
tive of the Arctic as a depository for global emissions of toxic chemicals gained 
further momentum when the AEPS published its first scientific assessment of 
pollution in the Arctic in 1997. This showed how persistent pollutants were able 
to travel on winds and in water to cold northern regions where they were taken 
up by, and efficiently stored in, the fat of marine mammals, such as seals, whales 
and polar bears, as well as the people who rely on these species as subsistence 
food (AMAP, 1997). Because the Inuit political movement had been launched 
in response to industrialization, as discussed in Chapter 3, scientists were not 
the only actors to provide input into this narrative. Inuit had an especially strong 
voice in Sheila Watt-Cloutier, who came to play a pivotal role in the negotiations 
on an international convention to limit the use and emissions of POPs, turning the 
question into one of human health and indigenous survival rather than simply an 
environmental concern (Downie and Fenge, 2003; Nilsson, 2012).
While the foundations for the attention paid to pollution in the Arctic and its 
implications were laid in scientific reports, scientific assessments do not neces-
sarily lead to a new narrative or a policy shift (Mitchell et al., 2006). In the case 
of POPs in the Arctic, the impact was as much related to how the scientific find-
ings were disseminated and woven into a highly personal story of toxic chemicals 
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affecting vulnerable indigenous women and children. The narrative’s influence is 
visible in the text of the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants 
of 2001, which in its preamble acknowledges that ‘the Arctic ecosystems and 
indigenous communities are particularly at risk because of the biomagnification 
of persistent organic pollutants and that contamination of their traditional foods is 
a public health issue’ (Stockholm Convention, 2001).
The Arctic pollution narrative went beyond POPs. It had an existential dimen-
sion with the potential to reach beyond the people who were directly affected 
because it challenged the notion of the region as pristine. It also showed that the 
Arctic was not exempt from the negative impacts of the chemicalization of soci-
ety, which the environmental movement had been discussing since the 1960s and 
the publication of Silent Spring (Carson, 1962). The Arctic was not as remote or 
isolated as previously imagined.
In recent years, the pollution narrative has faded from the public discourse, 
even if the issues continue to raise concerns. Its place has been taken by climate 
change and a narrative about the Arctic as bellwether of global change. This nar-
rative has its origins in global scalar perspectives. It developed in its modern form 
in the 1970s and 1980s, with the increasing sophistication of climate models and 
the attempt to understand the role of ice and snow in the Earth’s energy balance 
(Wormbs et al., 2017). The roots, however, go even further back and feature strong 
links between science and geopolitics. During the Cold War, the United States 
invested heavily in the geosciences, including a focus on meteorology and ocean-
ography, as part of its competition with the Soviet Union (Doel, 2003). In a 1983 
report that later led to the establishment of the US Arctic Research Commission, 
the Arctic was discussed as a ‘sensitive indicator and regulator of worldwide cli-
mate change’ (Hickok et al., 1983). In addition, as Chapter 3 discusses, Mikhail 
Gorbachev spoke about the Arctic as a weather engine in his 1987 Murmansk 
speech (Gorbachev, 1987). Climate change was also an issue in the early plan-
ning for circumpolar international scientific cooperation in what later became the 
International Arctic Science Committee (IASC), as a subject area in which a new 
committee for Arctic research ‘could operate as a genuine international body’, in 
contrast to issue areas where national interests were assumed to dominate (Roots 
and Rogne, 1987). Arctic research was also seen as important to worldwide sci-
ence programmes such as the World Climate Research Programme (Roots et al., 
1987). While IASC, once established, adopted climate change as one of its key 
priorities, it was not a prominent focus for the AEPS or when the Arctic Council 
was established in 1996 (Nilsson, 2007). This changed with the initiation of the 
Arctic Climate Impact Assessment (ACIA), which was a collaboration between 
IASC and two of the Arctic Council working groups: the Arctic Monitoring and 
Assessment Programme and Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna.
The ACIA has been called one of the most influential activities of the Arctic 
Council (Kankaanpää and Young, 2012) and also has a special role in supporting 
a narrative that places the Arctic in a global context. Its origin explains some of its 
impact. Planning for the ACIA caught the attention of the ICC, which became con-
cerned that it would focus only on scientific impacts, and wanted to focus on people 
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too, and also to ensure that there would be a specific policy outcome from the pro-
cess (Nilsson, 2007: 110, 129). The ICC had learned from its earlier work on POPs 
that scientific assessments could serve as potent policy tools and was now building 
on this experience in crafting its involvement in the ACIA process (Watt-Cloutier, 
2015). This goal was in alignment with the ambitions of the chair of the ACIA, 
Robert Corell, who wanted to push the international climate negotiations forward. 
Major efforts were also made to present the findings of the assessment in a way that 
could reach beyond the scientific community (Nilsson, 2007: 120 ff.).
Details of the ACIA process have been discussed elsewhere (Nilsson, 2007). 
Much of the wider attention paid to the scientific assessment at the time of its pub-
lication was linked to political controversy surrounding the production of a policy 
document. A study of media coverage of the ACIA in the United States showed 
that about half of all the news media attention focused on whether there would be 
a policy follow-up or the United States would try to prevent this (Tjernshaugen 
and Bang, 2005). There was also a distinct difference from the media reporting 
on the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in the same period. 
This focused heavily on scientific controversy, which was barely visible in the 
ACIA coverage. The controversy over the policy document gathered momentum 
when Sheila Watt-Cloutier, representing the ICC, testified before the US Senate 
Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation that the United States had 
tried to stop publication of the report (cited in Tjernshaugen and Bang, 2005).1 She 
also repeated a narrative to which the ACIA had given momentum by combining 
the homeland metaphor with the Arctic as bellwether metaphor: ‘My homeland—
the Arctic—is the health barometer for the planet’.
On 30 October 2004, the New York Times published an article based on a leaked 
copy of the ACIA report, which was to be launched at the November ministerial 
meeting in Reykjavik, raising the stakes even further for the policy negotiations. 
According to the article: ‘Several of the Europeans who provided parts of the report 
said they had done so because the Bush administration had delayed publication 
until after the presidential election, partly because of the political contentiousness 
of global warming’. The issue of delay referred to the ministerial meeting having 
been moved from September to November, allegedly to avoid interference with 
the US presidential election—an allegation denied by the Icelandic host of the 
meeting. The article’s description of the report further illustrates how this scientific 
assessment was fashioned into an effective tool for communicating a specific mes-
sage: ‘The report is a profusely illustrated window on a region in remarkable flux, 
incorporating reams of scientific data as well as observations by elders from native 
communities around the Arctic Circle’ (Revkin, 2004).
The text of the scientific report reveals an interesting development of the Arctic 
climate change narrative. Unlike earlier interest in the region from climate scien-
tists, the report focused not only on the region as part of a global context but also 
on the local dynamics of climate change by bringing in indigenous knowledge as 
well as sciences such as ecology and limnology, which often base their analyses 
on observations in local case study areas. The report thus brought together local 
and global perspectives as well as both scientific and indigenous perspectives, 
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which provided the media with a basis for stories that featured the human face of 
climate change (Nilsson, 2007).
The construction of this new narrative continued in two prominent scientific 
processes. The first was the Second International Planning Conference for Arctic 
Research in 2005. Along with the more traditional Arctic natural sciences of bio-
physical processes, this featured sessions on vulnerability and resilience as well 
as the notion of sustainability science, which included community perspectives 
(Bowden, 2005; see also Petrov et al., 2017). The second was the International 
Polar Year, 2007–2008, which, in contrast to earlier polar years, had a distinctly 
human dimension and profile as was obvious from both the logotype and the 
research programme (Krupnik et al., 2011). The power of the ACIA was thus 
linked to its inclusion of new issues in the climate change discourse, which had 
previously mainly focused on questions relevant to scientists rather than the 
broader political community, as well as to the fact that the assessment was inte-
grated into a process of articulating scientific priorities.
In the years immediately after publication of the ACIA, climate change, and 
by extension global change, was still mainly a narrative within the environmental 
politics discourse. However, it later gained power by virtue of the fact that climate 
change as an issue reached into multiple aspects of society, not least geopolitics, 
security and sovereignty. These issues were not part of the research agenda in 
the International Conference on Arctic Research Planning (ICARP) process but 
became prominent after the unexpected extent of the 2007 Arctic Ocean sea-ice 
minimum, which neither the ACIA nor the 2007 IPCC report predicted (for a 
review of sea ice and climate communication, see Christensen and Nilsson, 2017).
The 2007 and 2012 sea-ice minima, and the splurge in political and media atten-
tion on the Arctic that followed, meant that the narrow understanding of global 
change started to take on new and much broader meanings. In 2015, for example, 
the notion of the Arctic as a bellwether for global change was used rhetorically in 
a prominent way by US President Barack Obama at the Global Leadership in the 
Arctic: Cooperation, Innovation, Engagement and Resilience (GLACIER) confer-
ence in Alaska, which had been convened to push for a strong agreement at the UN 
Framework Convention on Climate Change Conference of the Parties in Paris in 
December 2015. In this gathering of the foreign ministers and other high represent-
atives of 20 countries and the EU, Obama placed the issue of climate change at the 
centre of world politics by claiming that ‘climate change is a trend that affects all 
trends—economic trends, security trends. Everything will be impacted’ (Obama, 
2015). The statement not only invoked a security narrative but also included a mul-
tiplicity of topics and located Arctic change within a storyline that went far beyond 
the environment and far beyond the people living in the region.
The revival of the resource and sovereignty narratives
The Arctic is rich in resources only to the extent that its geological features and 
ecosystem processes can be harvested and turned into something useful (Avango 
et al., 2013). If it were not for knowledge, infrastructure and technology, 
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combined with demand, the Arctic would not have attracted the attention of out-
siders to the extent that it has ever since the commercial fur trade and large-scale 
whaling campaigns of the 1600–1800s. To guarantee that the geological features, 
ecosystem processes and spaces are perceived as valuable to someone who can 
invest the necessary time and energy to harvest them, however, the distribution 
of value must be predictable through rules of ownership and other types of gov-
ernance arrangements. There must be rights to the resources. In the international 
system of states, this becomes a question of sovereignty. It is thus no coinci-
dence that state control of northern regions followed in the wake of interest in the 
potential resources that Arctic ecosystems, geology and spaces provide.
Today’s norms on sovereignty date back to when the modern state system 
was established in the 1600s, and the doctrine of freedom of the seas was for-
mulated for areas beyond a narrow stretch along the coastlines of states in the 
mid-1700s. Both doctrines were challenged in the 20th century. The notion 
of total state sovereignty over national territory must now compete with new 
global norms such as those related to the responsibility to protect human rights 
as well as environmental values, regardless of sovereign rights. Pushing at the 
traditional regime from the other direction, the freedom of the sea doctrine has 
been circumscribed by the extension of national sovereignty further away from 
national coastlines. On the oceans, the new norms were legally codified in the 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in 1982, following several dec-
ades of negotiations.
The end of the UNCLOS negotiations coincided with another significant 
development for the Arctic: an acute need for new sources of fossil fuels for 
energy, with hopes pinned on Arctic offshore deposits. Onshore oil exploitation 
was already under way in the Soviet Union and Alaska, and to a lesser extent 
also in Canada. South of the Arctic, offshore technologies were being applied 
in the North Sea, and both Norway and the Soviet Union were actively explor-
ing for Arctic offshore deposits. Norway drilled its first ‘wild-cat’ well in the 
Barents Sea in 1980 (Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, 2013: Chapter 5). In the 
Soviet Union, systematic explorations for offshore reserves in the Barents region 
began in the 1960s and increased in the 1970s. Exploratory drilling began in 
1981 (AMAP, 2010: 2_148).
In addition to the increased interest in offshore petroleum, access to marine 
ecosystem resources was also an issue, especially for countries that relied heav-
ily on income from fisheries. Iceland had recent experience of the so-called Cod 
Wars, when it had challenged earlier norms on territorial limits related to marine 
resources, while Norway and the Soviet Union had begun negotiations on access to 
and control of fish stocks in the Barents Sea, where there was no agreement about 
the marine border between the two countries. Furthermore, the ice-covered Arctic 
Ocean provided a place for the military to hide submarines carrying nuclear mis-
siles, while scientists wanted access to learn more about how the Arctic interacted 
with global climate processes. In the Soviet Union, ambitions to industrialize the 
Arctic included a renewed interest in the potential for shipping via the Northern 
Sea Route (Papanin, 1978; Bulatov, 1989).
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The conclusion of UNCLOS brought agreement on the rules of the game and 
a context in which disagreements could be negotiated and settled. It also brought 
most of the Arctic Ocean under the sovereign control of the coastal states, some-
times known as the Arctic 5: Canada, Denmark/Greenland, Norway, the Russian 
Federation (then the Soviet Union) and the United States. The United States has 
yet to sign UNCLOS but abides by its norms in practice, and it is clear from con-
temporary documents that maintaining the freedom of the seas was important in 
early discussions about the need for an Arctic policy (United States Arctic Policy 
Group, 1971). UNCLOS raised concerns also in Sweden, which lacks a coastline 
facing the Arctic Ocean and saw a risk of being denied access. UNCLOS made it 
important to assert a status as a polar nation, and Sweden achieved this by joining 
the Antarctic Treaty, including a prominent planting of a Swedish flag during a 
diplomatic visit to Antarctica in 1985. A speech from the time is illustrative:
We have witnessed, and some of us even participated in one of the biggest 
revolutions in international law of our time, namely the Law of the Sea in 
a short time. Activities of states have become resource oriented in rather a 
dramatic way. To be able to fulfil all goals, present and future, pertaining to 
exploration and exploitation of resources governments must more than ever 
rely on science and technology. Science, foreign policy and international law 
are now related in a way heretofore unexperienced.
(Johnson Theutenberg, 1985)
Sweden also established the Polar Research Secretariat in 1984 to support Swedish 
polar research and its role in politics.
UNCLOS determines the limits of a country’s territorial sea and allows coastal 
states an exclusive economic zone that extends 200 nautical miles (or 370 kilo-
metres) from their own coastlines. Within this range, each nation can engage in 
exploration activities and use available resources. Under Article 76 of the Treaty, 
it is also possible to apply to extend this zone up to around 650 kilometres from 
the coastline, provided that the given country’s continental shelf extends that far, 
which can be established by mapping the seabed. In the Arctic, the coastal states 
have been engaged in such mapping and so far Norway, Russia and Denmark have 
submitted documentation to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental 
Shelf, which evaluates the scientific evidence and makes a recommendation. The 
Commission’s recommendation for Norway was issued in 2009, while the docu-
mentation submitted by Denmark and Russia was still being evaluated as of 2018. 
In cases where claims overlap, it is up to the countries to negotiate. One example 
is the negotiation between Norway and Russia about the delineation in the Barents 
Sea, which was concluded in 2010 (Henriksen and Ulfstein, 2011). Chief among 
the overlapping claims still outstanding as of 2018 are Denmark’s, Russia’s and 
Canada’s claims to part of the Lomonosov Ridge (IBRU, 2018).
Claims to the extended continental shelf are not directly affected by changes in 
the sea ice, even if more open water might make it more urgent for states to have 
their claims documented and evaluated. In its Article 234, however, UNCLOS 
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also gives nations the right to impose environmental controls on ice-covered 
waters. With the ice extent shrinking, national control over waters also becomes a 
matter for dispute. In an attempt to keep up with changing environmental condi-
tions, there has been a successful push from the Arctic Council to revise the Polar 
Code of the International Maritime Organization, and environmental provisions 
of the Polar Code were adopted in 2015 and entered into force in 2017. However, 
the fact that rules and regulations are in place and major powers agree does not 
preclude displays of geopolitical power. It is in this sense that high-profile Arctic 
voyages that showcase various countries’ capacity to navigate Arctic waters 
should be viewed.
When UNCLOS was negotiated in the 1980s, no one seriously considered 
that the Arctic Ocean would ever have the potential to become an ice-free space. 
Attitudes changed following the record Arctic Ocean sea-ice minimum of 2007, 
which caught both researchers and political actors by surprise. In the summer 
of 2007 an expedition planted a titanium Russian flag on the seabed of the 
Arctic Ocean at the North Pole. This was followed by a heated exchange of 
words between political representatives of Canada and Russia (Steinberg et al., 
2015: Chapter 2). Also in 2007, the IPCC presented its fourth assessment report, 
removing any doubt that climate change was real. It was starting to become 
clear that the Arctic Ocean was likely to transform in only a few decades into a 
more accessible space than the ice-laden seascape that had previously presented 
such major challenges for shipping and offshore industrial activities. Would the 
agreements made under UNCLOS hold up in the light of this change, ensur-
ing that the rights of the Arctic 5 would remain intact? Was there a need for a 
new Arctic governance regime with a stronger role than the soft law high-level 
forum of the Arctic Council, which until now had mainly focused on scientific 
assessments?
These developments between 1980 and 2007 form the context for the Ilulissat 
Declaration, which was signed by the Arctic 5 in May 2008 and reaffirmed 10 
years later at a second meeting in Ilulissat in May 2018. The 2008 meeting was 
convened by Denmark for the five coastal states to send ‘a very clear political 
signal to everybody that we will manage the Arctic responsibly, that we have 
the international rules necessary and we will all abide by those rules’ (Thomas 
Winkler, head of international law, Danish Foreign Ministry, as quoted in Borger, 
2008). Moreover, the declaration was a reaction to the media attention on the 
Arctic ‘race for resources’ that had come in the wake of the Russian flag planting 
in the summer of 2007, as well as discussions among scholars, environmental 
NGOs and the EU about the need for a new Arctic governance mechanism. An 
account in the New York Times is illustrative. The reporter highlights how the 
Danish Foreign Minister, Per Stig Møller, ‘alluded to that voyage and the media 
blitz that followed’ and quotes him as saying ‘we have hopefully, once and for all, 
killed all the myths of a “race to the North Pole”’ (Revkin, 2008).
The Ilulissat Declaration did not break any new ground in relation to inter-
national law. It simply asserted that the signatories would abide by the existing 
norms of the Law of the Sea, and that the Arctic 5 would take responsibility for 
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the orderly management of the Arctic Ocean (Dodds, 2013). Its significance was 
political, in that it quashed any illusions that all actors had equal rights in rela-
tion to the Arctic. According to Dodds (2013), this was important in paving the 
way for an opening up of the Arctic Council to new observers, such as China, 
which were forced to relate to this show of power based on the international 
framework for ocean governance that had been agreed in the 1980s. Moreover, it 
reasserted the status of state sovereignty as the foundational principle of modern 
international law, in response to various calls to treat the Arctic Ocean as a global 
commons. Indeed, the Ilulissat Declaration makes reference to this basic principle 
in its first sentence: ‘By virtue of their sovereignty, sovereign rights and jurisdic-
tion in large areas of the Arctic Ocean . . .’ (Arctic Ocean Conference, 2008). 
Danish journalist Martin Breum also places the declaration in the context of the 
politics of Denmark–Greenland relations, where Denmark had a strong interest 
in asserting the Danish realm as a legitimate actor in relation to international law 
at a time of heightened political rhetoric about Greenland’s independence from 
Denmark (Breum, 2018a).
While UNCLOS was as legally relevant before the 2008 Ilulissat meeting as 
it was after, it was not an issue that received much attention in Arctic discourses. 
For example, there was not a single mention of it in the science plans from the 
ICARP-II meeting in 2005, or in any Arctic Council ministerial declarations 
before 2008. The Arctic Climate Impact Assessment, completed in 2004, contains 
one brief mention in relation to fisheries, and the first report on the oil and gas 
assessment published in 2007 only discusses pathways and the environmental and 
health impacts of oil and gas, not rights to the resources as such. The only Arctic 
Council document where it is prominently highlighted is the 2009 Arctic Marine 
Shipping Assessment (Arctic Council, 2009a). However, since the meeting in 
Ilulissat, UNCLOS has become a more prominent part of the Arctic rhetoric. All 
the national Arctic strategies issued after the Ilulissat Declaration make reference 
to UNCLOS. Furthermore, whereas none of the previous Arctic Council ministe-
rial declarations had mentioned it, the Law of the Sea appeared in the preamble 
of the 2009 Tromsø Arctic Council Ministerial Declaration: ‘Recalling that an 
extensive legal framework applies to the Arctic Ocean including, notably, the law 
of the sea, and that this framework provides a solid foundation for responsible 
management of this ocean’ (Arctic Council, 2009b).
Even actors that were highly critical of the Ilulissat meeting because it 
excluded other Arctic countries and indigenous peoples did not question the basic 
principles. One example is Iceland, which was upset about not being included in 
the meeting but pledged adherence to UNCLOS in its Arctic policy statement of 
2011, in which high priority was given to redefining who should be included in 
the exclusive club of coastal states, as stated in its second principle paragraph: 
‘Securing Iceland’s position as a coastal State within the Arctic region as regards 
influencing its development as well as international decisions on regional issues 
on the basis of legal, economic, ecological and geographical arguments’ (Iceland 
Althingi, 2011). The first principle highlighted the Arctic Council as the ‘most 
important consultative forum’.
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A more explicit criticism was expressed in the Inuit Circumpolar Council’s 
(ICC) Declaration of Inuit Sovereignty, which again adhered to the norms of sov-
ereignty set out in the Ilulissat Declaration but redefined them by including a 
broader set of international norms than those expressed in UNCLOS (ICC, 2009). 
Highlighting that ‘Inuit are a people’, the declaration referenced the Charter of 
the United Nations, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Vienna 
Declaration and Programme of Action, the Human Rights Council, the Arctic 
Council and the Organization of American States. Furthermore, it highlighted the 
special rights of indigenous peoples, as spelled out in the 2007 UN Declaration 
on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP). It specifically raised the criti-
cism that while referring to international law, the Ilulissat Declaration focused 
only on UNCLOS. In a scathing criticism of the narrow definition of sovereignty 
in the Ilulissat Declaration, the ICC declaration highlighted various agreements 
from recent years that recognized the right to self-determination, such as land 
claim settlements in Canada and self-government in Greenland, and concluded 
that: ‘The issues of sovereignty and sovereign rights in the Arctic have become 
inextricably linked to issues of self-determination in the Arctic. Inuit and Arctic 
states must, therefore, work together closely and constructively to chart the future 
of the Arctic’.
The ICC declaration builds on the arguments set out in writing on sustain-
able development from 1985–86, as discussed in Chapter 3. The declaration was 
further developed in connection with the ACIA process, by explicitly connecting 
the discourse on the impacts of climate change with a discussion on indigenous 
rights, which included filing a petition to the Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights to Oppose Climate Change Caused by the United States of America 
(Inuit Circumpolar Conference, 2005). This rights perspective is also elaborated 
on in Sheila Watt-Cloutier’s book The Right to Be Cold (Watt-Cloutier, 2015). 
Furthermore, it is increasingly coming to the fore in discussions on ‘stakehold-
ers in the Arctic’, in which representatives of indigenous peoples often reject the 
term stakeholders and instead emphasize the designation ‘rights holders’, which 
emphasizes a legal standing and status that is different from and stronger than that 
of other actors. This shifting international normative context has also been high-
lighted by academics (e.g. Bankes, 2004; Nicol, 2010; Bankes and Koivurova, 
2014). The extent to which this status is recognized in practice has varied over 
time and depended on context, and the Ilulissat Declaration is a clear example that 
it is still often ignored when states see themselves as the only legitimate actors. 
Interestingly, at a follow-up meeting of the Arctic 5 in Chelsea, Canada, in 2009, 
US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton made critical remarks about excluding 
indigenous peoples (Dodds, 2013). Given that the United States a decade earlier 
had been at odds with Canada about including a strong voice for indigenous peo-
ples in the Arctic Council, the statement shows how the narrative of indigenous 
rights had started to make inroads in national policy contexts too.
How is sovereignty discussed in the media? It is fairly prominent in the 
Canadian media: 187 articles in the Globe and Mail have contained both the 
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words Arctic and sovereignty since the late 1970s (the earliest mention in 
LexisNexis is 1977), compared to only a handful of mentions in the New York 
Times and The Guardian. In the US quality press, Scott Borgerson from the US 
Coast Guard Academy discussed sovereignty issues in the New York Times fol-
lowing the Russian flag planting and the response of Canada’s President Harper, 
with a focus on the Arctic being opened up to a race for resources and a call for 
the United States to sign UNCLOS (Borgerson, 2007). In 2013, the theme came 
up in writing about relations between Greenland and China, where the authors 
tried to calm the debate and clarify that Greenland was remaining firmly within 
the realm of Denmark and NATO (Breum and Chemnitz, 2013). Other articles 
gathered from a search of coverage about the Arctic in the New York Times focus 
only on relations between states, and the ICC on Inuit sovereignty is entirely 
absent from the coverage.
Why does the framing of sovereignty matter? Given the history of the Arctic 
as a resource frontier for colonial powers and the different views about desirable 
Arctic futures, sovereignty links directly to control over those resources and their 
role in the future of the region. Notions of sovereignty guide not only who has 
or should have a legitimate voice on different questions, but also the norms on 
what constitutes a valuable resource. Is it the geological features that provide the 
foundation for the mining and fossil fuel industries? Are ecosystem processes 
that serve as controls on the global climate system more valuable, or perhaps the 
local ecosystems that provide food and material, along with cultural identities 
and social networks? The norms that are negotiated within various governance 
systems guide the relative value attributed to these very different features of the 
environment, and shape the policies that build on those norms. Therefore, issues 
of sovereignty are ultimately about who has the moral and legal right to a voice 
in how the future is shaped. An emphasis on state sovereignty, as codified in 
UNCLOS and other legally binding international conventions, has given states a 
strong voice and standing relative to other actors and their interests, while agree-
ments, declarations and governance arrangements that lack this legally binding 
foundation, such as the Arctic Council, have provided more room for other voices, 
including those of indigenous peoples. In this context, the Ilulissat Declaration 
and the ICC’s declaration on Inuit sovereignty are about asserting or trying to 
change the rules of the game—the rules about how the negotiations should be 
carried out.
The global Arctic
Several states that do not have coastlines facing the Arctic Ocean and are not 
among the members of the Arctic Council have nonetheless been active in the 
region historically in research and the exploitation of its resources. When circum-
polar cooperation was being formalized in the early 1990s, their role had to be 
defined. This was not without controversy, as several of the Arctic states wanted 
to maintain control. This was first illustrated in the discussions around IASC as 
a forum for scientific cooperation. Scientists in the United Kingdom, Germany, 
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Poland, France, the Netherlands and Japan did not want to be excluded as the 
new cooperation was being formalized, while some of the Arctic countries were 
highly sceptical about their role. However, science organizations in these coun-
tries were admitted as full members in 1991 (Hacquebord, 2015). In the Arctic 
Environmental Protection Strategy of 1991, the Federal Republic of Germany, 
Poland and the United Kingdom are mentioned as observers that assisted with 
its preparation, together with the ICC, the Nordic Saami Council, the Soviet 
Union Association of Small Peoples of the North, the United Nations Economic 
Commission for Europe, the United Nations Environment Programme and IASC. 
When the Arctic Council was created, the different standings of these organiza-
tions were codified. The indigenous peoples’ organizations were made permanent 
participants, while other interested parties were able to apply for observer status. 
The United Kingdom, Germany, Poland and the Netherlands joined as observers 
in 1998 and France in 2000.
Following the record sea-ice minimum of 2007, which increased the prospects 
for further changes to the physical geography of the region, a second wave of 
actors wanted to participate in shaping the future of the Arctic. These included 
several Asian countries as well as the EU, where the European Parliament called 
for an Arctic Treaty based on the argument that the Arctic was a global commons 
(European Parliament, 2008; for a detailed account of the EU’s Arctic engage-
ment, see Raspotnik, 2018). In the time between the Arctic Council ministerial 
meetings in 2006 and 2009, China, Italy and the Republic of Korea, as well 
as the EU applied for observer status and became ‘ad hoc observers’ at lower 
level meetings, although not in the Arctic Council. The issue of admitting new 
observers remained highly controversial and the only decision taken was to com-
plete a review of the role of observers that had already begun (Arctic Council, 
2009b). The question remained deadlocked throughout the Danish chairmanship 
that followed, but by the time of the Nuuk ministerial meeting in May 2011, the 
Arctic countries had agreed to pursue a package solution to strengthening the 
Arctic Council that included defining the roles and responsibilities of observers 
and establishing a permanent secretariat. This work was to be finalized during 
the Swedish chairmanship (2011–2013). The Kiruna ministerial meeting, which 
concluded the Swedish chairmanship, received unprecedented media coverage 
compared to earlier Arctic Council meetings. In an analysis of 280 news stories 
from the Kiruna ministerial meeting in 2013, Steinberg et al. (2014) note
how the media frame the Arctic as a region of increasing global significance—
a region in which present-day participation is a strategic positioning for the 
future, and in which political presence holds symbolic significance for geo-
political relations far beyond the region’s latitudinal borders’.
(p. 273)
Also significant was the fact that two competing narratives were in play, where 
the newspaper coverage from the Arctic countries tended to be characterized 
as ‘northern protectionism’ while journalism from other parts of the world 
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emphasized ‘global interconnectedness’, even though it discussed similar issues 
such as natural resources, shipping routes, climate change and international 
political status.
The long-drawn-out discussion among the member states and permanent par-
ticipants on the politics of new observer status rules ended in a requirement on 
observers not only to accept and support the objectives of the Arctic Council, but 
also to acknowledge the Arctic states’ ‘sovereignty, sovereign rights and jurisdic-
tions in the Arctic’ and agree that ‘an extensive legal framework applies to the 
Arctic Ocean including, notably, the Law of the Sea, and that this framework 
provides a solid foundation for responsible management of this ocean’ (Arctic 
Council Rules of Procedure, Annex 2). The Arctic Council members had thus put 
down on paper their rules of the game in a way that would help to ensure that they 
maintained control of the region.
According to Paglia (2016), this ‘gatekeeper’ role served as a strong motiva-
tion for potential observers to engage in Arctic science and other activities that 
would prove their legitimacy as Arctic actors. Moreover, it has shaped contem-
porary articulation of what the Arctic is, including expressions such as China’s 
claim to be a ‘near-Arctic state’. While several countries started to engage more 
with the Arctic, China’s activities gained the most attention. These have included 
several Arctic voyages by China’s icebreaking research vessel Xue Long (Snow 
Dragon), built in 1993 and upgraded in 2007 and 2013, establishing a Chinese 
research station on Svalbard in 2003 and keen interest in investing in opportuni-
ties for mineral prospecting in Greenland and in energy infrastructure in Iceland. 
One possible reason for the heightened attention on China’s interest in the Arctic 
might be the growing geopolitical influence of China, where Chinese activities 
in the Arctic have come to be seen as a projection of a shifting global geopoliti-
cal landscape (Chaturvedi, 2012). Other writers, however, have analysed it as 
an expression of ‘orientalism’, or invoking fear of the East at a time when the 
Arctic as a space was opening up and less settled than previously (Dodds and 
Nuttall, 2016: Chapter 6). In this context, the new rules of procedure for the 
Arctic Council are described as an act of disciplining, whereby applicants must 
pledge adherence to the rules set by the Arctic Council (Dodds and Nuttall, 2016: 
citing Blank 2013).
Unlike many other countries, China was in no hurry to publish an official 
Arctic policy statement and its position was initially gleaned from various 
speeches, including occasions where Chinese officials talked about China as a 
near-Arctic state (SIPRI, 2012). In January 2018, however, China published its 
Arctic policy in both English and Mandarin in the Chinese newspaper Xinhua 
(XinhuaNet, 2018). Publication was immediately followed by blog commentar-
ies on its messages. The Danish journalist Martin Breum (2018b) noted that: 
‘China will not rock the Arctic boat per se, but it will, as we have long seen in 
real life, vigorously pursue its interests through any and all legal channels’, in 
a piece that also highlighted how Chinese investment in infrastructure had been 
welcomed across the Arctic. In another blog post, the academic and blogger, Mia 
Bennett, highlights the statement’s language about China being ‘a champion for 
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the development of a community with a shared future for mankind’ and the idea 
that China is a ‘globally-minded country (implicitly contrasted with the selfish 
“America First”)’ and ‘an active participant, builder and contributor in Arctic 
affairs who has spared no efforts to contribute its wisdom to the development of 
the Arctic region’ (Bennett, 2018). Philip Wen of Reuters reported on China’s 
ambition to develop a Polar Silk Road as part of the vast belt and road initiative 
from China to Europe and the Middle East (Wen, 2018).
As a piece of political rhetoric, China’s official policy confirmed many earlier 
informal statements and was thus not itself new, but both its publication and the 
anticipation of its publication illustrate the increasing importance of officially 
articulating a claim to a voice in Arctic affairs. Before 2007, explicit Arctic pol-
icy statements aimed at an international audience were rare, and policies on the 
region were often a matter of internal affairs or connected with specific issues of 
international cooperation, with focus on common environmental concerns. The 
surge in Arctic policy statements after 2007 illustrates how the impacts of climate 
change and the declining sea ice have provided new momentum to the discursive 
shaping of the Arctic space. This flurry mirrors the activities of the late 1980s and 
early 1990s, when IASC and AEPS were negotiated, but with a wider geographic 
breadth of interest. A major difference is that the discussions are now part of a 
public and open debate about the region, because the web has made it easy to 
access and easy to disseminate statements and publications. It is part of a shifting 
media landscape.
Concluding remarks
In the early 2000s, narratives about the global Arctic started to seriously challenge 
the exclusively regional focus that Arctic international governance had fostered 
throughout the 1990s. The global framing stemmed initially from the natural sci-
ences and insights about how the Arctic is connected to the rest of the world. These 
insights gained traction and attention from ongoing international environmental 
policy processes. Probably equally important was the fact that indigenous voices, 
speaking in unison with science, had been empowered by a growing indigenous 
movement to take an active part in the mediation of Arctic storylines. However, 
when the receding sea ice directed the world’s attention to the Arctic, the global 
framing was no longer politically advantageous as it could be implicitly inter-
preted as the Arctic being everyone’s space. Instead, Arctic states and indigenous 
peoples alike started to push a narrative focused on sovereignty, albeit with two 
different meanings. In this narrative, the global is limited to adherence to glob-
ally agreed norms and rules. In the norms summoned by indigenous peoples, the 
right to self-determination is emphasized, whereas the Arctic states have stressed 
rules that provide them with a privileged position vis-à-vis actors from outside 
the region. Somewhat counterintuitively, the geopolitical implication of the major 
shifts in Arctic climate conditions was, at least temporarily, the status quo. In an 
analysis of socio-ecological regime shifts at the circumpolar scale, Nilsson and 
Koivurova (2016) conclude:
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While climate change is often portrayed as a driver of social change in the 
Arctic, it does not appear that the ongoing changes in the biophysical features 
of the Arctic region have rocked current circumpolar governance structures 
out of kilter. On the contrary, the ongoing climate-related changes, in particu-
lar sea ice decline, appear to have reinforced political commitment to existing 
legal structures.
(p. 179)
As long as there are strong interests at stake, however, the discursive struggle 
between global and national scalar perspectives and narratives is likely to continue.
Note
1 The link in Tjernshaugen and Bang (2005) (http://commerce.senate.gov/hearings/ 
testimony.cfm?id=1307&wit_id=3815) is no longer valid but the statement can be retrieved 
from www.ciel.org/Publications/McCainHearingSpeech15Sept04.pdf (accessed 19 March 
2018). This record includes the following statement from Sheila Watt-Cloutier: ‘I ask 
you to look seriously at the Arctic for solutions to the global debate on Climate Change. 
More specifically I ask you to look at the role your Department of State is playing in the 
Arctic Council’s Arctic Climate Impact Assessment process. This assessment has been 
largely paid for by the United States, which has also provided an assessment secretariat 
based at the University of Alaska at Fairbanks. Bob Corell of Harvard University and 
the World Meteorological Institute has done a superb job of Chairing the exercise. The 
assessment is path-breaking and it is crucial that the world knows and understands what 
it says. Yet the Department of State is minimizing and undermining the effectiveness 
of this assessment process by refusing to allow policy recommendations to be pub-
lished in a stand alone form just like the assessment itself. Yet, this is what ministers 
of foreign affairs directed when, in Barrow Alaska in October 2000, they approved the 
assessment’.
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5 A post-petroleum region?
‘A good climate project’. This is how Norway’s Minister of Petroleum and 
Energy, Terje Søviknes, described a new North Sea project that looks set to 
deliver oil for the next 50 years and generate NOK 900 billion in revenues but 
also 1 billion tonnes of carbon emissions into the atmosphere as the oil is burned. 
His logic was that the oil would be extracted using carbon-efficient technologies, 
including solar power. From his viewpoint, the responsibility for the emissions 
does not rest with Norway, but with the countries that burn the oil. When pressed 
about the possible moral considerations of developing new oil and gas fields, 
he responded: ‘The climate challenge is global and must be solved globally’ 
(Søviknes, 2018). Søviknes also expressed high hopes for further discoveries of 
oil and gas in Norway’s Arctic sector.
Support for continuing oil and gas exploitation in the Arctic is not limited 
to state actors. At the 2018 Inuit Circumpolar General Assembly, Rex Rock, 
Chief Executive Officer of the Arctic Slope Regional Corporation, gave his ‘full-
throated endorsement of Arctic oil development’ (Rosen, 2018b). ‘You see, our 
region is dependent upon the economy that oil and gas development brings’, he 
told Arctic Today in an article that also highlighted that the school he was speak-
ing at, in Utqiagvik, Alaska, was, ‘built with oil money, in a city with public 
services funded by oil and with homes that are heated by natural gas that is a 
byproduct of oil development’—and that Rock leads the world’s richest indig-
enous organization.
These two episodes put the spotlight on a major Arctic dilemma: that the Arctic 
is entrenched in a fossil-fuelled global economy. As has been vividly illustrated 
in recent decades, the Arctic is also highly sensitive to climate change, and emis-
sions from burning oil and other fossil fuels are the main culprits. The situation 
creates a double vulnerability: to climate change and to shifts in the demand for 
fossil fuels. To reduce the risk of the most far-reaching impacts of climate change, 
the emission of greenhouse gases, and thus both the consumption and the produc-
tion of fossil fuels, must be cut not at the margins but dramatically. Such a cut 
will require finding alternative ways of fuelling the transport of people and goods, 
heating homes and producing energy-intensive materials and products. Slowly 
but steadily, a combination of new technical solutions and non-fossil forms of 
energy production is starting to transform transport and the production of goods. 
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However, the speed of this shift has been seriously insufficient to reduce the cur-
rent pace of warming. Something more must happen to avoid dangerous climate 
change, which is the goal of the global climate agreement initially negotiated in 
the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) 
(United Nations, 1992) and further confirmed in the 2015 Paris Agreement 
(UNFCCC, 2015). This will require shifting patterns of travel and consumption, 
especially for the growing middle class worldwide, and among the high-emitting 
super rich. It will also require stronger political leadership than has been apparent 
so far (see e.g. IPCC, 2018).
It is arguable that societies should simply accept the inevitability of large-scale 
climate change and focus on building resilience and adaptive capacity in order to 
manage the impacts. It might also be possible to buy some time by reducing emis-
sions of so-called short-lived climate forcers, such as soot (black carbon) and 
methane. These substances have a shorter atmospheric lifetime than carbon dioxide 
and may also be easier to target than taking on the global fossil fuel energy system as 
a whole. In the Arctic, soot is especially problematic because it darkens snow and ice 
so that they are less effective at reflecting the sun’s energy back to space (Cavazos-
Guerra et al., 2017). Unfortunately, these actions would only marginally address the 
overarching issue of slowing down the warming of the planet and reducing the risk of 
major shifts in climate, globally and in the Arctic (Arctic Council, 2013).
Because of the lack of progress in reducing greenhouse gas emissions, a 
growing chorus of voices is calling for cuts to the production of fossil fuels as 
a necessary complement to current policy instruments. This chorus includes 
voices from research on climate policy and energy economics (for a review, see 
Lazarus and van Asselt, 2018), from theorists highlighting how ingrained oil is 
in modern society (Urry, 2013) and in high-profile media stances such as that 
of The Guardian, which is running a dedicated campaign to keep fossil fuels in 
the ground (Rusbridger, 2015). The idea is that deliberately reducing the supply 
of coal, oil and gas would drive up the price of fossil fuel energy and serve as a 
complement to various efforts aimed at reducing demand.
This is not an easy direction of travel, given the powerful political and eco-
nomic interests at stake. These include transnational energy companies, state 
interests related to energy security and maintaining national incomes as well as 
local interests related to job opportunities and tax revenues. It is therefore not 
surprising that addressing climate change by keeping fossil fuels in the ground 
has become a contentious topic in relation to Arctic hydrocarbon resources, as 
illustrated by the above quotes. For environmentalists, the need to reduce the sup-
ply of hydrocarbons has become an added argument against offshore drilling, in 
addition to the risks of pollution and oil spills in pristine environments that have 
been the focus for a long time. From a local perspective, however, the arguments 
do not align quite as nicely. It is easy to agree on the need to avoid pollution and 
oil spills that would be detrimental to everyone. It is a quite different issue to face 
a potential loss of revenues from oil and gas as well as stranded assets in a sce-
nario of reduced production, regardless of whether the cause is plummeting global 
demand or political decisions explicitly aimed at cutting production.
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In a scenario of reduced production, some communities in the Arctic will face 
the serious dilemma of rising costs linked to adaptation to climate change com-
bined with the potential loss of revenue from oil and gas and stranded assets. The 
dip in oil prices following the oil market boom of 2009–2014 provided a sense of 
the coming challenge. In the United States, the dip had a major impact on jobs in 
Alaska (Baumeister and Kilian, 2016; Guettabi, 2016), which unlike many other 
oil-producing states has still not recovered from the recession induced by the oil 
price bust (Guettabi, 2018). In Norway, the number of jobs in the oil sector fell by 
20 per cent between 2013 and 2016 (Pico, 2017). In Russia, the fall in the oil price 
put a dent in the national budget, which relies heavily on income from oil and gas 
(Sabitova and Shavaleyeva, 2015). It also brought the revitalization of the Russian 
Arctic town of Teriberka to a halt, as it was reliant on the development of offshore 
extraction in the Russian Arctic (Nilsson et al., 2019). In a scenario workshop in 
Bodø, Norway, in 2012, some participants saw greater challenges arising from a 
green scenario than from fossil fuel development, at least in the shorter term until 
the economy could adjust (van Oort et al., 2015).
The high stakes involved in the challenge of climate change, including the 
need to move society away from a fossil fuel-based energy system, make climate 
politics a good test case for the potential and limitations of international regional 
governance mechanisms. It raises many of the overarching issues of how a regional 
perspective relates to local, national and global initiatives, as well as the varied 
interests across spatial scales. It is also an area in which media attention and the 
mediation of political messages intersect with issues of governance and whose 
voices should weigh most heavily. To provide a foundation for a discussion of 
the role of regional governance in climate politics, with a focus on reducing the 
supply of fossil fuels, this chapter presents some brief background on the national 
interests at play. It also discusses how Arctic oil and gas figure in media reporting 
about the region and analyses the policy narratives as they appear in national Arctic 
policies and Arctic Council documents. Based on these and the material presented 
in Chapters 2 to 4 on the shifting media landscape and on the wider context of how 
Arctic governance has evolved over time, the chapter seeks to answer one of the 
core questions of this book: What role can regional international governance play 
when there is a strong need for political action but competing interests?
What is at stake?
Environmental organizations often argue that extracting oil in the Arctic is absurd 
because of the local environmental risks linked to exploration and exploitation, 
and the need to move away from fossil fuels in order to save the planet. These 
arguments came strongly to the fore in the widely mediated protests against the 
activities of Shell in the Chukchi Sea, especially after the Kulluk platform ran 
aground and had to be towed to Seattle harbour where it became a highly visible 
symbol of the risks of oil exploration (Funk, 2015; Johnson, 2015a). Such critical 
views from outsiders are not necessarily welcomed by actors in the Arctic. This 
was clear at an event organized by the Arctic Economic Council in connection 
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with the Arctic Council Fairbanks ministerial meeting in May 2017, where a voice 
from the podium emphasized that Inuit, not outsiders, should make the decisions 
on their economic future. This stance is not based on a lack of concern about 
climate change and its impacts, where Arctic indigenous peoples have played a 
key role in highlighting the implications for the region (e.g. Watt-Cloutier et al., 
2006), but rather a reaction against others claiming a right to impose decisions on 
a region that is moving toward increased political independence. The reception 
for such claims or impositions will always be coloured by past experiences of 
colonialism. Strong reactions are also fuelled by more recent experiences, such 
as the impacts on local northern economies in Canada and Greenland of the EU’s 
ban on imports of seal skin, which was partly linked to a campaign in which 
Greenpeace played a major role (Sellheim, 2013).
In the mediation of the impacts of climate change in the Arctic, indigenous 
voices and voices from science and the environmental movement have amplified 
each other because of a shared interest in raising awareness of what is happening. 
Indigenous peoples are even brought to events to play exactly that role, where 
they are delegated to speak on behalf of the climate (Bjørst, 2012). In debates 
about reducing the extraction of fossil fuels in the Arctic, the intersection of dif-
ferent stakeholder interests is more complex, and there are conflicting lines of 
loyalties. To understand the challenges of moving toward a post-petroleum future 
for the Arctic, it is therefore necessary to understand the interests at stake for dif-
ferent Arctic actors.
Local situations vary across the Arctic and interests are closely linked to eco-
nomic structures. Of critical importance is the extent to which local and state 
economies rely on income and jobs from the hydrocarbon sector, but also how 
other sectors, such as shipping and tourism, might be affected either by higher 
oil prices or by climate change. What are the available options and what are the 
risks involved? While they have the potential to be greatly affected, local com-
munities rarely have much of a say in how global energy systems should develop. 
Such decisions are partly in the hands of energy corporations and energy-using 
industries, partly in the hands of national politics and partly in the hands of con-
sumers spread across the world. Focusing on the political scene, national actors 
have a considerable interest in a cheap and secure supply of energy for industry 
and transport, among other things. In regions where the ground holds hydrocarbon 
reserves, states also have considerable power in determining the future production 
of fossil fuels, as they often control the use of land and sea, and possess the legisla-
tive muscle and economic policy tools to either support or constrain development. 
Four Arctic states—Russia, the United States, Norway and Canada—are signifi-
cant players in the global fossil fuel energy market. In terms of future development, 
Greenland also figures in the discussion on Arctic hydrocarbon extraction.
Russia as the oil and gas giant
Russia possesses the lion’s share of Arctic oil and gas resources and its produc-
tion accounts for 95 per cent of total Arctic petroleum production. Moreover, 
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90 per cent of Russia’s total oil production comes from the Arctic (Lindholt and 
Glomsrød, 2015). Most of this is from onshore fields in West Siberia that were ini-
tially developed in the 1960s and expanded in the late 1970s and 1980s (AMAP, 
2010: 2_44). In the late 1970s, exploration also began offshore in the Barents and 
Kara seas, which led to the discovery of the huge Shtokman gas field in 1988.
Initially, hopes were high that development of the Shtokman field would 
bring much needed economic development to the Murmansk region, which had 
suffered severely in Russia’s economic downturn in the 1990s, but various cir-
cumstances brought the project’s development to a halt. First, there was the shale 
gas revolution, which undermined the market for liquefied natural gas (LNG) that 
would have made the project economically viable. Then, after Russia’s annexa-
tion of Crimea, the import of essential technologies for offshore development 
was hit by sanctions by the west. As a result, the whole project was put on hold 
(Nilsson and Filimonova, 2013) and the high hopes for local and regional eco-
nomic development were dashed (Nilsson et al., 2019). As of 2018, the only 
offshore development in active production is the Prirazlomnoye field. However, 
the development of onshore resources continues with a major focus on the Yamal 
Peninsula, where almost all of Russia’s gas production takes place (Lindholt and 
Glomsrød, 2015). While future relations with European investors and markets 
remain uncertain, Russia has turned to the east and engaged with China, where 
access to energy resources plays a key role in an emerging Arctic-related relation-
ship between the two states (Sørensen and Klimenko, 2017).
For Russia, Arctic oil and gas holds the key to both the national economy 
and regional development in parts of Russia’s north. It is also a tool of geopoli-
tics, in which the control of gas pipelines and prices figure into the relationships 
between Russian and former Soviet republics as well as between Russia and the 
EU (Högselius, 2013). The political stakes in Arctic oil and gas are thus very 
high, while at the same time the scale of production makes Russia an international 
oil and gas giant. Furthermore, projections of future production under differ-
ent climate policy scenarios, that is with or without policies to enforce the Paris 
Agreement, indicate that most of the growth of oil and gas production will take 
place in the Russian Arctic (Lindholt and Glomsrød, 2015).
Norway’s High North mission
Norway’s role as a fossil fuel producer began in the 1960s with exploration 
of offshore resources in the North Sea and the claim to sovereignty over the 
Norwegian continental shelf, including agreements on delineations against the 
United Kingdom and Denmark. At the end of the 1970s, the area north of 62°N 
was also opened up for petroleum activities and exploration moved northward. 
In 2005, Norway launched a major new policy initiative in respect of its Arctic 
region. Based on a study of Norwegian media coverage, Jensen and Hønneland 
(2011) called this new focus ‘The great narrative of the High North’. This ini-
tiative was in part based on foreign policy and Norway’s geographical location 
as a NATO outpost facing its huge neighbour, Russia. However, the underlying 
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current was linked to offshore petroleum resources in the Barents Sea on both 
the Norwegian and the Russian side. There was also a sense of urgency not to 
be left behind if Russia, with support from potential gas buyers in the United 
States, moved ahead. The hope was that Norway would become the supplier 
of offshore technology and know-how for the huge Shtokman field. Some of 
the documents of the time contained grand plans (e.g. Norwegian Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, 2006). Jensen and Hønneland describe these efforts as a 
nation-focused parallel to the foreign policy-driven region-building efforts of 
the 1990s, which focused on building relations with neighbouring countries in 
the Barents region.
Norway’s own Arctic resources were also being developed, and production 
from its major gas field (Snøhvid) came online in 2007. The context was one in 
which Norway’s non-Arctic production was moving past its peak and the Arctic 
region was of special interest for maintaining the income that had been so essen-
tial to building Norway’s modern economic welfare. The push to support the 
petroleum industry has had major impacts on governance. Most important from 
an international perspective was that in 2010 Norway and Russia finally settled 
their disputed maritime border in the Barents Sea, where control of resources is 
essential to any offshore development (Jensen, 2011). Nationally, an integrated 
management plan for the Barents Sea was established to provide a framework 
for addressing conflicting interests and resolving any potential disputes (Olsen 
et al., 2007). Hopes for regional economic development in the north have played 
a key role in the storyline of the High North. One example is a 2006 document, 
Barents 2020, in which the authors lament the fact that the goals of creating work 
and economic growth in northern Norway that were set in 1993 had not been met 
(Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2006).
Norway’s hydrocarbon extraction is all offshore and the economic impacts, 
except in relation to national income, are localized to places with onshore activi-
ties. One example in the Arctic is Hammerfest, where Statoil has built its onshore 
terminal and LNG facility for the Barents Sea gas fields. For the local popula-
tion, development has provided job opportunities and had ripple effects on the 
local economy, making Hammerfest an attractive place to live (Loe and Kelman, 
2016). However, for Arctic Norway as a whole, the economic value added by the 
petroleum industry is less than 1 per cent, dwarfed by sectors such as health care 
& social work, as well as public administration and the defence sector. In 2012, 
the petroleum industry ranked only 22nd among the sectors listed by Glomsrød 
et al. (2015b: 59). Overall, the Norwegian petroleum industry can therefore be 
described as a national interest, where it contributes about half of the country’s 
export income, and a local interest in the specific places that benefit economically 
from new job opportunities and investment, which creates hope in places that had 
previously been affected by economic hardship.
In a recent development, there has been increased attention in Norway on the 
sustainability of its focus on petroleum, leading to calls for a debate about what 
a post-petroleum era would look like (Dale and Kristoffersen, 2016). A study of 
media coverage of sustainability issues in the Arctic also shows a parallel upturn 
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in attention on the issue of climate change and oil, which might signal that the 
question is becoming part of the public discussion in a way that it was not in pre-
vious media coverage of the Arctic (Reistad, 2016). Furthermore, local security 
narratives increasingly emphasize the potential risks of petroleum-related activi-
ties, as well as increasing tensions between national and local perspectives (Dale 
and Kristoffersen, 2018).
Alaska’s oil economy
In the United States, supply from Alaska has formed an important part of the 
country’s oil economy since the development of the Prudhoe Bay oil field in the 
1970s, which came at a time when OPEC oil embargos had made the vulnerability 
of US energy supplies vividly apparent, through long lines at petrol stations and 
soaring petrol prices. The US Energy Information Administration agency ranked 
Alaska fifth among US states for crude oil production in April 2018 (US Energy 
Information Administration, 2018a). In 2017, the state produced approximately 5 
per cent of US crude oil. Before fracking made new petroleum resources available 
further south, it was even more important, producing 17 per cent in 2005. Most 
of this oil comes from the fields in North Slope, Alaska (for an overview, see 
AMAP, 2010: Chapter 2.4). In the decades after the large-scale development of 
Alaska’s oil began in the 1970s, the fields were of major national interest from an 
energy security point of view. This spurred major infrastructure investment, not 
least in building the trans-Alaska pipeline, and played a key role in the develop-
ment of a national Arctic policy (Nilsson, 2018b). It also transformed Alaska’s 
economy into one that is heavily dependent on income from the petroleum indus-
try, with ups and downs that track the global market (Cole and Cravez, 2004; 
Guettabi, 2016, 2018).
For Alaska, revenues from oil play a central role in the state’s economy, both 
for the public sector budget and for individuals who do not pay income tax but 
instead receive some of the dividends. In 2012, the oil and gas sectors accounted 
for 19.3 per cent of the economic value added by different sectors, surpassed only 
by the category ‘public administration and defense’ (Lindholt and Glomsrød, 
2015: 38). Alaska is also a major energy user, ranked third among states in energy 
consumption per capita (US Energy Information Administration, 2018b). It is 
therefore no surprise that Alaskan politics have been pro-oil rather than focused on 
environmental concerns. This has included laments over former President Barack 
Obama’s attempt to place limits on the areas in which exploration can take place 
and applause for President Donald J. Trump’s efforts to ensure that as much of 
Alaska as possible is open to the oil business (Nilsson, 2018b). However, there are 
some signs that the hegemony of the pro-petroleum discourse in Alaska is starting 
to be challenged. The state is being hit hard by the impacts of climate change, and 
in the summer of 2018 Alaska’s climate action team, appointed by the Governor, 
drafted a 45-page action plan that included suggestions for a system of carbon pric-
ing, partly to offset missing income from dwindling oil revenues and partly to start 
to address and mitigate the effects of climate change (Rosen, 2018a). However, 
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any such shifts are likely to meet resistance, as was quickly demonstrated in an 
opinion piece in Arctic Today just days after the action plan made the news (Cole, 
2018). What happens in Alaska will also depend on federal politics, and on how 
energy companies assess the costs and opportunities linked to new drilling ven-
tures, which in turn will relate to market analyses, operating costs and risks, and 
exploration results. How investors are affected by the mediated public image of 
energy companies might also play a role, which environmental NGOs will try to 
exploit. One example is how the press covered Obama’s high-level GLACIER 
conference in August 2015, in preparation for the Paris climate conference later 
the same year. Journalists’ interests were heavily focused on Shell’s decision to 
retreat from drilling, and some in the media framed the withdrawal as an environ-
mentalist victory (e.g. Krauss and Reed, 2015), in contrast to the victory of the 
oil industry only a few months earlier when Obama gave conditional approval for 
drilling off the Arctic coast (Davenport, 2015). The debate within Alaska about job 
losses was given less coverage in major international media, as were other issues 
that probably featured in the decision, such as environmental regulations, negative 
exploration results, low oil prices and high operating costs.
Canada
The Canadian Arctic contains major oil and gas reserves but these are much 
less developed than in Alaska (AMAP, 2010: Chapter 2.4). Oil and gas are 
also less important to the overall economy, and the sector accounts for less than 
4 per cent of economic value added by different sectors in the region, compared 
to mining which is 17 per cent (Lindholt and Glomsrød, 2015: 44). The lack of 
development can be explained by the major challenges linked to the huge dis-
tances and lack of infrastructure, which would require major investment that is 
unlikely while resources that are cheaper to extract are available further south, 
such as the Alberta oil sands. In recent years, production in the Arctic and the 
value it adds to the economy have been in decline, mainly because the fields are 
starting to reach the end of their lifespan (Lindholt and Glomsrød, 2015: 45). 
Furthermore, in 2016 Prime Minister of Canada Justin Trudeau issued a statement 
on Arctic climate leadership together with US President Barack Obama (Prime 
Minister of Canada, 2016). However, like the debate in Alaska, Trudeau was 
unpopular in the north among those who might stand to benefit from hydrocarbon 
development, who pointed out that they had not been consulted about the ban 
beforehand (Van Dusen, 2016).
In terms of national media coverage of the Canadian Arctic in the Globe 
and Mail, the focus on oil does not dominate as much as it does in the United 
States and oil does not seem to have driven media attention in recent years. In 
the 1970s and 1980s, however, hopes were high for oil riches and these were 
prominent in the media, including headlines such as ‘The Great Arctic Energy 
Rush’ in Business Weekly on 4 January 1983. Such hopes were inspired by 
development in Alaska, and led to major Canadian public investment in geo-
logical surveys of the north, as documented in detail by economic historian Paul 
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Ward, who also highlights the high hopes connected with narratives about the 
destiny of Canada as a nation (Warde, 2018).
Greenland
Greenland is not an oil producer. There are considerable undiscovered offshore 
oil and gas resources (Bird et al., 2008) and some potential drilling sites have 
been located by seismic surveying, but explorative drilling has so far not resulted 
in any viable extraction. A number of companies have pulled out of their engage-
ment in recent years. A scenario study assessment of future Arctic oil and gas 
production predicts that production is unlikely to start before 2040, after which 
there could be rapid growth in gas production (Lindholt and Glomsrød, 2015). 
Greenland’s political interest in oil and gas is very much linked to hopes of 
improving the national economy and ultimately becoming economically inde-
pendent of Denmark. However, future development will depend as much on the 
level of interest from foreign companies as on the government’s interest in issuing 
licences. Environmental NGOs also claim to have had a role in stopping further 
prospecting (e.g. Carrell and van der Zee, 2010).
Media narratives on Arctic oil and gas
Drilling for oil in the Arctic is a risky business that requires major commitment 
from governments as well as from energy companies. Not only are the costs high 
for operating in harsh environments far from markets, but the consequences of 
an oil spill would create public relations risks that environmental NGOs will be 
eager to exploit. In such a context, narratives that create high expectations about 
financial or political gains play an important role in encouraging investment, as 
Paul Warde showed in his study of Canada in the 1970s and 1980s (Warde, 2018). 
Expectations raised can relate to: financial gains from a business point of view; 
grand narratives about nation building, as in the case of Canada but also Norway 
and Greenland; national energy security, a key issue for the United States in the 
1970s and 1980s; and geopolitical power. Russia’s use of its gas exports is a 
prime example of the latter. Narratives need fuel, and the media can play a pivotal 
role in strengthening or challenging certain ideas. It is therefore useful to take a 
closer look at how Arctic oil and gas resources are discussed in various media.
One of the few longitudinal studies of media coverage of the Arctic—focused 
on the Canadian press—shows that already in the 1970s ‘it was the potential for 
energy resources, liquid natural gas and oil that riveted the media’s attention’ 
(Nicol, 2013: 216). Nicol notes that while the media focused on the potential of 
oil and gas, some alarms were already being sounded about the impacts of oil 
spills on fragile Arctic environments—and these made it onto the news agenda. 
Over the following decades, various other discourses became more apparent in 
the media’s coverage of the Arctic, but in absolute numbers a framing centred on 
resources and economic development maintained a strong position in Canada’s 
media coverage.
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Our own work has focused on the coverage of Arctic oil in the New York Times 
and The Guardian, complemented by insights from studies of how the Arctic has 
been framed in Russian and Norwegian media and some examples from Sweden, 
which does not have any oil resources of its own.
In the New York Times, early attention on the Arctic was closely linked to 
the discovery of the Prudhoe Bay oil field in Alaska in 1968 and the subsequent 
building of the trans-Alaska pipeline, and the newspaper featured regular updates 
on political and legal processes. Looking at more recent coverage in articles from 
2007–2015, a substantial part of the paper’s interest in the region was still closely 
linked to oil. In fact, the increase in the frequency of the word ‘oil’ in 2009 fol-
lowed by a drop in 2014 appears to mirror a similar increase and decline in the 
frequency of the word ‘Arctic’. As is apparent from Figure 2.2, the drop also 
followed the fall in the oil price. The use of words such as ‘climate’ or ‘ice’ 
increases only later, with a peak in 2012 when the Arctic sea ice receded to an 
unprecedented extent for a second time in six years.
A closer look at the articles in the New York Times that mention the word ‘oil’ 
shows that in 2007, the emphasis was heavily on business opportunities with an 
eye on the soaring oil price. There is a tone of great optimism that includes out-
looks on both Norway and Russia. One example is a major article about how the 
Snøhvid field was set to supply gas to US homes (Mouawad, 2007). In 2015, after 
the oil business was hit by a major drop in the global market price, the tone was 
much more sombre. Social issues came to the fore, as well as the curse of being 
dependent on oil incomes (Johnson, 2015b). The morality of extracting oil and 
gas in the Arctic, given the risk of pollution and the impacts of greenhouse gas 
emissions on the climate, also featured prominently, along with the politics of 
allowing exploration in the National Wildlife Reserve. One example is how the 
journalistic coverage highlighted the contradiction in Obama’s stance, when he 
called the world’s attention to the impacts of climate change in the Arctic while at 
the same time allowing offshore drilling. The story of Shell’s Arctic ventures and 
the company’s eventual withdrawal from the Arctic also featured in the New York 
Times (Krauss and Reed, 2015).
Oil is also one of the most important topics in The Guardian’s coverage of 
the Arctic in the period 2007–2015, but a quantitative snapshot of how often the 
word oil is used finds that attention on the Arctic does not appear to be as tightly 
linked to oil as it was in the New York Times. The most interesting feature in the 
patterns of shifts over time is the sharp increase in the use of both words, oil and 
climate, between 2014 and 2015. A closer analysis of the articles that mention 
the word ‘oil’ in The Guardian’s coverage of the Arctic in 2015 reveals that this 
attention was partly connected to a number of news events that were also covered 
by the New York Times, especially Shell’s activities in the Arctic, including first 
the approval to drill by President Obama and later Shell’s decision to abandon 
its activities in the Chukchi Sea and withdraw from the region. This reporting 
included drawing attention to campaigns by environmental NGOs as well as 
reporting on the political debate in the USA and the business risks involved in 
Arctic petroleum activities.
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Specific to The Guardian is an explicit editorial campaign to push for fossil 
fuels to be kept in the ground in order to protect the climate, with several in-depth 
articles about the rationale and the implications for the petroleum industry. The 
campaign was not specifically focused on the Arctic but included enough men-
tions to affect the amount of coverage about oil in a sample of articles that cover 
the Arctic. One example is how Obama’s stance on drilling and climate was used 
as an illustration:
Barack Obama has the same problem. During a television interview last year, 
he confessed that ‘We’re not going to be able to burn it all’. So why, he 
was asked, has his government been encouraging ever more exploration and 
extraction of fossil fuels? His administration has opened up marine oil explo-
ration from Florida to Delaware—in waters that were formally off-limits. 
It has increased the number of leases sold for drilling on federal lands and, 
most incongruously, rushed through the process that might, by the end of this 
month, enable Shell to prospect in the highly vulnerable Arctic waters of the 
Chukchi Sea.
(Monbiot, 2015)
A closer look at the articles that include the word ‘oil’ reveals that in 2007, The 
Guardian’s attention on the Arctic and oil focused on geopolitical and governance 
issues related to rights over this ‘oil-rich’ region, including the infamous planting 
of the Russian flag on the seabed at the North Pole, within a race-for-resources 
framing. The Russian oil boom, including its geopolitical context, also drew jour-
nalistic attention. In contrast to the 2015 coverage, the issue of climate change 
was almost absent from the 2007 articles that mentioned ‘oil’. Even if it appears 
to have been a more important topic overall, it was apparently treated as a separate 
issue. A steep rise in articles that included the three words ‘Arctic’, ‘climate’ and 
‘oil’ appears to have taken place in 2015, concurrent with The Guardian’s explicit 
focus on climate change and keeping hydrocarbon resources in the ground. In 
coverage of the Arctic in the New York Times, there was also an increase in the 
number of mentions of oil and climate in the same article in 2015, but not to the 
same extent as in The Guardian.
Also present in The Guardian’s Arctic coverage but not as dominant was the 
longstanding discourse on drilling versus protection of the fragile Arctic environ-
ment, where the focus was more on local impacts, especially related to the risk 
of accidents, and the unique features of the threatened environments. It is notable 
that the geographic focus within the Arctic was almost exclusively on oil activi-
ties in the United States, with only a few articles about Russia and Norway.
Russian sources of information about the Arctic naturally have a different 
focus, but the emphasis on hydrocarbon resources would seem to be a common 
denominator. A large quantitative study aimed at mapping the media situation in 
the Russian Far North and the Arctic Zone using algorithms for automatic topic 
detection highlights hydrocarbon production in the Yamal-Nenets autonomous 
okrug, or district, and offshore in the Arctic Ocean as major topics. The issue of 
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climate change was mentioned only in relation to scientific expeditions (Devyatkin 
et al., 2017). In a study comparing Russian and Norwegian media, Nefidova (2014) 
notes that the media debate was very much governed by the views of official 
political spokespeople, notably President Putin. Nefidova (2014: 83) found that 
‘the resource discourse’ is one on which the Russian public keeps a ‘voluntary or 
enforced silence’. This also held true when western environmental NGOs sought to 
engage with Russian oil and gas ventures, such as in the Arctic Sunrise ‘incident’ 
in 2013 when Greenpeace tried to climb on to the Prirazlomnaya drilling platform 
to halt its activities. The activists were arrested, and this was followed by a court 
process in which they were first accused of piracy, but this was later changed to 
hooliganism (Nefidova, 2014). A study of how the Arctic was covered in the offi-
cial newspaper Rossiyskaya Gazeta between 2007 and 2016 shows how this event 
was initially treated as a security matter, raising risks related to threats of terrorism, 
but that the tone later shifted to a stronger focus on the geopolitical implications of 
oil and gas in the Arctic (Klimenko et al., 2019).
With regard to the overall discussion of oil and gas, the Klimenko study found 
that the tone was initially optimistic, with a focus on the potential to develop the 
resources of the Arctic shelf. Arctic offshore resources were described as a guar-
antee of maintaining high levels of oil production in Russia once the traditional 
areas of resource extraction, primarily in Western Siberia, had been depleted. The 
Arctic was often referred to as a ‘resource base for the 21st century’, quoting a 
famous speech by then President Medvedev (Aleksey, 2008). Between 2010 and 
2013, the focus was on how to turn the Arctic, and the Arctic continental shelf 
specifically, into a major source of hydrocarbons and the obstacles that had to be 
overcome. Problems of geological prospecting, a lack of technological solutions 
for developing offshore deposits, and the need to stimulate national companies 
and attract foreign partners were the major focus.
From time to time, voices appeared to question the necessity, urgency and 
efficiency of Arctic shelf development. However, in contrast to the discussions 
in The Guardian, environmental concerns were not discussed as a reason to post-
pone tapping into the Arctic’s resources. The focus was instead on questioning 
the competitiveness of the Arctic projects compared to other potential sources 
of oil extraction, such as tar sands (Dolgopolov et al., 2011). Examples of simi-
lar questions increased in connection with the closure of the Shtokman project 
in 2012. However, discussion of cooperation with foreign companies and the 
creation of favourable tax conditions for working on the Arctic shelf continued 
until western sanctions were imposed following Russia’s annexation of Crimea, 
which radically changed the situation. In 2014, just months after production 
began at Prirazlomnaya, the impact of western sanctions became a topic of media 
attention related to Arctic oil and gas, resulting in a more cautious tone about its 
economic potential and feasibility given the absence of international partners. At 
the beginning of 2015, an opinion piece suggested a pause in the development 
of Arctic projects: ‘Should we, under such conditions, force development of the 
shelf or the Arctic Ocean? Why, despite the great importance of this region to 
Russia, not take a pause in the development of the Arctic oil and gas fields?’ 
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(Primakov, 2015). However, later in 2015–2016 the discussion returned to ways 
to develop the Arctic in spite of sanctions, and the absence of technology and 
foreign partners, rather than postponing or pausing development.
A totally different perspective is provided in the independent newspaper, 
Novaya Gazeta, where the need for Arctic resource development is repeat-
edly questioned. For instance, Novaya Gazeta called for less optimism from 
the government regarding the melting of the Arctic ice (Zakharov, 2009) and 
raised questions about the ecological risks related to the Prirazlomnaya rig in 
the Pechora sea (Novaya Gazeta, 2011), as well as the uncompetitive nature of 
the resource projects on the Arctic shelf (Dokuchaev, 2012). It also often criti-
cized the approach of the Russian government to developing the Arctic, calling 
attention to its inefficiency and lack of regard for the environment in the region 
(Latynina, 2008).
In the Swedish and Norwegian press, ‘oil’ appeared as a subject in a handful of 
articles in the mid-1970s and another handful in the early to mid-1980s, connected 
to the potential for oil extraction on Svalbard and developments in the Russian 
Arctic. In the few articles that appeared before 1990, the focus ranged from indus-
trial potential to environmental concerns and polar research. In Norway, attention 
on the Arctic surged in 2005, in connection with the launch of the High North 
Strategy which was intended to move northern Norway into a golden age based 
on oil and fisheries as the basis for a regional economic boom. A study of the 
Norwegian media discourse since 2007 (focused on the years 2012 and 2015 and 
the national newspaper Aftenposten) shows that oil was an important topic in the 
Arctic coverage, where articles about resource demands and extraction dominated 
other topics such as climate change and environmental issues (Reistad, 2016: 21). 
The attention on resource demand and extraction seems to have been connected to 
changes in the oil price, discussions about the need to extract the oil in the Arctic, 
the Paris Agreement and the so-called race for resources in the Arctic. Like The 
Guardian, there is an increasing focus on both oil and climate in the same article 
in 2015. Based on her Norwegian results, Reistad speculates that this might signal 
a shift that could potentially ‘lead to these topics being treated together also in the 
political discourse’ (Reistad, 2016: 41). This twist is further supported by a study 
of Russian and Norwegian media coverage of environmental issues and the Arctic 
in 2013–2014, where Nefidova observes that the Norwegian media used climate 
change as an argument against exploitation of the Arctic ecosystem, and describes 
this as a sign of a moral discourse and ‘a new imaginative barrier . . . for the pro-
ponents of the resource-based economy’ that is characteristic of the two countries’ 
engagement in the Arctic (Nefidova, 2014: 125).
Given the above observations on how the media has discussed the Arctic and 
oil, there may have been a shift in the general discourse, whereby the economic 
hydrocarbon resource narrative is starting to be seriously challenged by an oil/
climate/environment narrative. It is difficult to tell how enduring this shift will 
be, given that the empirical material only covers the period to 2015 when the 
Paris Agreement was moving climate change high up the international agenda 
at about the same time as the oil business was starting to feel the squeeze from 
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falling oil prices. This combination may have made new extraction ventures in the 
Arctic less attractive from a business point of view and thus provided space for an 
alternative narrative to emerge. Such a window can easily close as the market shifts. 
The quotes at the beginning of this chapter indicate that oil optimism had returned 
to the political discourse by 2018, without necessarily linking plans for extraction in 
the Arctic to any moral obligation related to mitigating climate change.
The policy narrative
How do Arctic policy narratives compare with the media coverage? One way to get 
a sense of the dominant policy concerns is to examine national Arctic strategies. 
By 2013, all the Arctic states had published strategy documents that highlighted 
their political priorities, and some countries have since published updated versions 
or more detailed implementation plans. A closer look at the strategies launched 
in 2007–2013 finds both differences from and similarities to the media coverage. 
The most striking difference in the words used in these documents is the heavy 
emphasis on cooperation, which is largely absent from the media coverage, and 
that relatively less attention is paid to oil. The words ‘climate’ and ‘environment’ 
figure prominently as does ‘research’. A similar emphasis on ‘cooperation’, and 
on ‘climate’ and ‘environment’, is also apparent in the biannual ministerial dec-
laration by the Arctic Council. The attention on oil is also less prominent here, 
and exclusively focused on issues related to oil pollution, or in recent years on 
the efforts to coordinate the prevention of oil spills and pollution. However, a 
closer reading of the Arctic strategies, the ministerial declaration of 2013 and a 
vision document presented by the Arctic Council in 2013 reveals a shift in empha-
sis toward supporting economic development, in which cooperation becomes a 
tool for making the Arctic a ‘safe operating space for business’ (Nilsson, 2018a). 
While attention to climate change features prominently, there are no signs of the 
moral discourse in relation to the extraction of fossil fuel resources that highlights 
the need to keep hydrocarbons in the ground.
Looking at the activities of the Arctic Council and its working groups, a dis-
cussion of the conflicting interests at the intersection between reducing emissions 
of greenhouse gases and developing Arctic oil and gas resources is also absent. 
This is hardly surprising, given the strong national interest in oil and gas, but is, 
nonetheless, striking. The Arctic Council has carried out a major assessment of the 
impacts of oil and gas activities in the Arctic (AMAP, 2010). It was highly ambi-
tious in mapping both the environmental and the social impacts of such activities, 
but explicitly excludes discussion of the connection between fossil fuels and cli-
mate change (p. 1_2). International cooperation in the Arctic Council excludes 
some issues that are linked to strong national interests, such as military security. 
It also tends to avoid or be careful about issues where strong national economic 
interests are at stake, such as fisheries and whaling. The Arctic Council came late 
to the issue of climate change but since it has been on the agenda, climate change 
impact assessments have played a prominent role in its work and in directing 
attention to the sensitivity of the region in terms of both local environments and 
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livelihoods, and in relation to the global climate (ACIA, 2005; AMAP, 2011, 
2017c). There have also been considerable efforts to map emissions of short-lived 
climate forcers, especially soot, and to get these under control. However, when it 
comes to emissions of greenhouse gases and the links to the extraction of fossil 
fuels in the Arctic, the Arctic Council has been silent (Nilsson and Meek, 2016).
Looking at how various media have discussed climate politics in relation to 
the Arctic Council, a study of how different governance bodies are covered in the 
media showed that black carbon emerges as a regional concern, but that the focus 
on the mitigation of Arctic warming mainly occurred within a global framing. In 
the coverage of the UNFCCC, the Arctic primarily featured as the signifier of cli-
mate change rather than in relation to specific regional-local concerns (Buurman 
and Christensen, 2017).
A challenge for circumpolar international governance
The impacts of global climate change in the Arctic are undeniable and will con-
stitute a major long-term challenge to sustainable development in the region, 
directly through impacts on livelihoods, infrastructure and everyday life, and 
indirectly as the need for costly adaptation measures diverts resources from other 
investments. It is also beyond doubt that curbing further climate change will 
require dramatically reduced emissions of greenhouse gases from the use of fos-
sil fuels. To reach the goal of the 2015 Paris Agreement—to keep warming as 
a global average below 1.5 or 2 °C—will require considerably more effort to 
reduce emissions of greenhouse gases than has been put in place so far (IPCC, 
2018). Moreover, studies of the pathways to such a goal show that policies aimed 
at reducing the use of fossil fuels will not be sufficient, and that these will have to 
be complemented with cutting down on the extraction of hydrocarbons (Lazarus 
and van Asselt, 2018). According to one estimate, if all the oil, gas and coal from 
existing extraction sites is burned, the global temperature rise would exceed the 
2 °C limit (Kartha et al., 2018). In the circumpolar north, this global average 
could lead to at least twice this rise in temperature due to Arctic amplification. 
If additional oil and gas fields are explored and developed, more fossil fuels 
will reach the market and an emerging view from research on the topic is that 
such additional supplies would make it impossible to reach the goals of the Paris 
Agreement (Lazarus and van Asselt, 2018), and thus also make it impossible to 
slow the pace of climate change in the Arctic.
As is repeatedly highlighted in many recent accounts of the Arctic, a large 
share of global unexplored hydrocarbon reserves is to be found in the region, 
mainly under the continental shelf (Bird et al., 2008). Based on the strong focus 
on oil in media reporting, Arctic oil and gas also appears to be an important driver 
of the surge in interest in the region in the past decade. New opportunities for 
mining and shipping are other factors, but one of the major attention grabbers 
from a media point of view has been the potential for major new oil and gas 
resources. This is not a surprise, given that Arctic oil and gas epitomize a range 
of different concerns: business interests from the fossil fuel industry, geopolitical 
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considerations related to energy security, the wish for local economic develop-
ment and jobs, and concerns about the impacts of industrial activities in fragile 
Arctic environments. Stories that fit neatly into recurring narratives of the north, 
such as those related to a race for resources or geopolitical conflicts, are especially 
attractive from a media point of view, as are spectacular events that symbolize 
the clash between incompatible concerns, such as environmentalists’ protesting 
against the activities of oil companies. More complex stories of how oil and gas 
have provided financial power to indigenous peoples are more difficult to fit into 
mediatized events, but are starting to emerge, as are stories about the downside of 
being dependent on income from oil (Johnson, 2015b; MacFarquhar, 2015; see 
also Dale et al., 2018).
While media coverage may influence decision making, it is far from being the 
only factor. In regional international governance, it might not even be the major 
factor. In relation to Arctic oil and gas, the Arctic Council has framed the issue 
quite differently, as a matter of making oil and gas development compatible with 
good environmental management, with no attention paid to the role of fossil fuels 
in global climate change. It is as if the Arctic Council has been able to separate 
the impacts of climate change in the Arctic from a major causative factor that lies 
within reach for decision makers in the Arctic countries—further exploration of 
hydrocarbon resources with the aim of putting additional supplies of fossil fuels 
on the market.
At one level, this lack of attention on the negative role of Arctic fossil fuel 
supplies in combating climate change could appear inevitable—national eco-
nomic and security interests are simply too strong in relation to the perceived 
risks related to climate change. It therefore appears that the potential for regional 
international governance to take on long-term sustainability challenges that col-
lide with short-term national interests is very limited. The perception of the risks 
related to climate change might, of course, change and tip the balance, but given 
the extent of the impacts already observed and the vast knowledge available about 
the dramatic future impacts of Arctic climate change, both globally and locally, 
such a shift in perceptions does not seem likely any time soon. An alternative 
pathway—although still challenging—would be to focus on reducing the strong 
national and economic interests at stake on the supply side. Is there some way to 
make it attractive to keep fossil fuels in the ground for those who have the neces-
sary economic and political power to make such decisions?
Based on developments in the Arctic over the past decade, such a scenario is 
most likely to be guided mainly by how the global market performs and whether 
the profitability of extraction declines to a situation in which new exploration 
ventures are no longer feasible. Such calculations are beyond the direct con-
trol of the Arctic countries. However, specific political decisions about what 
areas are to be opened up for exploration and public investment can also play a 
role, not least in the Arctic where both costs and risks are high. Such decisions 
mainly rest with national-level actors. A regional international governance body 
is unlikely to have any direct influence on either of these potential pathways to a 
post-petroleum future. This lack of formal or genuine capacity to influence raises 
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the question of what role, if any, a regional international governance body might 
play in keeping fossil fuels in the ground. These questions are not relevant only 
to the Arctic, but analysing the specific context of the Arctic case could provide 
some insights into the political challenges involved in a shift to supply-side cli-
mate policies. Given that the issues are global in scope, it is also relevant to ask 
why the Arctic should take a lead and be at the forefront of a major transforma-
tion of the global energy system.
Kartha et al. (2018) has elaborated a framework for determining whose car-
bon should be kept in the ground based on equity considerations. They argue 
that an equitable distribution of the costs of decarbonizing the economy will be 
essential to halt the extraction of coal, oil and gas, and that due attention needs to 
be paid to creating a new foundation for replacing the livelihoods and revenues 
of those who are currently economically dependent on such activities. With the 
right mechanisms in place, they believe that the challenges are not insurmount-
able: ‘In principle, societies could undertake a decarbonization transition in which 
they anticipate the transitional disruption, and cooperate and contribute fairly to 
minimize and alleviate it’ (Kartha et al., 2018: abstract). Further elaborating and 
implementing such a framework would also be a way of avoiding a situation in 
which market forces determine whose carbon should not be extracted, in which 
the most expensive extraction is likely to cease first as the price of oil drops, for 
example, because of declining demand. In such a situation, Arctic communities 
could be particularly vulnerable because the economic base is often narrow and 
their remoteness from global markets and harsh operating conditions make Arctic 
oil and gas relatively more expensive compared to other sources, especially in 
places where the necessary infrastructure has not already been developed.
The ethical considerations in designing a supply-side policy would, accord-
ing to Kartha et al., involve an ‘extractor pays principle’. This is based on the 
insight that the total amount of hydrocarbons that can be extracted is finite if 
agreed climate goals are to be met. Following the principle of common but dif-
ferentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities outlined in the UNFCCC, 
countries that have already extracted fossil fuels would have a greater obligation 
to contribute to a transition away from extraction. However, the agreed reference 
to ‘capabilities’ also means taking account of the respective capacities of different 
societies to bear any burdens involved in curbing extraction and transitioning to 
a low carbon world (Kartha et al., 2018), which in their view means economic, 
institutional and physical capacity. At the national level, it is easy to argue that the 
Arctic countries rank highly in a global comparison of capacity. This is also true 
at the international regional level, where the Arctic Council provides essential 
institutional capacity. Locally and at the subnational level, however, the situation 
varies considerably. Nonetheless, there is no reason to believe that an ‘extractor 
pays’ principle would automatically prioritize all potential extractive activities in 
the Arctic over some other parts of the world.
Thus far, ethical principles have played only a limited role in decisions about 
hydrocarbon extraction. National economic and security interests appear to 
rule, along with global supply and demand, which are in turn influenced by 
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new technologies such as those used in the shale gas revolution. Ethical prin-
ciples are unlikely to trump either of these drivers, even if they are enshrined 
in international conventions. Given the weak history of the Arctic Council in 
addressing the social and environmental costs of extracting fossil fuels and the 
strong national interests at stake, the international regional body is unlikely to 
take a lead on supply-side climate policy.
A politically more feasible way forward would be to focus on increasing the 
capacity to manage a future in which the extraction of fossil fuels in the Arctic 
is no longer economically viable. Such a situation could come about through 
declining global oil prices and an accompanying lack of interest from oil and 
gas companies, regardless of the political decisions made at the national level. It 
could also be fostered by a stronger focus in global climate politics on supply-side 
policies. Lazarus and van Asselt (2018) discuss the potential for various economic 
instruments and regulatory approaches. The latter path might create a more pre-
dictable situation for oil- and gas-dependent economies in the Arctic than the 
former, and may thus be easier in terms of adaptation in both local and national 
contexts.
A focus on increased adaptive capacity is also a context in which the Arctic 
Council could play an important role because of its mission to foster collabora-
tion across national borders. It fits well with insights from recent assessments of 
adaptation action, which initially focused on adaptation to climate change but 
have also highlighted narrow economic structures as critical aspects of vulner-
ability (AMAP, 2017a, 2017b). The Council could also build on the knowledge 
base from circumpolar assessments of human development (Larsen and Fondahl, 
2014), resilience (Arctic Council, 2016) and Arctic economies (Glomsrød et al., 
2015a). Most importantly, building adaptive capacity does not challenge national 
interests in the same way as a focus on national resources. It might, therefore, not 
be as divisive and controversial as raising the supply of fossil fuels as an issue for 
international regional collaboration.
Given the current political situation both internationally and in some countries, 
it might even be politically counterproductive to focus on fossil fuel supply in 
the Arctic Council, as this could threaten international cooperation in its current 
form. The potential gains from a focus on adaptive capacity would include that, 
if it leads to improvements on the ground, it could make people in the Arctic and 
Arctic countries less dependent on income from oil and gas and thus less vulner-
able to a shift away from fossil fuels globally, which is essential to reducing the 
pace and magnitude of climate change. In the longer run, it might also make those 
Arctic countries and communities that are dependent on fossil fuel extraction bet-
ter able to see supply-side climate policies as an opportunity rather than a threat.
Concluding remarks
In international media, the Arctic is often placed in the context of global or 
national narratives, and the local and regional are made news pegs for bigger sto-
ries. Reporting on oil and gas is no exception. Indeed, national interests in Arctic 
104 A post-petroleum region?
fossil fuel resources have played a major role in the media narratives of the past 
decade or more. Recent reporting does highlight some of the local challenges of 
being vulnerable to falls in the oil price, but does not always provide much space 
for local agency. From a local perspective, oil can been seen both as providing 
economic security and welfare and as a source of insecurity, as highlighted in this 
chapter as well as in a new study of northern Norway, Alaska and Greenland after 
the 2014 drop in oil prices (Dale et al., 2018). These discussions about the future 
of petroleum reveal tensions along both spatial and temporal dimensions. In such 
tension fields, it becomes essential to control the narrative. While governance 
of the oil and gas sector remains in the strong grip of national interests, national 
narratives are challenged by the increasing pressure to take global climate change 
concerns into consideration as well as from local desires for self-determination 
in a region with a history of both colonialism and vulnerability to the economic 
volatility of global energy markets.
As for regional governance, strong national interests appear to have kept 
political discussion of limiting the production of fossil fuels off the agenda of 
circumpolar political cooperation. However, the Arctic Council has the poten-
tial to navigate a shift toward a post-petroleum future by supporting increased 
local capacity for dealing with the rapid and dramatic shifts in the global energy 
market that are essential if future increases in global temperature are to be kept 
below dangerous levels. Such support might, at the moment, provide the only 
feasible way forward in a difficult political situation with strong national and 
economic interests at stake, combined with a dire need for international coop-
eration and to create connections between global and local scalar perspectives. 
What the political geography of the Arctic region will look like in the possible 
future scenarios of post-petroleum societies and what strategies will be followed 
in rescaling governance remain to be seen.
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6 Arctic geopolitics in times of 
transformation
On 8 October 2018, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 
issued a report on the consequences of a global temperature rise of 1.5 °C. The 
accompanying press release noted that: ‘Limiting global warming to 1.5 °C would 
require rapid, far-reaching and unprecedented changes in all aspects of society’ 
and that limiting warming ‘could go hand in hand with ensuring a more sustain-
able and equitable society’ (IPCC, 2018a). In the Arctic, warming happens two to 
three times faster than in the rest of the world, and the IPCC report states:
There is high confidence that the probability of a sea-ice-free Arctic Ocean 
during summer is substantially lower at global warming of 1.5°C when com-
pared to 2°C. With 1.5°C of global warming, one sea-ice-free Arctic summer 
is projected per century. This likelihood is increased to at least one per decade 
with 2°C global warming.
(IPCC, 2018b: 10)
Less than two weeks after the IPCC report was published, 2,000 people gath-
ered for the Annual Arctic Circle Assembly in Reykjavik to continue discus-
sions on the ‘challenges and opportunities’ presented by the new Arctic that is 
emerging. The participants came from all over the world, including Asia and the 
Pacific Islands. Iceland’s former president and chair of the Arctic Circle, Ólafur 
Ragnar Grímsson, noted that ‘Our neighborhood has become a global playing 
field’ (Grímsson, 2018). Depledge and Dodds (2017) argue that this annual event 
has become a ‘bazaar’ at which actors that have been marginalized by the for-
mal circumpolar governance of the Arctic Council have a free hand to sell their 
ideas and imaginaries of the Arctic and its future. While the impacts of climate 
change served as an unavoidable context at this meeting, as in previous meetings 
of the Arctic Circle, the focus of the discussion remained more on the Arctic as 
a global space on to which visions of new infrastructure and business opportuni-
ties can be projected. The 2018 Arctic Circle Assembly included several sessions 
about China’s Belt and Road Initiative, as well as a lavish reception funded by 
the Chinese Embassy featuring Chinese stage performers. Japan and the EU also 
attended the assembly for the first time. The Arctic Council had an unassum-
ing stand among other institutional exhibitors. Its voice in plenary sessions was 
Geopolitics in times of transformation 111
limited to a short presentation of the priorities of the upcoming Icelandic Chair, 
which will commence in the spring of 2019.
While, throughout the 2018 Arctic Circle Assembly, the various media were 
mainly represented by specialist journalists who focus on the Arctic, Arctic 
change has occupied an increasingly large mainstream media space over the past 
decade, as discussed in previous chapters. Through news channels and popular 
venues, such as online and mobile platforms, audio-visual exhibitions, literature 
and film, narratives of environmental transformations, geopolitical tensions and 
future scenarios have been digitally mediated and remediated. In this process, 
conceptions of ‘actual’ space in the geographic sense and ‘virtual’ space in the 
mediated sense in the role of geopolitics have shaped each other. According to 
Christensen et al. (2018: 1):
The actual and virtual sites and locales (e.g. museums, electronic media 
space, film, music, archives, etc.) where narrative interventions materialize 
constitute spaces of narrativity. Narrated space (such as ‘the ocean’ in a 
broad, and ‘the Arctic’ or ‘the Ozone layer’ in specific senses) signifies the 
site of environmental transformation.
Events such as the Arctic Circle Assembly demonstrate how realities and 
urgencies present in narrated space and discourses put forth in spaces of narrativ-
ity can merge and collide. As the geographic alterations in the Arctic (i.e. narrated 
space) due to a warming climate affect both the near and the far, the contours 
of narrated space expand to include the presence of new entrants such as Japan, 
China and South Korea. In parallel with this process, the range of spaces of narra-
tivity on to or through which the local and global, corporate and state, and public 
and private imaginaries are projected drastically increase. In each case, the space 
in question both informs and is informed by geopolitics and power interplays.
Media ecologies and Arctic spaces of narrativity
Spaces of narrativity are subject to certain dynamics, and these are rapidly chang-
ing. While mainstream media and certain forms and genres of visuality and 
textuality more easily find central spaces of presence and a wide circulation, oth-
ers such as small-budget or experimental productions and outlets find a voice 
from the margins. As is noted in Chapter 2, in a changing media ecology, integra-
tive perspectives are needed to grasp the dynamic interplays between actual and 
virtual spaces and scales. To return to our discussion in the introductory chapter, 
two notions are especially relevant in the context of the Arctic: disintermediation 
and media ecology. While it has long been speculated that elite gatekeeping will 
disappear and content created horizontally will disintermediate and dwindle the 
role of the mainstream media as the primary political intermediaries, other voices 
have argued that traditional media will retain their significance and influence as 
they feed from and into these alternative outlets (Aday et al., 2013). A perspective 
based on media ecology that takes account of the complexities of such interplays 
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in mediatized environments avoids such binaries as traditional/big versus alter-
native/small media. The media ecology perspective instead conceptualizes the 
media as ‘an environment that surrounds the subjects and models their cogni-
tive and perceptual system’, and the disintermediation perspective ‘looks at the 
interactions between media, as if they were species of an ecosystem’ (Scolari, 
2012: 209–210). Such perspectives go beyond the reductionist understanding of 
the media only as digital forums and make it possible to understand offline forms 
of communication, such as art, music, performativity, activism and orality, within 
that ecology.
In the case of the Arctic, as revealed throughout this book, big-media interest 
is still mostly linked to event-based reporting, and their in-depth, extensive stories 
are often the result of expensive ‘parachute journalism’. While such journalism 
is costly and difficult to offer on a regular basis, the resulting news stories and 
reports can reach a wide audience, especially when remediated via social and 
small media. There has also been a growing diversity in the topics and themes 
of mainstream media reporting about the Arctic, as well as an increasing use by 
international news media of specialized online news sites such as Arctic Today, 
which provide ‘on-site’ and locally contextualized reporting.
Conflicting, cooperating and invisible narratives
Over the past decade, stories about climate change have been interwoven with 
other recurring and sometimes conflicting narratives of the north, such as the race 
for resources, most notably access to offshore oil and gas, the Arctic as an arena 
for potential geopolitical conflict, and the Arctic as a unique environment that 
must be protected from the impacts of industrial development. Meanwhile, Arctic 
states have tried hard to defuse conflicts on respect of both environmental goals 
and competition for resources. The emphasis has been on international coopera-
tion in the region, with the Arctic cast as a zone of peace in a world of increasing 
conflict. The Arctic should be safe.
The emphasis on cooperation and managing potential conflicts within existing 
governance mechanisms has been further underscored by the signing of several 
legally binding agreements, such as when the five Arctic Ocean littoral states—
Canada, Norway, Russia, Denmark and the United States—and the five global 
fishing giants in the northern hemisphere—Iceland, Japan, South Korea, China and 
the European Union—agreed a moratorium on fishing in the Central Arctic Ocean 
in early October 2018 (e.g. Harvey, 2018; Sevunts, 2018). This moratorium did 
not stem from an Arctic Council initiative. It therefore signals something different 
from earlier agreements on search and rescue, oil spill prevention and scientific 
cooperation. Even if these earlier cooperation agreements were not Arctic Council 
agreements per se, since this regional body does not have the power to enter into 
legally binding agreements, they nonetheless placed Arctic regional cooperation 
centre stage. By contrast, the Arctic Ocean fishing moratorium illustrates how 
Arctic governance has become increasingly framed as a global concern. It follows a 
similar logic to the Ilulissat Declaration of 2008 (Arctic Ocean Conference, 2008), 
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where the Arctic littoral states emphasized the UN Convention on the Law of the 
Sea (UNCLOS) as the major governance mechanism for resolving interstate dis-
putes in the Arctic—a premise that has since been widely accepted not just in the 
Arctic but beyond the region.
Another attempt to manage potential conflicts in the Arctic is the empha-
sis in Arctic Council initiatives on preventing pollution and ensuring best 
practices in industrial development. This was evident in the Arctic Council’s 
Kiruna Vision of 2013, which highlighted the notion of ‘a safe Arctic’ (Arctic 
Council, 2013; Nilsson, 2018). In such discussions, states are often framed 
as the most legitimate actors. This is apparent from analyses of discourses 
about sustainability in the Arctic, where Gad and Strandsbjerg (2019) highlight 
‘how nation states and their concerns with economic development take on a 
privileged position’ and that the concept of sustainability is used ‘to recon-
firm states and markets as central identities for the future development of the 
Arctic’. In the process, goal conflicts become ‘a technical problematique’ of 
making the exploitation of natural resources as benign as possible. Meanwhile, 
the conflict between the exploitation of Arctic oil and gas and the need to halt 
global warming by cutting emissions of greenhouse gases is neglected, as dis-
cussed in Chapter 5. Moreover, the narrative leaves no space to talk about the 
geopolitical implications of transforming the Arctic region in a post-petroleum 
future. In media reporting, geopolitical issues are mainly linked to access to 
petroleum resources and there is an implicit assumption that current consump-
tion levels must continue, in stark contrast to the IPCC’s conclusions.
The attempts to reframe potential conflicts between industrial development 
and environmental goals into cooperative ventures on sustainability have not 
been quite as successful as the handling of potential conflicts over rights to 
Arctic resources. One major reason for this is that environmental organizations 
continually work to boost a counter narrative: that industrial development in 
the Arctic, especially the exploitation of oil and gas, could spell disaster for the 
Arctic environment. Their spectacularly staged events, such as the kayak pro-
test in Seattle harbour calling attention to Shell’s activities in the Chukchi Sea 
and the attempt by the Arctic Sunrise to scale Gazprom’s rig in the Kara Sea, 
are designed to get media attention. In the mainstream media, however, these 
stories were covered as ‘events’ and attention usually dissipated once the event 
itself was over. Mainstream media’s coverage of larger environmental events of 
global scale displays the same pattern. For instance, while there were represent-
atives of vulnerable communities, trade unions and Arctic indigenous groups 
present in the front lines of the People’s Climate March in 2014, news reporting 
focused on the size and spectacle and celebrity speeches. Similarly, the voices 
and images of the Saami and other Arctic communities did not feature in inter-
national news during the negotiation of the Paris Agreement in December 2015 
(Christensen et al., 2014; Russell, 2016).
In the shadow of larger conflicts with global dimensions, and despite the 
growing multiplicity of Arctic topics, the stories of social transformations 
in the Arctic in recent years remain underreported by the mainstream media. 
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For the four million people who live in the region, the most important impacts 
of both climate change and growing industrial development are those that are 
felt at the local level and affect daily livelihoods, as well as local and subna-
tional regional economies. Some stories on local impacts fit well within a global 
framing, not least the impacts of warming on indigenous cultures. In such cases, 
indigenous voices are often subsumed into narratives on global environmen-
tal change or victimhood. Other potential news stories do not fit as neatly into 
global narratives. These include the local implications of industrial development, 
whether positive or negative, as seen from a local perspective. These are also the 
stories that do not immediately fit into the oft-repeated mantra: ‘What happens in 
the Arctic doesn’t stay in the Arctic’. Journalists and editors of major mainstream 
media outlets might not see them as newsworthy, given that their readers’ interest 
in the Arctic is steered by the global impacts of changes in the northern polar 
region. Thus, while climatic and economic impacts are felt and narrated glob-
ally, what happens in the locales of the Arctic does stay there unless avenues are 
available for voicing local concerns to broad audiences.
Regional mediation networks
Non-simplistic narration of local life and realities often has difficulties compet-
ing with existing frames and norms for space and visibility in a mediatized social 
landscape. Nonetheless, local stories still have a natural place in local media 
reporting. Until recently, such local media reports were divided by language, 
national context and distribution channels, but the growth of a web-supported 
circumpolar media landscape is changing this picture. As discussed in Chapter 2, 
the sharing of stories across news outlets in different parts of the region is creating 
a setting where journalists and editors specializing in Arctic issues connect these 
stories to each other and into a larger picture. For example, at a panel on Arctic 
journalism at the 2018 Arctic Circle, Eilis Quinn from Eye on the Arctic told the 
audience about how she had placed similar stories about the impacts of mining 
and extraction on reindeer herding and on caribou together on the website, and 
that she worked with the aim of making similar links with other issues. In the pro-
cess, the phenomena become something more than disconnected local conflicts. 
Instead, regional patterns become visible, creating the potential for the sharing of 
experiences across different localities and countries. This speaks to the potential 
power of alliances between small-scale media outlets to create new networks of 
‘comingtogetherness’ for people in the Arctic.
It is possible to compare the new connections that are starting to emerge from 
circumpolar media reporting with a process that began in the scientific assess-
ments of environmental change in the Arctic carried out by the working groups 
of the Arctic Council and its predecessor the Arctic Environmental Protection 
Strategy. Such assessments put insights from national observations and stud-
ies into a circumpolar context and created a new understanding of the Arctic as 
a region. One specific example is how the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment 
mapped local observations of the impacts of climate change by indigenous people 
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onto a circumpolar picture in order to create a new and convincing story about cli-
mate change being real in the here and now (Huntington and Fox, 2005: 68–69). 
Over the years, such coordination has created a picture of a region where the 
impacts of human activities on the environment cannot be ignored. These include 
the impacts not only of climate change, but also of long-range pollution, and they 
have framed the Arctic as part of a global environmental change context rather 
than an exceptional and pristine region.
In recent decades, circumpolar scientific networks have grown to now include 
a range of disciplines as well as major efforts to produce interdisciplinary work. 
This growth has been supported partly by the Arctic Council and its assessments, 
but also by scientific organizations such as the International Arctic Science 
Committee (IASC) and the International Arctic Social Science Association 
(IASSA), as well as by initiatives such as the International Polar Year 2007–
2008 and the recurrent strategic planning of Arctic research by the International 
Conference on Arctic Research Planning (ICARP). In 2017, the legal agreement 
on scientific cooperation in the Arctic provided further institutional support for a 
circumpolar perspective on Arctic research.
The regional and local media networks that are now emerging involve fewer 
people and lack formal institutional support. Their activities have, at times, also 
been circumscribed by economic challenges or by the political will to suppress 
certain discourses. They are, nonetheless, part and parcel of the circumpolar civil 
society community that has emerged during the recent decades of circumpolar 
state cooperation in the Arctic Council. Together with similar networks based on 
myriad scientific collaborations along with the formal and informal networks that 
now connect indigenous peoples across the Arctic, they represent a circumpolar 
society that is independent of formal political cooperation. These networks have 
also created the basis for a regional Arctic communicative realm that might not be 
immediately recognizable as geopolitical because they have lesser presence and 
influence in formal international politics, but nonetheless have geopolitical impli-
cations. Their potential power lies more in the extent to which they will be able 
to influence overarching mediations of the region and its futures than in formal 
power in international regimes.
Transformation challenges
In the coming years, people living in the Arctic will face many challenges that 
will require open and candid discussion about both immediate and long-term 
consequences. Some of these issues are linked to political decisions at the local, 
national and circumpolar levels but many will be influenced by global develop-
ments, including climate change and shifts in the markets for raw material and 
energy resources. As the IPCC has emphasized, the need to limit global warming 
requires ‘rapid, far-reaching and unprecedented changes in all aspects of soci-
ety’ (IPCC, 2018a). The implications for the Arctic go beyond shifting to greener 
technologies to meet local energy needs, which may be comparatively easy, given 
the new technologies that are now emerging and the local benefits of cheaper 
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and more reliable energy sources. Much more challenging will be how the global 
shifts that are necessary will affect the demand for Arctic resources.
For communities and countries that are currently dependent on income from 
oil and gas, the necessary shift will require diversification of the economy. In 
areas with the potential for renewable energy in the form of wind power or hydro-
power, conflicts over land use are already an issue. At the Arctic Circle Assembly 
in 2018, indigenous peoples voiced concerns that, once again, they would be 
forced to carry a disproportionate burden of a global challenge (Schreiber, 2018). 
Communities and countries where mining is economically important might also 
face the consequences of shifts in global demand, including a potential push for 
new mines to access minerals that are important to the green technologies. In the 
wake of such increasing demand, there is likely to be increased competition for 
land. Furthermore, even if efforts to radically halt global emissions of greenhouse 
gases are successful, Arctic warming will continue for some time. There is thus 
also a need for adaptation to new climate conditions and to share knowledge and 
experience of how to best navigate the new situation.
Media with a circumpolar reach could potentially play an important role 
in supporting networks and knowledge-sharing across the Arctic. However, 
there are major risks that media will not be able to fulfil this potential. These 
include political tensions that prevent various media from working freely as well 
as the economic vulnerability that affects what reporters and media organiza-
tions can do, even when ambitions are high. Furthermore, the fragmentation of 
the media landscape, narrowcasting and the growth of social media that cater 
only to specific groups complicates the picture, as does mistrust of established 
media channels. Fragmentation and lack of trust have geopolitical implications 
if diverging discourses are pitched against each other to fuel or escalate con-
flicts rather than help resolve disagreements. Furthermore, the lack of nuance 
and space for criticism increases the risk that recurring global and national nar-
ratives will maintain their hegemony and leave little space for the discussion of 
alternative futures based on local aspirations and priorities.
Complex geopolitics
In formal regional cooperation, the Arctic Council continues to function despite 
political differences between the Arctic states. Adherence to applying UNCLOS 
norms to resolve potential conflicts in the Arctic has the support of Arctic and 
non-Arctic states alike, despite the reluctance of the United States to ratify it. 
Nonetheless, while discourses and displays of cooperation and peace continue to 
define the region, growing military presence raises concerns about darker sides 
of geopolitics (Wezeman, 2016). These include Russian military activities in the 
Arctic, combined with Russia’s strong economic and geostrategic interests, which 
have both regional and global implications. In addition, while NATO does not 
have a unified strategy for the Arctic, a NATO military exercise in Norway in 
October and November 2018—Trident Junction—de facto involved the Arctic. 
Trident Junction is the largest NATO exercise in decades and the first one north of 
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the Arctic Circle in three decades. While NATO maintains that this activity is not 
meant as a military threat to Russia, it was partly a response to Russia’s increased 
submarine presence in the region. The Trident Junction exercise has been heavily 
mediated in international news, which warrants a reflection on the geo and politics 
in geopolitics.
Understandings of the role of geopolitics in international dynamics have oscil-
lated between classical and critical schools of the discipline, and Arctic change in 
combination with how the region is narrated provides fertile ground for compar-
ing and contrasting the different schools (Eklund and van der Watt, 2017; Wegge 
and Keil, 2018). Furthermore, these trends highlight a need to understand the role 
of media and mediation, including the dialectical relationship between the discur-
sive realm and materiality. As discussed in Chapter 2, a conception of mediation 
that construes the media beyond discourse and representation and places centre 
stage the materialities of media presence and connectivity would alleviate the 
rift between the theoretical dichotomies of hard and soft power. In this context, 
geoeconomic relations and how they intertwine with the increased globaliza-
tion in finance, economy, political and cultural domains become important. In 
the Arctic, the supremacy of an economic focus is most visible. While climate 
change and its regional and global consequences occupy a large space in both 
political and media discourses, forums such as the Arctic Circle, Arctic Frontiers 
and the Arctic Economic Council are home to convergent and contested business 
ideas and ideals involving the Arctic and its resources. In such discourses, climate 
change is discussed in relation to opportunities more than threats. An important 
step in harnessing these opportunities is support of new infrastructure, including 
communication infrastructures that will inevitably influence the Arctic at various 
levels, including the mediation of various discourses and their reach.
What define the geopolitics of the Arctic today are the dynamic interac-
tions of social, environmental and technological systems and how these affect 
discourse formation and narratives. While military and political presence and dis-
plays of power have implications that extend beyond the region to potentially 
include non-Arctic powers and their interests, discourses that emphasize justice 
and environmental violence, as highlighted by post-structuralist conceptions of 
geopolitics (critical geopolitics, popular geopolitics, feminist geopolitics), trav-
erse the region across scales through mediated circuits. The increased fibre optic 
connectivity of the region as well as the emergence of regional and local media 
outlets and alliances thus complement and have the potential to challenge global, 
often reductionist, mediations of the Arctic. While local and regional voices and 
their international political impact might not today be at the level where they can 
powerfully impact the future of the Arctic, increased connectivity brings with it 
some promise and hope of more nuance.
Concluding remarks
There are limits to the potential for regional international governance in cases 
where strong state interests are at stake. When challenged by uncertainty because 
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of the impacts of climate change and the growing interest from actors outside the 
region, the framing of the region has shifted from a circumpolar focus to a com-
bination of reasserted state interests and new assertions of the Arctic as a global 
space. In this process, local voices have had difficulties projecting their concerns. 
However, the period of peaceful cooperation in the Arctic over the past three dec-
ades has created civil society and media networks across national borders in the 
region, including connections among indigenous peoples and among researchers. 
Collaboration across local media outlets and their growing significance in larger 
media ecologies can give local stories circumpolar and global reach, and increase 
the potential for more nuanced narration of the Arctic. In a geoeconomic and geo-
political context of contested spaces and futures, the ‘regional’ no longer resides 
in specific governance mechanisms but in social networks enabled by increased 
communications capacities and power to influence.
As discussed throughout this volume, multiple factors shape both the material 
and discursive dimensions of regions, providing an exceptional opportunity to 
rethink the role of geography in politics. According to classical geopolitics, material 
conditions and physical geography reign supreme in influencing state power and 
status in international relations and politics. By contrast, critical accounts of geo-
politics challenge the determinism inherent in a focus on physical geography and 
place centre stage the role of discursive and cultural factors. One lesson from the 
analysis in this book is that discourses, physical geographies and other materialities, 
such as infrastructure, interact in a dynamic manner. A second lesson is linked to the 
continuing expansion of infrastructure and communication networks in the region. 
These economically and politically driven investments have supported the emer-
gence of regional, small-scale media capacity to communicate local voices globally, 
voices and visions that were previously missing from the geopolitical scene. Added 
to this are other forms of discursive interventions such as films and art that convey 
messages and visions about the localities in the Arctic, thanks to reduced production 
and circulation costs in the current media ecology. While the visible and envis-
aged impacts of climate change remain a major driver of Arctic geopolitics, with 
new actors, new interests and new concerns, in addition to Arctic states that have 
increased stakes both commercially and in relation to military and security issues, 
the role of communication infrastructure and networks should not be underesti-
mated in influencing future visions and priorities. Geography and space matter in 
actual and virtual terms as the Arctic continues to transform.
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